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Summary 
 
 
This Thesis consists of three chapters examining the interaction and comovement between different 
financial assets in terms of their price, liquidity and volatility, and analysing the impact of the central 
bank's monetary policy stance on this interaction. 
The interaction of the Stock, Bond and CDS markets: An empirical analysis examines the 
price co-movements between the stock, bond, and CDS markets finding differences in the timing with 
which information is reflected in these asset-markets. It further identifies the factors that generate 
order flow in these markets focusing on the instruments controlled closely by the central bank. The 
examination of those instruments includes a comparison between standard and non-standard monetary 
policy measures and the identification of the monetary transmission channel. 
Sovereign Bond and CDS Market Liquidity. Arbitrage Activities and Central Bank 
Interventions analyses the joint dynamics of sovereign bond and CDS market liquidity taking into 
account the no-arbitrage relationship between them, i.e., the CDS-bond basis, and provides evidence 
of asymmetric liquidity interaction between the two asset-markets. The examination of central bank 
interventions and regulatory changes reveals that the ECB's open market purchases and the EU's 
naked CDS ban managed to limit the mispricing in the sovereign bond and CDS markets and 
improved the bond-CDS liquidity interaction. 
Volatility and Integration in the European Sovereign Bond and CDS Markets studies the 
strength and direction of volatility linkages between European sovereign bond yields and CDS 
spreads and assesses whether volatility linkages lead to stronger cross-asset integration. The analysis 
points to the existence of two blocs within the EMU according to the level of bond-CDS integration, a 
level which in the EMU South is inversely related to the CDS-bond basis. It additionally lends support 
to the implementation of  non-standard monetary policy measures, since an easing in the ECB's policy 
stance improves the level of cross-asset integration. 
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1. Introduction 
In the present Thesis I examine the interaction between financial markets and I assess the 
effectiveness of central banks in affecting this interaction. My research evolves across two parallel but 
closely connected fronts, that of financial asset-market comovement on the one hand, and that of 
monetary policy on the other. On the first front, I analyze the comovement and interaction between 
different financial asset-markets by considering three forms of interaction, namely price, liquidity, and 
volatility. The analysis of these forms is empirically analyzed within the context of three different 
chapters, however as these chapters (Sections 3-5) and Literature Review (Section 2) reveal, all three 
types are strongly interrelated. On the second front, I consider the role of monetary policy in affecting 
this interaction by attributing particular attention to the recent non-standard policies adopted by 
central banks following the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. The 
role of monetary policy is considered in each of the three empirical chapters of the Thesis. 
The objective of Section 1 is to introduce the reader to the subject of the present Thesis and 
the reasons for its examination. To this end, in the remainder of the Introduction I briefly discuss the 
importance of the issue of financial asset-market interaction as well as that of monetary policy 
(Sections 1.1 and 1.2) and I present an outline of the objective and results of the analysis conducted in 
each of the empirical chapters of this Thesis (Section 1.3). Since this Thesis is concerned with the 
policy response to the recent financial and European sovereign debt crises I further incorporate a 
discussion (Section 1.3) of the differences between the two crises. 
 
1.1 Financial Asset-Market Comovement 
The intertemporal comovement and interaction between financial asset-markets constitute important 
features of the financial market framework and therefore have captured the interest and attention of a 
number of different market participants: government agencies for regulatory purposes, private and 
institutional investors for trading and hedging against credit risk, banks and financial institutions for 
setting capital requirements. The identification of the nature of the joint dynamics between financial 
assets is of paramount importance to policy makers and financial regulators who monitor the 
12 
 
interaction and correlation between different markets in order to allocate efficiently risk in the 
financial system and minimize the likelihood of a systemic crisis occurring. This is due to the 
potential repercussions of financial asset comovement on financial stability. In the case of a negative 
shock occurring within or transmitting to the financial system, investors proceed to the sale of the 
same assets simultaneously, thereby resulting in heightened volatility.  
In this respect, stronger (positive) correlations between financial assets can be attributed to a 
form of herding behaviour. This behaviour causes diversification to be less profitable and thus 
investors might be induced to assume positions of a higher risk, which above a certain point might 
become excessive. The end result is a surge in financial market risk, which can further contribute to 
the outbreak of financial crises. Along the same lines, private and institutional investors manage 
portfolios and/or leverage diversified positions that depend on price data from a number of distinctive 
assets and are thus, affected by the degree and the nature of correlations and linkages between those 
assets. In addition, financial institutions incorporate information on the transfer of risk between 
different assets when pricing structured products that are subject to the interaction of different 
markets. Thus, the exact identification and constant monitoring of correlations across a broad 
spectrum of financial assets, is essential for containing systemic risk and enabling the efficient 
allocation - and diversification - of funds across financial markets.  
From a central banking perspective, although the focus of central banks is mainly attributed to 
price stability, the global financial crisis combined with the Eurozone crisis, has shifted this focus 
towards the (extreme) financial market developments during the crises periods. This amendment in 
the objectives of central banks assigns macroprudential policy a crucial role in ensuring systemic 
resilience and deterring financial market crashes. The revision in central bank thinking and practice is 
further discussed in Section 1.2 below. 
 
1.2 Monetary Policy 
In addition to the examination of the interaction between financial asset-markets, central in my 
analysis in the present Thesis is the role of monetary policy, and in specific that of non-standard 
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monetary policy. The consideration of the role of monetary policy is due to the fact that although  
monetary policy is conducted in terms of variables/objectives that the central bank monitors closely, 
such as the level of output, employment and inflation, 
‘‘the influence of monetary policy instruments on these variables is at best indirect. The most 
direct and immediate effects of monetary policy actions, such as changes in the Federal funds rate, 
are on the financial markets; by affecting asset prices and returns, policymakers try to modify 
economic behaviour in ways that will help to achieve their ultimate objectives’’  
(Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) 
This importance of monetary policy, and especially of non-standard monetary policy is further 
enhanced by the recent financial and European sovereign debt crises. The evolution and the intensity 
of these crises have created new challenges for monetary policy makers in both Europe and the US, 
which extend beyond the realm of standard theory of monetary policy. Monetary policy is normally 
conducted in terms of an operating target for the short-term nominal interest rate, i.e., the Federal 
funds rate in the case of the Federal Reserve, or via the discount rate, i.e., the rate on main refinancing 
operations (MRO) in the case of the European Central Bank.1 However, as an initial response to these 
crises, central banks in major economies drastically reduced their base interest rates to near or zero 
level (zero lower bound). This reduction was further extended to levels below zero thereafter. Since, 
the support of the economy through traditional measures was no longer feasible, central banks 
resorted to measures of non-standard monetary policy. 2 
To this end, the main challenge as well as alternative approach for the current and future 
conduct of monetary policy pertains to the optimum size of the central bank's balance sheet. As 
evidenced in Figure 1.1 the Fed's balance sheet expanded from $900billion in the summer of 2008 to 
over $2.2trillion in the fall of 2008. This increase in the size of the central banks' balances sheet was 
driven by an increase in the reserves that depository institutions hold with the central bank (also 
                                                            
1 See Mishkin (2001), Curdia and Woodford (2011). The equivalent of the Federal funds rate in Europe is the 
EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average), although officially the ECB does not target the interest rate.  
2 A description of the measures of non-standard monetary policy is provided in Section 2.6.1. 
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termed bank reserves), which increased from $10billion in March 2008 to over $900billion in April 
2009. This surge has consequently led some commentators to suggest that the main interest of US 
monetary policy has changed, from a policy of targeting interest rates to one termed as ‘‘quantitative 
easing’’ (Curdia and Woodford, 2011). From a similar perspective the ECB's balance sheet grew from 
€2.0trillion in the beginning of 2010 to almost €3.0trillion in late 2011, with excess reserves (the 
current account holdings of banks with the ECB in excess of required reserves) surging from less than 
€100billion in the summer of 2011 to over €800billion in the spring of 2012. 
Figure 1.1 
Total Assets of Federal Reserve and European Central Bank 
 
 
                         Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
 
                       Source: Statistical Data Warehouse 
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This shift in central bank thinking and policy raises the issue of whether the supply of bank 
reserves (or perhaps the monetary base) should be considered as an alternative or even superior 
operating target for monetary policy (Curdia and Woodford, 2011). It further raises the issue of 
whether in periods where interest rates are at the zero lower bound - as is the case in the US since 
December 2008 or in Europe since November 2013 - the amount of bank reserves should constitute 
the only important monetary policy decision (Mishkin, 2009; Curdia and Woodford, 2011). For all 
those reasons, in the present Thesis I pay particular focus on the recent policies of quantitative easing 
implemented by the Fed and the ECB. Within this framework, I examine measures of bank reserves 
vis-à-vis measures of interest rates in terms of their effectiveness to exert an impact on financial asset-
markets.  
 
1.3 The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis 
Pivotal in the empirical analysis of the present Thesis is the examination of the policies adopted by the 
central banks as a response to the two major financial crises of the 21st century, namely the 2007-
2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, alternatively Eurozone crisis. For that 
reason, the terms ‘‘global financial crisis’’  and ‘‘European sovereign debt crisis’’ are often 
mentioned throughout the Thesis. Although the two crises share certain similarities - since the 
financial crisis created the financial and economic conditions for the evolution of the Eurozone crisis - 
every crisis is distinct with regards to the causes that led to its development. The 2007-2008 financial 
crisis refers to the US subprime mortgage crisis which subsequently led to the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 and the development of a banking crisis at the global level. This crisis 
was triggered by the US housing bubble and the way with which US banks evaded regulatory capital 
requirements. The repackaging of mortgages into mortgage‐backed securities, enabled banks to 
reduce the amount of capital required against their loans, thereby increasing their ability to make 
loans many‐fold; the end result was the concentration of mortgage default risk in those banks, which 
render them insolvent at the time of the housing bubble burst (Acharya et al., 2009).  
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The US-originated crisis and the resulting global financial shocks led to the evolution of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Due to these shocks, cross-border financial flows dried up from the 
end of 2008 onwards, as investors repatriated funds to home markets and reassessed their exposure to 
the euro area countries (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). This process disproportionately affected 
countries with the greatest reliance on external funding and short-term debt, especially those with 
weak fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (Lane, 
2012). These problems were magnified by the bailouts of those countries' banking sectors and the 
inadequate fiscal measures as a response to the slowing economic activity in the post-2007 period. 
The event that triggered the Eurozone crisis however was Greece's upward deficit revision in late 
October 2009, which led to a financing package of 110€ billion and supporting economic policies as 
part of the respective country's agreement on an economic adjustment programme in May 2010 with 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 
concerns about the solvency of not only Greece, but of all the debt-laden euro area countries 
intensified, thus leading to the adoption of fiscal consolidation programmes in many euro area 
countries and the resort to non-standard monetary policies on the part of the ECB. The Greek debt-
restructuring in March 2012, the largest one in the history of sovereign defaults further marked the 
2010-2012 period which constituted the worst phase of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
1.4 Outline of the Empirical Chapters 
In the first empirical chapter of the Thesis (Chapter I) which is titled The interaction of the Stock, 
Bond and CDS markets: An empirical analysis, I examine the interaction between the stock, bond and 
CDS markets by employing a number of market indices in Europe and the US. The examination is 
important in light of the immense growth of index trading associated with index mutual funds and 
exchange-traded funds and the consequent popularity of value-weighted and/or index portfolios 
(Bhattacharya and Galpin, 2011). In addition, this growth has resulted in an increase in systematic 
liquidity and systematic risk (Kamara et al., 2008) and in the efficiency of price information (Chordia 
et al., 2011). Therefore, I assess whether the surge in index trading and passive investment strategies 
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is associated with enhanced information transmission between the stock, bond, and CDS markets, or 
information is instead reflected in one market and then transmitted to the rest, thereby giving rise to 
lead-lag relationships. 
However, the recent financial and European sovereign debt crises have redefined the role of 
central banks; in addition to their inflation mandate, they assumed the role of preserving financial 
stability. This is because asset price crashes can be severe in the event where central banks either 
remain passive (unresponsive) or when actively reinforce deflationary pressures. For this reason, I 
examine the success of central banks in affecting financial markets by attributing particular focus on 
non-standard measures of monetary policy and the associated expansion of the central banks' balance 
sheets. Since the Fed is the first central bank to adopt quantitative easing following a major crisis (i.e., 
the 2007-2008 US credit crunch) I compare the impact of its policy on the domestic financial markets 
relative to the ECB which resorted to non-standard policies to a lesser extent and only after the 
escalation of the Eurozone crisis. 
I contribute to the literature by examining this interaction at the market level. This enables me 
to: a) put to the test the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of comovement according 
to which market indices are disassociated from underlying fundamentals thereby giving rise to 
differences in the information transmission and b) address the fact that movements in single-name 
securities are subject to both idiosyncratic and systematic risk. By shifting the examination from the 
firm- to the market-level I segregate the systematic risk from the idiosyncratic and focus only on the 
former. That way I prevent certain idiosyncrasies, such as asymmetric information and insider trading 
problems, from distorting the timing and magnitude of the cross-asset flow of information. 
I additionally contribute on the issue of monetary policy and in particular of the ability of 
non-standard monetary policy tools in affecting financial markets under certain conditions. These 
conditions refer to periods of financial market disruption where in addition, the interest rate is at the 
zero lower bound and thus the central bank is deprived of its main monetary policy tool. In this 
respect, I shed light on the debate about the role of central banks for ensuring financial stability during 
extraordinary economic periods. On the one hand, traditional Keynesian approaches suggest the 
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ineffectiveness of non-standard monetary policy measures during financial crises, however more 
recent studies (e.g., Mishkin, 2009; Curdia and Woodford, 2011) advocate a greater role for the 
expansion of the central bank's balance sheet through asset purchases. 
By constructing measures that reflect exogenous variations of the central bank's policy stance 
I ease concerns about the endogeneity between central bank measures and financial market 
conditions. I alleviate the remaining concerns by considering a vector autoregression (VAR) that a 
priori assumes the simultaneous interaction of the monetary policy and financial market variables. 
Furthermore, the identification of the VAR with sign restrictions enables me to determine the asset 
that acts as the main channel for the transmission of the non-standard measures to financial markets.  
Through my analysis I confirm the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of co-
movement, since I find differences in the timing of the information transmission across the stock, 
bond and CDS markets. These differences are more evident in Europe before the financial crisis, and 
in the US after the crisis, where information about fundamentals is reflected first in the stock index 
and then transmitted to the bond and CDS indices. My results further lend support to the Fed's non-
standard monetary policy measures. In particular, I show that measures of the Fed's policy stance 
induce greater movements in the US indices after the crisis compared to the impact exerted by 
measures of the ECB's stance on the European indices. Among those measures I distinguish measures 
of bank reserves held with the central bank, thereby providing a rationale for the expansion of the 
Fed's balance sheet as an instrument of US monetary policy. 
The examination of the price comovement and interaction in the first empirical chapter is 
succeeded by the examination of the other major type of cross-asset interaction, that of liquidity, 
which is the focus of the analysis conducted in the second empirical chapter (Chapter II), titled 
Sovereign Bond and CDS Market Liquidity. Arbitrage Activities and Central Bank Interventions. To 
examine the issue of cross-asset liquidity interaction I consider the sovereign bond and CDS markets 
since the respective asset-markets have been in the core of the liquidity dry-up in the European 
sovereign financial markets during the Eurozone crisis. In addition, under the Basel III regulatory 
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framework government bonds and derivative contracts are eligible as ‘‘high-quality liquid assets’’ to 
be held by banks in order to protect from liquidity shocks and systemic liquidity crises.  
Being a cash asset and a derivative contract respectively, the bonds and the CDS are linked 
via a no-arbitrage relationship, namely the CDS-bond basis, which is the difference between the CDS 
spread and the credit spread on the bond and is theoretically expected to guarantee the comovement 
between the two asset-markets. Acknowledging the role played by the CDS-bond basis for the pricing 
and dynamics of sovereign bonds and CDSs, I further assess how the CDS-bond basis affects the 
bond-CDS liquidity interaction and whether it drives the two asset-markets towards or away from 
their equilibrium price.  
Sovereign bonds and CDSs have further constituted the target of an unprecedented series of 
central bank interventions within the European context, while government bonds have been the target 
of the second round of the Fed's quantitative easing programme. Therefore, I examine the ability of 
the central banks in Europe and the US to affect the liquidity of the sovereign bond and CDS markets 
and whether non-standard monetary policy measures are able to restore the equilibrium relationship 
between the two assets, as reflected in the level of the CDS-bond basis. 
The examination is additionally necessitated by the speculative attacks via the CDS market 
that aimed at elevating the yields on the government bonds of the debt-laden countries of the EMU 
South. These attacks brought about the EU's regulatory response which was materialized in the form 
of a ban on the trading of naked CDS contracts, which was however challenged by the International 
Monetary Fund on the grounds that the ban is detrimental to the liquidity of the sovereign bond 
market. Given this change in regulation as well as the arguments against it, I analyze the impact of 
sovereign CDS market liquidity on the liquidity of the sovereign bond market following the ban.  
My contribution is three-fold: First, by examining the liquidity interaction between assets 
linked by arbitrage I show that deviations from their equilibrium price are important drivers of 
liquidity dynamics and vice versa. The consideration of the CDS-bond basis further enables me to 
identify which of the two assets acts as a limit to arbitrage. Second, I analyze the effect of central 
bank interventions and most importantly that of non-standard monetary policy measures that targeted 
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specifically the two asset-markets, such as the asset purchase programmes implemented through the 
ECB's Securities Markets Programme and the Fed's second round of quantitative easing. Third, the 
EU's decision to ban the naked CDS trading acts as a natural experiment that allows me to empirically 
evaluate whether falling sovereign CDS liquidity exerts a negative impact on the liquidity of the 
sovereign bond market during the post-ban period. 
My results suggest that sovereign bond liquidity drives sovereign CDS liquidity, especially in 
the countries of the EMU North. I further find that bond illiquidity is the major driver of the 
deviations from the bond-CDS equilibrium price, thereby supporting the arguments about the most 
illiquid asset acting as a limit to arbitrage (see Roll et al., 2007; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011; 
Nashikkar et al., 2011). I also provide evidence that the ECB and Fed interventions affected the bond-
CDS liquidity dynamics and relieved the pressure on the CDS-bond basis exerted by bond illiquidity, 
a result consistent with the theoretical predictions of the preferred habitat theory. Contrary to Beber 
and Pagano's (2013) predictions I support the EU's decision to adopt the naked CDS ban, since in the 
period following the ban a deterioration in the CDS liquidity improves liquidity in the bond market. 
Following the examination of price and liquidity interaction in the first two empirical 
chapters, in the third empirical chapter (Chapter III) I focus on the issue of financial asset-market 
volatility and integration. The chapter is titled Volatility and Integration in the European Sovereign 
Bond and CDS Markets and I calculate the dynamic bilateral volatility spillovers between the 
European sovereign bond and CDS markets during the 2007-2014 period. I conduct the examination 
within the European context since the severe tensions and negative spillovers observed between and 
across the respective asset-markets during the Eurozone crisis are crucial from the perspective of 
macroprudential policy implementation and the minimization of systemic risk. Due to the importance 
of financial market integration for the transmission of monetary policy - particularly within the 
confines of a monetary union - I further analyze the extent to which the stance of the ECB's monetary 
policy and the process towards monetary integration affects the degree of sovereign bond-CDS 
integration. 
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My contribution concerns the nature of the examination itself: considering the theoretical 
arguments that asset volatility constitutes the primary driver of asset integration, I empirically 
investigate whether an increase in the volatility spillover between the bond and CDS markets in each 
Eurozone country is associated with an increase in the level of integration between the two asset 
markets, as reflected in the level of their conditional correlation. In addition, bond and CDS contracts 
are linked by an equilibrium relationship which is conditional on the level of the bond-CDS 
conditional correlation. Therefore, I conduct the first empirical examination of the link between asset 
integration and asset equilibrium relationship, and assess whether a rise in bond-CDS correlation 
drives the two assets close or away from their equilibrium relationship, thereby eliminating or giving 
rise to arbitrage opportunities. 
I further contribute at the methodological front. In particular I consider a generalized vector 
autoregression model augmented with common factors that allows me to a) identify the impact of 
domestic and foreign shocks to sovereign bond and CDS markets while acknowledging their 
endogenous nature and b) take into account the asymmetric size of these shocks. By recursively  
estimating the model I calculate the dynamic cross- and intra-market volatility linkages' throughout 
the total of the examination period and I identify breaks in those linkages' evolution. I additionally 
differentiate in the field of asset integration by modelling the conditional correlation between the bond 
and CDS markets - which is a measure of the level of bond-CDS integration - through an asymmetric 
generalized DCC GARCH. Compared to traditional GARCH approaches, I capture the dynamic and 
time-varying nature of the bond-CDS relationship. I further address the phenomenon of “asymmetric 
volatility” where financial asset volatility increases more following a negative rather than a positive 
shock of the same magnitude. These features are in turn particularly relevant when considering the 
negative financial and fiscal shocks that have occurred during the European sovereign debt crisis.  
My results indicate a unidirectional volatility spillover from the sovereign bond to the CDS 
market in all EMU countries. Along these lines, Germany qualifies as the main transmitter of bond 
volatility to the CDS markets of the Eurozone core, while Ireland and Italy emerge as significant bond 
and CDS volatility contributors to the rest of the European CDS markets. When I proceed to the 
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asymmetric generalized DCC GARCH analysis I find that an increase in the level of bond-CDS 
integration in each of the countries of the EMU South coincides with an increase in the bond-CDS 
volatility spillover in the same countries. Therefore, I support the theoretical arguments about 
volatility being a major driver of cross-asset correlation (see Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016). I further 
identify two blocs across the Eurozone, in terms of their level of bond-CDS integration: the EMU 
South where integration has strengthened after the Lehman Brothers collapse (late 2008), and the rest 
of the EMU where it has followed the reverse track. By including the CDS-bond basis in my analysis 
I document an inverse relationship between bond-CDS integration and the CDS-bond basis in the 
EMU South and Belgium. Lastly, I point to the ability of the ECB to affect integration between the 
European sovereign bond and CDS markets since I provide evidence that expansionary monetary 
policy exerts a strong and positive impact on the level of bond-CDS integration.  
The Thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the most pertinent studies and presents 
the theoretical framework governing the empirical examination. The empirical analysis is comprised 
of Chapters I, II and III and is presented in Sections 3-5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Section 2 provides the most relevant studies with regards to the issue of asset comovement and the 
role of monetary policy. The aim of this Section is not to provide an exhaustive literature review but 
rather present the most important and influential studies that are required for the effective 
understanding of the subsequent empirical chapters in Sections 3-5. The literature review begins by 
presenting the fundamental theories that underlie the issue of market comovement, namely the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of 
comovement. According to these contrasting theories, comovement in financial assets either reflects 
comovement in the underlying fundamentals (Efficient Market Hypothesis), or is delinked from shifts 
in their underlying fundamentals (‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of comovement).  
After the presentation of the theories that analyze the nature and extent of the assets' 
dependence on underlying fundamentals, follows a discussion of the channels of the information 
transmission between assets. Particular focus is attributed to the channels of liquidity and volatility, 
which according to studies at both the theoretical and empirical front, emerge as the main factors for 
asset comovement and interaction. Since prominent in the present Thesis is the examination of the 
interaction between bonds and CDS contracts, an additional factor as well as channel that affects 
those assets' interaction is their equilibrium relationship, i.e., the CDS-bond basis. To this end the 
discussion is extended in order to present all relevant studies on this theoretical equivalence between 
the CDS contract and the underlying bond, and also on the overall issue of bond-CDS interaction.  
The final part of this Section presents the theoretical foundations of the link between asset 
prices and monetary policy. It further analyzes the rationale for central banks to incorporate asset 
prices in their formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Since the focus of the present 
Thesis is on the impact of non-standard monetary policy measures, the discussion involves a brief 
description of those measures and provides an overview of the main studies examining the impact of 
those measures on financial asset-markets.  
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2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis and the ‘‘Friction-based’’ and ‘‘Sentiment-based’’ 
Theories of Comovement  
The proposition that constitutes the cornerstone of modern financial theory is the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, further known as the Random Walk Theory. This proposition has been applied 
extensively to theoretical and empirical studies of financial asset prices as well as fundamental 
insights into the price discovery process and asset comovement. Owing its existence to the work of 
Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965a; 1965b), the Efficient Market Hypothesis maintains that asset 
prices reflect all publicly available information. To this end, within the context of an information-
efficient market any changes in the prices of financial assets must not be predictable if they fully 
incorporate the information and expectations of all market participants (Samuelson, 1965). The best 
way to understand this proposition is perhaps through an old joke frequently told among economists, 
according to which an economist is walking down the road along with companion; when seeing a 
$100 bill on the ground and the companion reaches down to pick it up, the economist says “Don't 
bother - if it were a genuine $100 bill someone would have already pick it up” (Lo, 2004). This 
example although accurately describing the logic underlying the EMH, i.e., the incorporation of  all 
pertinent information in an asset's price (e.g., the $100 bill left laying on the ground), at the same time 
reveals its primary weakness: the counterfactual assumption with regards to human behaviour, namely 
rationality (ibid). Since Roberts (1967), it has been customary to distinguish between three types of 
market efficiency, each corresponding to three different types of information sets: 
1) The weak form of Efficient Market Hypothesis which maintains that asset prices fully 
reflect the information contained in the historical sequence of prices. 
2) The semi-strong form of EMH which maintains that in addition to historical price 
information, asset prices reflect all publicly available information pertinent to the respective asset. 
3) The strong form of EMH which maintains that all information, whether publicly available 
or private, is known to any market participant and fully reflected in asset prices. 
 Hence, the more efficient the market is, the more random and therefore unforecastable the 
sequence of asset price changes generated within the respective market. This is due to the presence of 
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active market participants, who in their search for profits exploit all relevant information at their 
disposal, thus incorporating this information into market prices and instantly eliminating potential 
profit opportunities that were existent upon the initiation of the market participants' trades. The 
instantaneous occurrence of this trading pattern in a world of frictionless markets, rational investors 
and no trading costs, guarantees in turn that asset prices always reflect all available information 
(Malkiel, 2003). A direct corollary of the EMH is the traditional theory of price comovement, 
according to which comovement in prices reflects comovement in fundamental values (Barberis et al., 
2005). Since, under the EMH, prices should always be equal to their fundamental value (i.e., the sum 
of an asset's rationally forecasted cash flows discounted at a rate appropriate for their risk), in a 
frictionless economy with rational investors any comovement in prices must be due to comovement in 
fundamentals (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Barberis et al., 2005). An asset's fundamental value can 
change either because of news about that asset's cash flows or because of news about discount rates 
that are used in order to calculate the asset's future cash flows. Thus, under the traditional theory of 
price comovement, correlation in asset prices is attributed to correlation in news about either cash 
flows or discount rates.  
However, a number of studies provide evidence that this traditional approach of comovement 
is incomplete and that prices of similar assets react differently to their common underlying 
fundamentals. In particular, Hardouvelis et al. (1994) and Bodurtha et al. (1995) examine closed-end 
funds, the assets of which trade in different countries from the funds themselves. According to the 
traditional theory of price comovement the returns on these funds must comove with the returns on 
their underlying assets. In reality however, their returns are found to be disassociated since the closed-
end funds appear to comove with the national stock market where they are traded, rather with the 
stock market in the country where their underlying assets are traded. This is further the case for 
domestic closed-end funds which appear disassociated from their asset holdings when the latter 
include large-cap stocks (see Lee at al., 1991). The disassociation between asset returns is also evident 
when identical (twin) stocks are considered, such as the Royal Dutch shares and the Shell shares 
respectively. Although these type of stocks should react to the same underlying fundamentals, because 
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theoretically they are claims to the same cash-flow stream, in practice their returns are delinked from 
each other (see Froot and Debora, 1999). From a similar perspective, Fama and French (1995) find 
that the movements between small and value stocks are unrelated to the stocks' reaction on news 
about underlying fundamentals, while Pindyck and Rotemberg (1988) find that aggregate demand - 
contrary to traditional approach of comovement - cannot be considered as a plausible source of 
correlation in the prices of seven different commodities.  
The common conclusion of those studies is that asset prices react differently to the same 
underlying fundamentals. They thus give rise to a new class of ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-
based’’ theories of comovement, according to which in the presence of economies with frictions or 
with irrational investors and in which there are limits to arbitrage, comovement in asset prices is 
delinked from comovement in underlying fundamentals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Barberis et al., 
2005). These theories in turn describe three specific views of comovement. namely the category view, 
the habitat view and the information diffusion view. The first relates to the category view, where the 
deviation of asset prices from their fundamental values is due to the categorization of assets into 
categories (e.g., large-cap stocks, oil industry stocks, investment-grade bonds), with the coordinated 
demand for this categories inducing common factors in those assets' returns (see Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003).   
Demand-driven is also the habitat view, whereby investors for a number of reasons choose to 
trade only a subset of all available assets (Barberis et al., 2005). Factors such as liquidity, risk 
aversion and sentiment cause investors to change their exposure in this subset of assets and 
consequently create common factors in their returns; this in turn disassociates those assets' returns 
from their underlying fundamentals (Claessens and Yafeh, 2012). Due to the both the category and 
habitat views having similar empirical applications they can be merged into a single view, that is the 
demand-based view (see Greenwood, 2008; Claessens and Yafeh, 2012). 
The third view is the information diffusion view, where the presence of market frictions 
results in information being incorporated more quickly into the prices of some assets than others. 
Investors having faster access to breaking news and arriving information, as well as the means to 
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exploit it engage in trading, thereby inducing common factors in asset returns (Barberis et al., 2005). 
Again, greater asset liquidity (a factor also cited as an explanation under the demand-based view) and 
lower trading costs, cause the release of good (bad) news to be reflected within the same day only in 
some assets: these assets consequently move upwards (downwards), whereas the rest of the assets 
follow the former in their movements after some delay, therefore giving rise to lead-lag dynamics 
between them (Claessens and Yafeh, 2012). 
This difference between the traditional and the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ 
theories of comovement, is clearly illustrated in the study of Vijh (1994), who examines the market 
betas of stocks added to the S&P 500 index and provides the first evidence of ‘‘friction-based’’ and 
‘‘sentiment-based’’ comovement. Since Standard and Poor's emphasizes that the choice of stocks for 
the inclusion in the S&P 500 is based on the effort to make the index representative of the overall US 
economy, under the traditional view of comovement those index-included stocks' fundamental values 
should be correlated with other stocks and assets' fundamental values.  However, under the demand-
based view, the index constitutes a preferred habitat (natural category) for a number of investors. The 
consequent fund flows in and out of that habitat (category) increases the correlation of index-included 
stocks within that habitat and disassociates them with their underlying fundamentals (Vijh, 1994). In 
addition, according to the information-diffusion view, the stocks included in the index reflect faster 
the incorporation of news about cash flows, owing to the greater liquidity of those assets, their lower 
trading costs or to the fact that are held by investors with better access to information (Vijh, 1994; 
Barberis et al., 2005; Claessens and Yafeh, 2012).  
To this end, Vijh (1994) offers support to the demand-based and information diffusion views 
by showing that stocks entering the index start to incorporate market-wide news at the same time with 
the rest index-included stocks, thereby increasing the stock-correlation within the index and 
decreasing the stocks' dependence on their underlying fundamentals. This is further verified by 
Barberis et al. (2005) who building on Vijh's study provide evidence of an even stronger 
disassociation of S&P 500-included stocks from underlying fundamentals, and therefore support of 
friction- and sentiment-based comovement which extends to more recent data. Thus, under both 
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demand-based and information-diffusion views, some stocks' fundamental values become less 
correlated with other stocks' fundamental values and also with similar assets that are claims to the 
same cash-flow streams, such as the company's bond issue or a derivative on that stock (Vijh, 1994; 
Barberis et al., 2005). The difference in the timing of information incorporation affects in turn not 
only the degree of asset-correlation and dependence on underlying fundamentals but also the lead-lag 
dynamics within the same or across different asset-markets.  
The ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ views on comovement as well as the majority 
of the empirical studies conducted, primarily concern index-included assets and therefore constitute 
the primary theories governing index-based investment (Claessens and Yafeh, 2012). Thus, they offer 
an additional motivation as well as justification for the employment of asset-market indices in the first 
empirical chapter in Section 3. An additional conclusion derived from the demand-based and 
information-diffusion views concerns the importance of asset liquidity for the comovement and 
interactions between asset returns. This role of liquidity as a driver of cross-asset interaction is 
considered in the formulation of hypotheses in the first empirical chapter of Section 3, where the most 
liquid asset is expected to lead the less liquid one(s).3 It further acts as a motivation to examine the 
liquidity interaction between assets that theoretically should move together in Section 4.  
 
2.2 The Interaction Between Stocks, Bonds and CDSs 
The first empirical chapter of the Thesis in Section 3 examines the issue of the comovement 
and interaction between the stock, bond and CDS markets. For this reason, Section 2.2 presents the 
theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between the three asset-markets as formulated in the 
Merton-originated structural models of credit risk. This will provide a theoretical justification for the 
selection and concurrent examination of  stocks, bonds and CDS contracts and further facilitate the 
understanding of the hypotheses with regards to the sign and nature of those asset-markets' interaction 
in Section 3.2. After the analysis of the theoretical relationship between the stock, bond and CDS 
                                                            
3 The role of liquidity in the lead-lag relationships and the general interaction between assets are analyzed in 
more detail in Section 2.4. 
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markets, follows an analysis of the empirical studies examining the relationship between the 
respective asset-markets. 
The structural models of credit risk (see Merton, 1974; Black and Cox, 1976) derive the 
theoretical link between equities, bonds and CDSs. According to these models, under the assumption 
of efficient markets, a change in a firm's default probability is already reflected in the firm's share 
price. This is due to the fact that any change in a firm's credit risk does not only affect the prices of 
credit derivatives written on the firm's assets, such as a futures contract or a CDS, but it further affects 
the firm's share and bond prices.  
When a firm faces unfavourable financial conditions, the resulting increase in the firm-credit 
risk leads to a consequent increase in the probability of default on the firm's bonds and other 
obligations. Hence, the price on the firm's bond and the firm's share price will decrease. Additionally, 
when a firm is in distressed condition, the purchase of insurance against its default becomes more 
expensive, thereby raising the spread on the CDS contracts written on the firm's bonds. The 
deterioration in the firm's credit risk will further raise the demand for protection against the potential 
event of the firm-default, which further causes downward pressure on the firm's share and bond 
prices. This in turn owes to the sellers of CDS contracts, which hedge their exposure to the firm by 
shorting either the firm's share or the firm's bond. In efficient markets, this simultaneous interaction 
between the firm's stocks, bond and CDS contracts constitutes the fundamental basis of arbitrage 
between equity and debt. 
Merton (1974) first modelled the firm's equity as a call option written on the firm's assets with 
a strike price equal to the firm's face value of debt. Alternatively, a firm's bond is modelled as a put 
option on the firm's assets with the same strike price. In its simplest form, the structural form of 
Merton's (1974) model assumes that the firm issues two types of assets, equity and a zero coupon 
bond. Default occurs at maturity whenever the value of the firm's assets falls below the face value of 
the zero-coupon bond. Later approaches however relax Merton model's assumptions by allowing 
default to occur at any time, modelling the default threshold, and considering various dynamics of the 
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firm's assets and different types of capital structure.4 Among them, Black and Cox (1976) incorporate 
safe covenants that allow the creditors to assume control of the borrowing firm when its value drops 
below a certain threshold, an addition that makes default time uncertain ex ante. 
The main finding derived from the structural credit risk models is that an increase in a firm's 
credit risk and thus in its probability of default results not only in an increase on the spread of the 
firm's CDS contract, but also in a fall in its share and bond prices. The fact that this relationship is 
theoretically valid in the presence of efficient markets suggests that under the ‘‘friction-based’’ and 
‘‘sentiment-based’’ approaches of asset comovement the dynamics between stocks, bonds and CDSs 
might evolve differently than the predictions of the Merton-originated models.5 This restrictive 
assumption about market efficiency, in combination with that friction- and sentiment-based 
approaches of comovement primarily refer to index-included assets, serves as a justification for the 
examination of the interaction between the stock, bond and CDS markets through the employment of 
market indices in Chapter I (Section 3). It additionally forms the expectation that under index-
investing information is not simultaneously reflected across stocks, bonds and CDSs, but - according 
to the information-diffusion view (see Section 2.1) - is incorporated faster in one asset before being 
transmitted to the rest. The main reasons for the emergence of these lead-lag relationships are in turn 
differences in the liquidity and volatility between asset-markets, that affect the assets' capacity with 
regards to the reception and transmission of information. An analysis of the liquidity and volatility 
channels is presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. 
The hypothesis that stocks, bond and CDS markets do not adjust simultaneously to new 
information which additionally forms the basis for the examination of the stock-bond-CDS interaction 
conducted in Chapter I, is further motivated by studies at the empirical front. These studies although 
focusing on single-name securities reveal differences in the transmission of information between the 
three asset-markets, that consequently give rise to lead-lag relationships between them. However, 
                                                            
4 These approaches include the studies by Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Leland (1994) and Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995).  
5 For an analysis of the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of asset comovement see Section 2.1. 
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even though the stock market appears to be leading the information-transmission process, its leading 
role is not always unambiguous since the CDS market is also found to be transmitting information to 
the other two asset-markets. The main scepticism about these studies concerns the use of single-name 
securities and the examination period, which refers to the early and mid 2000's. The first is important 
in light of the demand-based and information diffusion views of comovement which have been 
derived from the examination of index-included securities. In addition, single-name securities have 
been documented to incorporate both idiosyncratic and systemic risk, while they are also subject to 
insider trading.6 The significance of the second lies in that the period up to the 2007-2008 US 
financial crisis coincided with the unprecedented growth in the size and volume of the CDS market 
which might have biased the role of CDS contracts as transmitters of information. 
In particular, the first examination of the joint dynamics of the stock, bond, and CDS markets 
was conducted by Longstaff et al. (2003). Their analysis included 68 US firms during the 2001-2002 
period and their VAR specification provided evidence that the CDS and stock markets lead the bond 
market. The same VAR representation is employed by Norden and Weber (2009) in their analysis of 
an international sample of 58 firms during the 2000-2002 period, with their results suggesting that the 
equity market induces movements in the CDS and bond markets. Furthermore, according to their 
vector error correction model (VECM), which is further employed by Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu 
(2004; 2006), the CDS market appears to contribute more to price discovery thus causing the bond 
market to adjust to price movements in the CDS market (a finding consistent with Blanco et al. 
(2005)). This is however confirmed only for the US and not for the European market. 
A general VECM representation is also employed by Forte and Pena (2009) to analyze the 
price discovery process between stock market's implied credit spreads (i.e., a homogeneous measure 
of credit risk derived from a modified version of Leland and Toft’s (1996) structural credit risk 
model) and bond and CDS spreads. Their results suggest that stocks lead CDSs and bonds more 
frequently than the opposite, while also lend support to the leading role of the CDS market with 
                                                            
6 The difference between single-name securities and index-included securities and the advantages of employing 
market indices are analyzed in Section 3.1 of Chapter I. 
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respect to the bond market. The CDS market is also found to Granger cause bond spread changes 
(Norden and Weber, 2009; Forte and Pena, 2009), a result in tandem with Coudert and Gex (2010) 
who tested the above relationships during the 2005 GM and Ford crisis. The only examination at the 
sovereign level is conducted by Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), with results being considerably different 
than those at the corporate level: in a sample consisting only of emerging market sovereign issuers no 
equilibrium relationships are found between the three asset-markets, while no asset-market appears to 
lead the price discovery process.  
 
2.3 The CDS-bond Basis 
Section 2.2 presented the main empirical studies pertaining to the issue of the comovement and 
interaction between the stock, bond and CDS markets, which is analyzed in the first empirical chapter 
of the present Thesis (Section 3). The subsequent empirical chapters, i.e., Chapters II and III in 
Sections 4 and 5 respectively, examine the interaction between the bond and the CDS markets. For 
that reason, the focus of Section 2.3 is attributed to the equilibrium relationship between bonds and 
CDS contracts, i.e., the CDS-bond basis, which further constitutes one of the primary channels for the 
comovement of the two asset-markets (the other major channels being liquidity and volatility, which 
are analyzed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively). After the analysis of their equilibrium relationship, 
Section 2.3 presents the empirical studies conducted on the subject of price discovery and 
comovement between the bond and CDS markets. 
According to the no-arbitrage theory of pricing CDS, the premium of a CDS contract on a 
reference name, e.g., a bond, should equal the asset-swap spread for the same reference name (in the 
case of a bond this is the difference between the yield on the bond and the LIBOR curve (Choudhry, 
2006)). This theoretical parity, or else the CDS-bond basis, has been proved by previous studies (see 
Duffie, 1999; Hull and White, 2000), however in practice a number of reasons, such as accrued 
interest, the cheapest-to-deliver option and counterparty risk cause the basis never to be equal to zero, 
with market liquidity also playing a key role to this inequality (Hull et al., 2004; Blanco et al., 2005; 
Zhu, 2006; Chen et al., 2010). In particular, during the pre-2008 financial crisis period, the basis for 
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the majority of corporate bonds was found to be positive, thereby giving rise to considerable arbitrage 
opportunities (Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Baba and Inada, 2009). 
Despite the studies focusing on the corporate level, the literature on the examination of the 
CDS-bond basis is also comprised of studies focusing at the sovereign level. In general, while the 
basis is found to be negative at the corporate level (see Section 2.3.1), when sovereign CDSs and their 
underlying bonds are considered, the results - although ambiguous - point towards the existence of a 
positive basis, or at least a non-negative one (see Section 2.3.2). At the theoretical level, Duffie (1999) 
was the first to derive the theoretical parity between CDS premia and the asset-swap spread, noting 
however that the ideal corporate bond spread should be the spread over LIBOR or a floating rate note 
with the same maturity as the CDS referenced on the same firm, otherwise there can be no perfect 
arbitrage. Furthermore, according to Duffie (1999), this theoretical link holds, only if CDS premia and 
yield spreads are viewed as a pure measure of credit risk; in the case in which both of them are 
affected by additional risk sources, e.g. liquidity, these risk sources may exert an impact on this link 
and cause the basis to deviate from zero. In a similar spirit, Hull and White (2000) tested whether 
approximate no-arbitrage arguments give accurate valuations of CDSs and thus, whether they impact 
on the CDS-bond basis, They also provided an application of their methodology with the use of real 
data.  
 
2.3.1. Corporate Level Examination 
  The first empirical examination of the theoretical parity between the CDS premium and the asset-
swap spread was conducted by Longstaff et al. (2003), with their results suggesting that credit 
protection is not priced consistently in the corporate bond and the credit derivatives market. The 
significantly higher - according to Longstaff et al. (2003) - implied cost of credit protection in the 
corporate bond market, comprises the first evidence of the existence of a negative CDS-bond basis, 
with the significant tax-related and liquidity components built into the spreads of these corporate 
bonds being cited as the best plausible explanation for that deviation from parity. In stark contrast to 
the corporate bonds, CDS premia were found to only depend on the actual default risk of the 
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underlying bond that were written on. In a later study (see Longstaff et al., 2005), the illiquidity of 
corporate bonds was also found to add to the equilibrium cost of corporate debt, and therefore being 
responsible for the deviation (negative in this case also) of the basis from its theoretical parity. 
An empirical investigation of the validity of the theoretical relationship between CDS premia 
and bond credit spreads is also conducted by Blanco et al. (2005) who, in line with Longstaff et al. 
(2003; 2005), find no evidence that parity holds in their investment grade bonds sample. Their results 
suggest that the approximate equivalence holds only in the case where the risk-free rate is proxied  by 
the swap rate; they further indicate that the CDS premium and the credit spread form an upper and 
lower boundary for the true price of credit risk, respectively (Blanco et al., 2005). The exact opposite 
conclusion, i.e., the CDS premium forming a lower bound and the credit spread forming an upper 
bound for the price of credit risk, is reached by Fontana (2010). In particular, for the period during the 
2007-2008 crisis, the basis is found to be persistently negative, suggesting that it would be cheaper to 
bear credit risk in the cash market. It appears that cash bonds, due to being funded instruments, have 
their spreads adversely affected by the cost of funding with a consequent effect on their yields which 
are driven higher; on the other hand, CDS spreads - which are unfunded instruments - are only 
affected by counter-party risk being sold at discount (Alexopoulou et al., 2009; Fontana, 2010). Along 
the same lines, Alexopoulou et al. (2009) and Fontana (2010) find CDS spreads to be more sensitive 
to changes in systematic risk compared with the corporate bond spreads, a view only denied by De 
Wit (2006), who in contrast to the bulk of literature, provides evidence about a positive basis, 
although focusing on a short (1-year) pre-crisis period only (ibid).  
 
2.3.2. Sovereign Level Examination 
  In contrast to the corporate level, where the CDS-bond basis is found to be negative, the examination 
at the sovereign level yields considerably different conclusions. The different nature and status of the 
sovereign borrowers compared to their corporate counterparts is cited as a possible explanation for 
this divergence. The option of default is less preferred by countries and in the event that a default 
occurs this is generally accompanied by debt restructuring and/or debt exchange, with the Greek debt 
35 
 
restructuring being the latest example (Lane, 2012; Blundell-Wignall, 2012). In addition, the problem 
of asymmetric information is less prevalent at the sovereign level, where information about the 
financial health of the sovereigns is generally more available and accurate. 
Furthermore, CDSs have been used extensively for regulatory arbitrage to minimise the 
capital banks and government agencies are required to hold; while this tactic can create bank 
instability, it also adds to market liquidity, with both factors being significant drivers of changes in the 
level of CDS premia and bond yields (Vayanos and Wang, 2012; Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2013; 
Praz, 2014). Taking into consideration that the above aspects impact on sovereign CDS and bond 
prices, and therefore on the theoretical value of the CDS-bond basis, it comes as no surprise that the 
implied cost of credit protection between the CDS and bond market is significantly different when the 
focus of examination is shifted from the corporate to the sovereign level.  
While the common factor of all pertinent studies is that the analysis includes only emerging 
countries, different conclusions are reached depending on the credit rating of the securities considered 
or the time-horizon employed. For instance, in Küçük (2010) speculative grade bonds are found to be 
more expensive than what is implied by their CDS premia, while when investment grade securities are 
considered, bond prices and CDS premia are either more balanced or CDS premia are considerably 
cheaper compared to their underlying bonds, with this divergence being explained by limits to 
arbitrage due to difficulty of short selling the bond, and also by speculation in the CDS market. In a 
different study (see Adler and Song, 2010) the CDS and bond markets are found to price credit risk 
for the emerging market sovereigns equally (with the exception of Argentina and Brazil), with any 
deviations from parity observed leading towards a positive basis. Last, Ammer and Cai (2011) 
provide evidence that these two measures of credit risk deviate considerably from their theoretical 
equivalence in the short run, due to factors such as liquidity and contract specifications, however they 
estimated a stable long-term equilibrium relationship for the majority of sovereigns examined. 
Not only has the CDS-bond basis been the focus of a great number of studies, but the causes 
of this deviation from parity has also been addressed by the literature, with Blanco et al. (2005) and 
Küçük (2010) noting that this deviation may be due to investors being unable to short the bond and 
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therefore, not succeeding in taking advantage of the arbitrage opportunities available. Blanco et al. 
(2005) also suggest that the cheapest-to-deliver option drives down corporate bond prices with a 
consequent effect on the basis' theoretical value, a view also shared by Ammer and Cai (2011) and 
Lin et al. (2011). Particular importance is also given to the liquidity premium, however it is no clear 
whether it causes the basis to deviate from zero by acting through the CDS or the bond market (Chen 
et al., 2010; Nashikkar et al., 2011; Vayanos and Wang, 2012; Fontana and Scheicher, 2016). 
 
2.3.3. The Interaction between Bonds and CDSs 
Notwithstanding the focus given on the theoretical equivalence between the CDS premium and the 
bond credit spread, an additionally important issue addressed by the literature is the comovement 
between the two asset-markets in order to identify which market leads the other in terms of price 
discovery. Due to the flexibility and the institutional features of the CDS market where - in contrast to 
the bond market - short positions are more easily to establish, price discovery is expected to take place 
mainly in the CDS market (Blanco et al., 2005; Norden and Weber, 2009). The lead of the CDS 
market is also attributed to the expectation that volatility is mainly transferred from the CDS to the 
bond market (when default probabilities for bonds increase bond holders resort to the CDS market in 
order to obtain protection against default risk, thereby increasing the demand for CDSs (Zhu, 2006; 
Norden and Weber, 2009)). In the empirical part, the majority of studies validates the above 
expectations, by providing evidence that the CDS market leads the bond market both at the corporate 
(Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Forte and Pena, 2009; Baba and Inada, 2009) and the sovereign level 
(Fontana and Scheicher, 2010; Arce et al., 2011; Delis and Mylonidis, 2011). The results of these 
studies are consequently employed in the formulation of hypotheses in the first empirical chapter in 
Section 3, according to which the CDS market index is expected to lead the bond market index.  
At the corporate level, price discovery is found to occur in the CDS market, mainly due the 
CDS market being the easiest place in which to trade credit risk, enabling that way informed traders to 
engage in more frequent and efficient transactions (Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006). The lead of the 
CDS over the bond market is verified in the case of a US-only sample (see Blanco et al., 2005), an 
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international sample (see Zhu, 2006), and in a sample of Japanese financials (see Baba and Inada, 
2009), with all studies employing a variety of methods, ranging from Granger causality tests to vector 
autoregressives and error correction models. It appears that liquidity factors significantly matter not 
only for the CDS market's lead, but also for the adjustment dynamics between those asset classes, 
especially in the short-run, an argument also verified by Forte and Pena (2009); the only limitation 
being the short (2-year) period of examination, which also constitutes a common factor among all 
studies focusing on the particular issue. 
The analysis of the price discovery process between the CDS and bond market yields 
somewhat different results when the focus is shifted from the corporate to the sovereign level. Even 
though the CDS market appears to have a leading role over the bond market, this is not a unanimous 
conclusion, as there is a number of studies arguing in favour of the bond market causing movements 
in the CDS market and not vice versa. In particular, there is evidence from a 5-year sample of 30 
emerging market sovereigns that the bond market leads the price discovery (see Aktug et al., 2012), 
an argument also finding support from Ammer and Cai (2011); even though in the latter study the 
bond market does not have a predominant lead, it is nevertheless found to lead the CDS market more 
frequently than the previous literature suggests, with both studies citing the cheapest-to-deliver option 
as the most plausible explanation for this differentiation. 
Ambiguous results are also presented in Fontana and Scheicher (2010; 2016), where the CDS 
market leads the bond market in half of the 10 euro area sample countries, while in the other half price 
discovery is observed in the bond market (in a time-horizon sufficient enough to capture the effect of 
the 2008 financial crisis). Nonetheless, the financial crisis appears to impact differently on the CDS - 
bond interaction across the euro area according to Delis and Mylonidis (2011), the Granger causality 
tests of which revealed that Southern European countries' CDS spreads Granger cause credit spreads 
following the onset of the crisis. Granger causality tests are also employed by Palladini and Portes 
(2011) to verify their VECM results about the European CDS market moving ahead of the bond 
market in terms of price discovery, results that are in tandem with the corporate finance literature. The 
predominant role of the CDS market in the euro area is also verified in an extended analysis by Calice 
38 
 
et al. (2011). Despite the apparent focus on credit interactions, bid-ask spreads were employed - along 
with last prices - in order to examine the liquidity spread interactions over the 2009 -2010 period, with 
results suggesting a positive and significant lagged transmission from the liquidity spread of the CDS 
market to the credit spread in the bond market (Calice et al., 2011).  
 
2.4 Liquidity Interaction  
After the analysis of the theoretical propositions governing the bond-CDS interaction and the 
discussion of the main empirical studies on this issue, Section 2.4 describes one of the main reasons as 
well as mechanisms of cross-asset interaction, that is, the liquidity channel. The analysis of this 
channel is essential for the understanding of the hypotheses in Chapter I (Section 3), where the lead-
lag relationships between stocks, bond and CDSs are formulated on the basis of their liquidity. It 
additionally forms the basis for the examination in Chapter II (Section 4), since it provides the 
theoretical arguments about the liquidity interaction between the sovereign bond and CDS markets. 
The analysis starts with a brief discussion of the concept of liquidity and then proceeds to the 
mechanism through which shocks to liquidity in one asset propagate to other assets, thereby affecting 
their prices.  
Liquidity is a rather abstract and complex term: liquidity typically refers to the ease of trading 
a security.7 This complexity in the concept of liquidity is due to the various sources that liquidity can 
arise from. Perhaps the most known source is the exogenous transactions costs. These costs are 
incurred by the seller and the buyer of the security during the transaction (trading) of the security, and 
include brokerage fees, order-processing costs, or transaction taxes. An additional source is the 
demand pressure and inventory risk. This source is related to the presence and availability of buyers in 
the market the exact moment(s) where sellers need to sell their securities. In particular, when the 
market is short of buyers, the seller might be forced to sell to a market-maker, who only buys the 
security in anticipation of a future sale. However, during the holding of the security, the market-maker 
                                                            
7 For an excellent and more detailed survey of the concept of liquidity and the theoretical and empirical studies 
see Amihud et al. (2005) and Foucault et al. (2013).  
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is exposed to price changes. These price changes constitute in turn a risk that the market-maker 
imposes on the seller of the security during their transaction.  
Private information regarding fundamentals and/or order flow is a further source of liquidity. 
Trading with an informed counterparty always entails a loss, since the buyer (seller) of a security 
might worry that the potential seller (buyer) has private information about the entity issuing the 
security (Amihud et al., 2005). In contrast to private information about fundamentals, a recent 
common practice for hedge funds is to close their positions at the end of the trading day. In the event 
where a trading desk is informed about the timing of a hedge fund's closing out of positions (the order 
flow), due to the consequent downward pressure on prices, the sale of the same securities by an agent 
and the purchase at a future time can result in a significant profit for the agent. Lastly, liquidity can 
also arise due to search friction, i.e., the search for a counterparty to trade a particular security or a 
large quantity of a given security. This is particularly relevant in the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, 
where the absence of a central marketplace results in financing or opportunity costs due to the delay in 
the trading and the consequent price concessions needed in order to facilitate the trading; in the event 
where this search is avoided and the security is traded without delay, then the agent foregoes the 
search-related costs but is subject to illiquidity costs (Amihud et al., 2005).  
After a discussion of the concept of liquidity and the various sources of liquidity, the focus 
now is shifted to the reasons and mechanisms that result in liquidity comovements between assets. 
One possibility for the existence of these comovements is that are generated by common shocks that 
affect the liquidity of several assets synchronously. The origins of these shocks and the consequent 
liquidity comovements are either supply-side related to the funding constraints of financial 
intermediaries, or demand-side and driven by correlated trading activity, the level of institutional 
ownership and investor sentiment (Karolyi et al., 2012).  
In specific, the supply-side is derived from theoretical approaches that examine the role of 
funding constraints for the provision of liquidity (see Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009; Hameed et al., 2010). Common in these approaches is the prediction that large market 
declines or high volatility exert an adverse impact on the funding liquidity of financial intermediaries 
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that perform the role of liquidity suppliers to financial markets. The end result is a reduction in those 
intermediaries' liquidity provision across many securities, which further leads to a decrease in market 
liquidity and an increase in liquidity comovements (Karolyi et al., 2012). According to the demand-
side view, commonality in liquidity is mainly attributed to the trading behaviour of institutional 
investors (see Kamara et al., 2008; Koch et al., 2009) and the correlated across securities demand for 
liquidity due to the investors' weak incentives to trade in individual securities (see Chordia et al., 
2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001). In the latter case, these incentives can be driven by the level of 
transparency and investor protection in a give country (see Morck et al., 2000). Lastly, an additional 
demand-side explanation relates to investor sentiment, which can result in correlated trading 
behaviour and thus, to common movements in liquidity within or across asset-markets (see Huberman 
and Halka, 2001).  
However, in addition to common shocks affecting the liquidity of different assets 
simultaneously, liquidity comovements can further result due to shocks specific to liquidity supply in 
one asset class propagating to other asset classes.8 According to this mechanism, liquidity providers in 
one asset class, e.g., exchange-traded funds (ETFs), often receive information from other asset prices, 
e.g., from the underlying assets of ETFs; this information-transmission and cross-asset learning 
eventually results in interconnectedness in the liquidity of those asset classes (Cespa and Foucault, 
2014). In specific, dealers in the ETF use the price of the underlying asset as a source of information, 
since the underlying asset's price reflects information about fundamentals known to that asset's 
dealers. However, the price of the underlying asset is further subject to transient demand pressures,  
particularly when the provision of liquidity for dealers in the underlying asset increases (Cespa and 
Foucault, 2014). Thus, the price of the underlying asset constitutes a noisy signal for dealers in the 
ETF, with the information transmitted by this signal being analogous to the sensitivity of the 
underlying asset to transient demand shocks: the less liquid is the underlying asset, the less 
informative its price is for dealers in the ETF (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Cespa and Foucault, 
2014).  
                                                            
8 This mechanism is analyzed in detail in Cespa and Foucault (2014).  
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Along the same lines, in the event where a shock to dealers in the underlying asset (such as a 
fall in the dealers' risk aversion) increases the cost of liquidity provision in that asset, this in turn 
increases uncertainty for dealers in the ETF and consequently their cost of liquidity provision. The 
end result is that a drop in liquidity of the underlying asset propagates to the ETF. This spillover 
causes the price of the ETF to be less informative for dealers in the underlying asset, thereby creating 
a chain reaction that amplifies the initial shock (Cespa and Foucault, 2014). Hence, there are two risk 
factors affecting the ETF's liquidity: one specific to the ETF and one specific to the underlying asset. 
Dealers in the ETF are only informed about the first, while they receive information about the second 
from the price of the underlying asset. This cross-asset learning creates a feedback loop and therefore 
an illiquidity multiplier, with the strength of the multiplier being analogous to the sensitivity of each 
asset price to illiquidity (see Cespa and Foucault, 2014).  
The propagation of liquidity through cross-asset learning is valid when dealers are either 
market-makers or arbitrageurs. This is important when considering assets tied by a no-arbitrage 
relationship, such as those examined in the present Thesis. The stocks, bonds and CDS contracts are 
linked via the fundamental no-arbitrage condition between equity and debt (see Section 2.2), while 
bonds and CDSs through the CDS-bond basis (see Section 2.3). Thus, both mechanisms of liquidity 
comovements, i.e., the common shocks and the cross-asset learning, are useful in understanding the 
hypotheses formulated in the analysis of the interaction between the stock, bond and CDS markets in 
Chapter I (Section 3) and between the sovereign bond and CDS markets in Chapter II (Section 4).  
 
2.5 Volatility Interaction 
After the analysis of the liquidity channel, Section 2.5 presents the channel of volatility which 
constitutes an additional mechanism for the transmission of information between assets. The 
theoretical foundations of the relationship between asset prices and asset volatility are provided by the 
work of Ross (1989), where it is shown that in an arbitrage-free economy the volatility of prices is 
directly related to the flow of information to the asset-market. Similarly to the case of liquidity 
linkages in Section 2.4, volatility linkages are further divided into two different channels, i.e., one 
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relating to common information affecting assets simultaneously and one relating to information 
spillover due to trading activity. The former channel is rather straightforward and as is the case with 
the demand-side explanation of liquidity comovements, common information stimulates trading 
activity in more than one asset-markets concurrently by changing investors' expectations and 
speculative demands (see Harvey and Huang, 1991; Ederignton and Lee, 1993). Sources of volatility 
that result in common information transmission across financial assets can arise for example from 
scheduled macroeconomic releases such as those on the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, or the 
producer price index. In addition, negative shocks, such as a corporate or sovereign default, further 
affect risk aversion and underlying fundamentals, thereby resulting in a concurrent increase in 
information and volatility transmission across financial assets (Fleming et al., 1998; Connolly and 
Stivers, 2005).  
The second mechanism that leads to the creation of volatility linkages between assets is 
information spillover caused by cross-asset hedging. The intuition behind hedging as a source of 
cross-asset linkages can be easily understood by resorting to the work of Fleming et al. (1998) and 
assuming two negative correlated asset-markets, such the stock and bond markets, and a trader that 
operates in both asset-markets. An information event altering the trader's expectations about stock 
returns, and therefore affecting his demand for stocks, can further affect that trader's demand for 
bonds. This can occur because of the trader's consideration of the (negative) correlation between stock 
and bond returns when rebalancing his portfolio, even in the case where the information event leaves 
the trader's expectations about interest rates (i.e., the primary driver of bond returns) unchanged 
(Fleming et al., 1998). This is part of the trader's attempt to employ the bond market as a hedge for his 
speculative position in the stock market. Hence, this initial information event not only affects the 
trader's demand for stocks and bonds, but further results in an information spillover between the two 
asset-markets, therefore generating trading and volatility in both asset-markets. 
However, an increase in volatility linkages between assets is further expected to result in an 
increase in those assets' correlation. Under the assumption that prices are represented by martingales, 
cross-asset correlation is driven by the comovement of the continuous part of the price processes or by 
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the comovement of their jumps, or by both together (see Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009; Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 
2016). In any case - and particularly in times of heightened market stress where information-related 
shocks hit all asset-classes simultaneously - an increase in price commonality and/or in jumps leads to 
an increase in the correlation among assets (Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016). This is particularly evident in 
the case of a shock to one country (or group of countries), where increased cross-market linkages 
cause a consequent (significant) increase in cross-market correlations, which in some cases can 
eventually give rise to contagion phenomena between different asset-markets (Rigobon, 2002; 
Andersen et al., 2003). Moreover, during these crisis periods investors increase the risk exposure of 
their portfolios across all assets, thereby leading to a simultaneous adjustment of prices across-the-
board and a rise in covariation between asset returns (Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016).  
Overall, the analysis of the channels of cross-asset volatility interaction suggests that the 
cross-asset hedging channel applies to assets primarily employed for hedging, such as stocks and 
bonds, or a derivative, such as a CDS contract, and the underlying bond. Thus, the examination of the 
volatility linkages between the sovereign bond and CDS markets in Chapter III (Section 5) is 
theoretically relevant since these linkages are expected to occur between the two asset-markets via 
both channels, i.e., through common information and through cross-asset hedging. In addition, the 
theoretical arguments about increased volatility leading to increased correlation constitute the basis 
for the analysis of the conditional correlation (which further reflects the level of integration) between 
the sovereign bonds and CDS contracts in the second part of Chapter III (see Section 5.5). The 
negative financial and fiscal shocks during the European sovereign debt crisis justify the selection of 
the European sovereign bond and CDS markets and provide further impetus to the examination of 
their volatility interaction and level of integration.  
 
2.6. Monetary Policy and Asset Prices 
The last part of this literature review is dedicated to the link between monetary policy and asset 
prices. Since the present Thesis is primarily focused on the period following the financial and the 
European sovereign debt crises, during which central banks heavily resorted to the use of non-
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standard tools of monetary policy, a solid understanding of the nature and scope of these tools is 
necessary in order to facilitate the transition to the subsequent empirical chapters in Sections 3-5. To 
this end, Section 2.6 includes a brief introduction of the measures of non-standard monetary policy 
before proceeding into the examination of the channels with which monetary policy affects asset 
prices, as well as the reasons for the incorporation of asset prices into the decisions of monetary 
policy makers.  
 
2.6.1 Non-standard Monetary Policy 
The recent global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis have been characterized by a 
widespread introduction of non-standard monetary policy measures, otherwise termed unconventional 
monetary policy measures. The main distinction between standard and non-standard monetary policy  
is that under the latter, the central bank actively uses its balance sheet to exert a direct impact on 
market prices and borrowing conditions beyond the impact exerted by changes in the overnight 
interest rate. In addition, when interest rates have reached the zero lower bound (i.e., when interest 
rate reaches zero or near zero), non-standard policies are the only tools available for central banks in 
order to formulate their monetary policy stance. Non-standard measures have been tailored to the 
respective economies and their structures and have been employed to protect the real economy from 
the escalation of the financial crisis, or as was the case in the Eurozone, to enable the functioning of 
the interbank market and most importantly to preserve the stability of the monetary union during the 
European debt crisis. Non-standard measures have taken various forms, such  as enhanced credit 
support, credit easing, quantitative easing, enhanced liquidity provision, and loose collateral policies. 
They have further exhibited differences depending on whether have been implemented within the US 
or the Eurozone economy. A brief description of those measures follows. 
In specific, the first non-standard monetary policy measures by the Federal Reserve have been 
adopted during the onset of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. These measures have been characterized as 
credit easing since their objective was to support the efficient functioning of the credit market. To this 
end, in November 2008 the Federal Reserve announced the first round of asset purchases, also known 
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as QE1. Under this programme, the Fed purchased $1425billion of mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs) and $300billion of long-term Treasury bonds, with these purchases corresponding to 12% of 
US GDP. These purchases were followed by a second round that was termed QE2 and was conducted 
from November 2010 until June 2011. During these round the Federal Reserve purchased $600billion 
of long-term Treasury bonds in an attempt to reduce the level of long-term bond yields. QE2 was 
subsequently replaced by QE3 (September 2012 - December 2012) were the Fed conducted monthly 
purchases of MBSs and long-term Treasury bonds amounting to $40 and $45billion per month 
respectively. Overall, these three rounds of quantitative easing have increased the size of the Federal 
Reserve's balance sheet from $0.9trillion in 2007 to $4trillion at the end of 2013. 
In Europe, the ECB responded to the US-originated financial crisis in October 2008 by 
adopting full allotment and fixed rate of interest for its Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), 
i.e., the ECB's main liquidity providing operations. In May 2009 the ECB announced the purchases of 
€60billion of covered bonds under its Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP). This programme 
was later supplemented by the Securities Market Programme (SMP) in May 2010 which included 
primarily the purchase of government bonds in order to support the stressed government bond 
markets, particularly those of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Under the SMP, €220billion 
of government bonds were purchased (mainly during the periods from May 2010 to June 2010 and 
from August 2010 to January 2010) amounting to 2.5% of euro area GDP. In September 2012, a new 
asset purchase programme was announced, namely the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), 
according to which the ECB planned to conduct purchases of government securities in the secondary 
market.9  The securities to be purchased were with maturity of 1 to 3 years and issued by EMU 
member states under a fiscal consolidation programme, thus aiming to improve the borrowing 
conditions of the countries under fiscal strain. However, the OMT programme was not eventually 
                                                            
9 The announcement of the OMT was marked by the strong verbal intervention of the ECB's President Mario 
Draghi, according to which ‘‘Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. 
And believe me, it will be enough’’ (Speech by Mario Draghi, at the Global Investment Conference in London, 
26 July 2012).  
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utilized. The purchases were conducted instead from the beginning of March 2015 onwards under the 
expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) and were extended to public and private sector securities, 
amounting on average to €80billion a month. These purchases were intended to be carried out until a 
sustainable upwards adjustment is achieved in the path of euro area inflation, consistent with an 
inflation rate below but close to 2% over the medium term. An additional unconventional measure by 
the ECB was the massive liquidity injection through its Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) 
that aimed at enhancing bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money market. The two LTROs 
auctions with maturity of three years were conducted in December 2011 and February 2012 as fixed 
rate tender procedures with full allotment, i.e., banks had their bids fully satisfied against adequate 
collateral and on the condition of financial soundness.10 The total amount lent during the two auctions 
was approximately €1trillion.11  
 
2.6.2 The Channels of Monetary Policy 
Following the presentation of non-standard monetary policy measures, Section 2.6.2 analyzes the 
channels through which non-standard monetary policy is transmitted to asset prices. The most natural 
channel through which non-conventional policies affect financial markets is the ‘‘portfolio balance’’ 
channel. Analyzed in Tobin (1961; 1963; 1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973), this mechanism 
describes how central banks affect the level of yields on different financial assets through altering the 
                                                            
10 LTROs with maturity of six and twelve months respectively have also been part of the response to the 
Eurozone crisis and conducted before the 36-month LTROs. 
11 Under the first operation 523 counterparties borrowed in total €489billion and under the second 800 
counterparties borrowed €529.5 billion. LTROs were succeeded by the Targeted LTROs (TLTROs), under 
which the counterparties were entitled to an initial TLTRO borrowing allowance equal to 7% of the total amount 
of their loans to euro area non-financial private sector, excluding households for house purchase (more 
information is provided in the ECB's press release on June 5 2014). TLTROs were conducted in September 
2014 and December 2014 and the total amount borrowed was not permitted to exceed this initial borrowing 
allowance. 
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relative supplies of financial claims with different durations and liquidity. Thus, the central bank 
through altering the relative quantities of money and government bonds held by the private sector can 
exert an impact on financial asset prices and consequently on real investment decisions. This 
mechanism is based on the assumption of imperfect asset substitutability and on heterogeneity across 
agents; the former assumption applies to the degree of substitution between bank deposits and bonds 
held by the public, while according to the latter some agents must hold different portfolios so that 
prices need to change in order to reach an equilibrium (Joyce et al., 2012).  
Next, the ‘‘portfolio balance’’ channel is analyzed within the context of portfolio balance 
models and models of credit imperfections. Within that context, two main channels emerge through 
which asset purchases by the central bank can affect financial asset prices and the economy, namely 
the ‘‘portfolio substitution’’ channel and the ‘‘bank lending’’ channel (see Miles, 2011, 2012; Joyce 
et al., 2012). According to the ‘‘portfolio substitution’’ channel the purchase of bonds by the central 
bank reduce the number of bonds held by the banks, increasing at the same time the amount of bank 
reserves deposited at the central bank.12 These central bank-purchases of bonds are immediately 
reflected in a rise in bank reserves and also bank deposits (in the case where the bonds were 
purchased from non-banks, such as pension funds). This is in turn exactly where the assumption on 
imperfect substitutability comes into play, since if bank reserves and bank deposits were treated as 
perfect substitutes this would leave the yields on the purchased bonds unchanged.13 However, 
imperfect substitutability is not an implausible assumption. This is due to the preferred habitat theory 
and the pricing of duration risk.  
Large-scale asset purchase programmes, such as the series of QE by the Federal Reserve, or 
the SMP and the APP by the ECB, involve the exchange of a long-dated asset, i.e., bonds, for a short-
                                                            
12 This channel is analyzed in detail in Joyce et al. (2012). 
13 In the case of perfect substitutability the economy would enter a liquidity trap where the additional supply of 
central bank money (in the form of reserves) would not lead to a rise in bond prices and therefore a fall in bond 
yields. The end result would just be an exchange of this extra central bank money for bonds as banks would just 
passively accept more reserves held with the central bank (Joyce et al., 2012). 
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dated one, i.e., bank reserves and bank deposits.14 Although some investors are indifferent to this 
change in the duration of the assets held in their portfolios, the greater fraction of it, such as pension 
funds and insurance companies have long-dated liabilities that prefer to match them with assets of 
similar duration (Joyce et al., 2012). This need for preserving the duration of their assets results in a 
demand for assets of a similar maturity, which in combination with the decrease in the volume of 
long-dated assets outstanding due to the central bank purchases, bids their prices up and drives down 
their yields. The reduction in the risk premium required by the potential buyers of those assets is 
translated into a rise in the prices and a consequent fall in the yields on long-dated assets, such as 
outstanding or newly-issued government bonds, corporate bonds, or equities. Hence, according to this 
mechanism, the initial central bank purchases and the consequent reduction in bond yields eventually 
lead to improved borrowing conditions, thereby enabling the raising of funds by corporations; this 
will further generate greater capital gains for the ultimate owners of those assets, i.e., the households, 
which will also increase their wealth (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Joyce et al., 2012; 
Miles 2012). The investment of this extra funding raised by the companies and the consumption of 
this increase in household wealth will increase aggregate demand and through that output, thereby 
concluding the ‘‘portfolio balance’’ channel of central bank-conducted asset purchases 
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Joyce et al., 2012). 
The mechanisms behind this channel are consistent with the preferred habitat theory, where 
investor clienteles with preferences for a particular segment of the yield curve play a crucial role for 
the determination of bond yields (see Modigliani and Sutch, 1966; Vayanos and Vila 2009; 
Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010; Acharya et al., 2012; Gromb and Vayanos, 2012). The main 
theoretical implication derived from this theory is that a central bank through altering the supply of 
long-term debt can exert an impact on the level of bond yields. This ability of the central bank to 
influence the evolution of bond yields is also verified in the presence of risk-averse arbitrageurs 
(Vayanos and Vila, 2009). Arbitrageurs integrate maturity markets, by exploiting discrepancies 
between identical bonds and ensuring that the term structure is arbitrage-free; however their risk 
                                                            
14 A description of the asset purchases programmes of the Fed and the ECB is provided in Section 2.6.1. 
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aversion enables the demand shocks of the clienteles to affect the term structure and therefore 
constituting an additional determinant of bond prices (Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Gromb and Vayanos, 
2012). An extension of preferred habitat approach is the ‘‘duration channel’’, where the central bank 
purchases of long-duration assets (medium-to-long-term government bonds) and the supply of zero-
duration assets (bank reserves) results in a decrease in the average duration of the stock of bonds held 
by the private sector (see Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Gagnon et al., 2011). This consequently reduces 
the premium required to hold duration risk, thereby increasing the price paid by investors in order to 
hold duration risk when the supply is reduced. 
The other channel of non-standard monetary policy transmission is the ‘‘bank lending’’ 
channel, which refers to the availability of bank credit. This channel is expected to mainly operate 
under conditions of stress with regards to the availability of funds to the banking sector and 
constitutes the channel through which monetary policy exerts an impact on the banks' cost of funds, 
thereby leading to an additional response in bank lending (see Kashyap and Stein, 1994, 2000). The 
respective channel which rests on the failure of the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) proposition of banks, is 
built around the premise that the central bank through its conduct of open market operations can shift 
banks' loan supply schedules (Kashyap and Stein, 1994, 1995).15 Along these lines, a contraction in 
reserves results in banks reducing the supply of loans with a consequent effect on the (higher) cost of 
capital for bank-dependent borrowers. The impact of this channel should in turn be greater for banks 
with less liquid assets since less liquid banks are unable to protect their loan portfolio in the event of a 
monetary tightening simply by drawing down cash and securities (Stein 1998; Kashyap and Stein, 
2000; Kashyap et al., 2002). Thus, to the extent that the central bank supply of bank reserves exceeds 
the banks' demand for liquidity, the latter will expand lending, therefore leading to a consequent 
reduction in the cost of borrowing and the level of bond yields (Joyce et al., 2012). Due to the 
importance attributed to the transmission of liquidity to the banking sector and through that to the real 
                                                            
15 The lending channel further requires a) some borrowers who cannot find perfect substitutes for bank loans and 
b) imperfect price adjustment. More details can be found in Bernanke and Blinder (1998). 
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economy, the ‘‘bank lending’’ channel emerges the primary channel describing the effect of the 
ECB's massive liquidity injection into the European banking system under the LTRO programme. 
In general, the ‘‘portfolio balance’’ and the ‘‘bank lending’’ channels constitute the main 
channels for the transmission of non-standard monetary policy to financial asset-market prices. These 
channels provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the effect of the non-standard policy 
measures implemented by the ECB and the Fed on the European and US financial asset-markets 
respectively in the subsequent empirical chapters. They further constitute the basis for the formulation 
of the hypotheses in the respective chapters, where the large-scale asset purchases and the massive 
liquidity injection by the central banks during the financial and the Eurozone crises are expected to 
have positively affected financial asset-markets. Following the Literature Review in Section 2, this 
Thesis proceeds to the empirical analysis which is presented in Chapters I, II and III of Sections 3-5.  
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3.1. Introduction 
Economic theory maintains that in a frictionless economy with rational investors, asset prices fully 
reflect their fundamental values.16 Given this ‘‘rationality assumption’’, comovement in financial 
asset prices should reflect only comovement in the underlying fundamentals. In practice however, the 
comovement of asset prices is often delinked from shifts in their underlying fundamentals, due to the 
information about these fundamentals being reflected differently on asset prices (see Barberis et al., 
2005).17 
This chapter explores the issue of financial asset price comovement by investigating the price 
comovement and interaction between the stock, bond and CDS markets. Acknowledging the growing 
popularity of index trading, especially that associated with index mutual funds and exchange-traded 
funds, and the consequent surge in the demand for value-weighted or index portfolios (see 
Bhattacharya and Galpin, 2011), it considers data from US and European market indices that enable 
the examination to focus on the information flow between these assets at the market-wide level. 
Particular attention is paid to differences in this interaction when moving from the pre- to the post-
financial crisis periods, as well as from the US to the European market. The examination further 
identifies primitive factors that generate order flow in these assets and, possibly, induce correlated 
movements in their prices. Among these factors it distinguishes the recent trend in central banking of 
quantitative easing and the resulting growth in bank reserves held with the central bank. This is 
motivated by the fact that monetary policy makers might at times respond to large movements in asset 
prices, as has been the case with the rise and the reduction in the Federal funds rate - partly - due to 
the concern over ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ in the mid to late 1990s and over the dot-com bubble in the 
early 2000s respectively (Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). 
                                                            
16 See the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) by Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965; 1970). An analysis of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis is provided in Section 2.1.  
17 This is best described by the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of comovement. These 
theories are presented in Section 2.1. 
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The issue of the empirical interaction between financial assets was brought on the top of the 
agenda due to the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, when the 
concerns about the predominant - but disproportional to its size - role played until that time by the 
CDS market for the global financial system heightened.18 At the same time, the debate about the 
influence of the CDS market has been fuelled by the fall in the CDS market's size from $2.00 trillion 
in early 2007 (and $1694 billion in June 2010) to $670 billion in June 2014.19 These developments in 
the CDS and bond markets, were accompanied by movements in the equity market, with the monthly 
price (in real terms) of the S&P 500 experiencing a plunge of roughly 60% from the October 2007 
peak (1764.23) to the March 2009 trough (733.15), before returning to the 2007 level in September 
2013. 
Still, there is significant unawareness regarding the nature and the specifications of the 
empirical relationship between these three markets. The rise and fall of the CDS market and its 
consequences for the underlying bonds' market enhance this unawareness, as they may have induce 
changes to the morphology of this relationship. Changes that may have been further driven by the 
drop in the stock prices during the 2007-2009 period, the largest since World War II. These 
developments serve in turn as a motivation for the examination of the joint interaction between these 
markets and the way with which this interaction has evolved during the recent decade.  
                                                            
18 It has been argued that - notwithstanding that the net outstanding amount of CDS contracts on European 
sovereign reference entities amounted to $500 billion in early 2012, and thereby constituted a relatively small 
component of the underlying sovereign bonds market - the $4.6 trillion of European bonds backed by CDS 
contracts combined with the remarkable increase in the CDS market's liquidity since 2008, allowed investors to 
leverage their opinion on sovereign credit risk and thus, cause developments in the underlying cash market 
(European Systemic Risk Board, 2013).  
19 However, the market risk transaction activity, which refers to the volume of trading, shows an increase in the 
CDS transaction volumes as measured by notionals from 2011 to 2013; this increase being driven by a surge in 
CDS index trading. 
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The investigation of price comovements is particularly relevant considering the progressively 
stronger linkages across markets, due to faster access to information and trade execution. Most 
importantly, these markets were subject to several information shocks, mainly due to heightened 
market uncertainty during the financial and Eurozone crises, as well as to the unprecedented central 
bank interventions. This in turn provides sufficient variation in price transmission over time, 
especially when the market was under extreme stress; it further highlights the role of central bank 
policy for the interaction of financial markets in this changing economic environment. 
So far the empirical evidence on market comovements and asset-market linkages is mostly 
restricted to the examination of a pair of assets, with the first examination of the joint dynamics 
between the stock, bond and CDS markets being conducted by Longstaff et al. (2003), as part of a 
general examination of the pricing of credit risk in the CDS market. 20 Their vector autoregressive 
(VAR) analysis of a sample of 68 US firms during the 2001-2002 period suggested that the CDS and 
stock markets lead the bond market, while the same VAR representation in the analysis of an 
international sample of 58 firms during 2000-2002 by Norden and Weber (2009) concluded that the 
stock market leads both the CDS and bond markets. A vector error-correction model (VECM) 
representation is also employed by Forte and Pena (2009) to analyze the price discovery process 
between stock market's implied credit spreads and bond and CDS spreads, with results suggesting that 
stocks lead CDSs and bonds more frequently than the opposite, while also lending support to the 
leading role of the CDS market with respect to the bond market. 
                                                            
20 Studies include those by Fama and French (1993), Kwan (1996), Hotchkiss and Ronen (2000), Baele et al. 
(2010) for stocks and corporate bonds (however there is no consensus on which of the two markets has the lead 
over the other), those by Longstaff et al. (2003), Byström (2005), Acharya and Johnson (2007), Fung et al. 
(2008), Norden and Weber (2009), Forte and Pena (2009), for stocks and CDSs (providing dubious results), and 
those by Longstaff et al. (2003), Hull et al. (2004), Blanco et al. (2005), Norden and Weber (2009), Forte and 
Pena (2009), Das et al. (2014), for corporate CDSs and bonds (where information is generally transmitted from 
CDSs to bonds). A detailed review of the literature on the interaction between stock, bond, and CDSs and an 
analysis of the channels of this interaction is provided in Sections 2.2 to 2.3.3. 
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The common characteristic of these studies is the employment of firm-specific data, without a 
consideration of the drivers that induce movements across these asset-markets This chapter 
contributes to the above studies by addressing both issues. First, it shifts the focus of the examination 
to the market-level by employing market indices, which (in contrast to single-name contracts) are able 
to capture the information flow at the market-level, while providing returns representative of the 
broader market. Second, it considers the primitive factors that induce financial asset price movements 
and affect cross-asset interaction. Among those factors it examines the role of monetary policy and in 
particular the shift towards non-standard policy measures. 
The focus attributed to the market level is necessitated by existing evidence that changes in 
single-name securities' prices are driven by systematic and/or firm-specific risk, hence the 
transmission mechanism between asset returns at the firm level may have been influenced by the 
individual securities’ response to changes in market-wide systematic risks and/or to non-systematic 
shocks (Hull et al., 2004; Acharya and Johnson, 2007). Thus, the employment of market indices limits 
the noises in information flow due to firm-specific risks and enables the segregation of the impact of 
market-wide factors from that of the idiosyncratic ones, allowing that way the analysis to concentrate 
on market risk solely. Idiosyncratic risks, such as asymmetric information and insider trading 
problems, have been documented to have a strong presence in the CDS market (Acharya and Johnson, 
2007; Fung et al., 2008). The vast  exposure of the CDS market to idiosyncratic risks is due to the 
nature of the credit derivatives market itself, since by definition almost all major players are insiders 
(Acharya et al., 2007). These risks have also important implications for the efficiency of credit risk 
pricing as well as for credit risk transfer, e.g., to the underlying securities such as corporate bonds, 
thereby adding noise to the information flow between them (Acharya et al., 2007). 
The idiosyncrasies further impact on the credit risk - and thus on the information - flowing 
from the CDS markets to the stock markets, with this flow being concentrated on days with negative 
credit news and for entities that experience adverse credit events. However, additional noise on the 
stock-CDS information flow arises from the fact that idiosyncrasies, such as insider trading, are also 
heavily present in the stock market, with a number of studies documenting that insider trading lowers 
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liquidity and increases trading costs (see Easley et al., 1996; Chun and Charoenwong, 1998; Bettis et 
al., 2000; Brockman and Chung, 2003; Fishe and Robe, 2004). This is dictated by the basic tenet of 
market microstructure theory according to which, liquidity partially reflects the information 
asymmetry created by informed traders; thus market makers may alter the quoted depth as well as the 
bid-ask spreads (i.e., the primary measure of asset liquidity) in response to perceived increases in 
insider trading (Kavajecz, 1998; Dupont, 2000). Since liquidity is one of the main channels for the 
propagation of information between assets, insider trading is elevated into a primary determinant of 
stock-CDS interaction.21 Despite its effect on stock liquidity, insider trading furthers raises the cost of 
equity capital (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002) and results in greater volatility (Du and Wei, 2004).22  
Given these adverse effects on the information flow between stocks, bonds and credit 
derivatives any study on the interaction between single-name contracts must take into account the 
idiosyncrasies present. Due to the employment of market indices these idiosyncrasies are diversified 
away and are prohibited from adding bias to the directional relationship of the information flow 
between different assets. The removal of these idiosyncrasies is especially important for investors in 
CDS and equity market indices as well as investors in general, since market indices serve as 
benchmarks for the evaluation of single-name investments.  
The segregation of these idiosyncrasies is further important in order to consider the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, which constitutes the second contribution of this chapter. In this 
respect, the examination of the information flow at the market level is crucial since monetary policy 
aims at affecting broader economic and financial market aggregates. The consideration of the role of 
monetary policy is an essential component of this chapter's analysis and enables the extension of 
previous studies on an issue that remains unexplored: the identification of the factors that generate 
order flow in financial asset-markets and result in correlated price movements between them. Among 
those factors, monetary policy emerges as the principal candidate for causing movements in financial 
                                                            
21 A description of the liquidity channel and the ways with which affects the comovement and interaction 
between assets is provided in Section 2.4. 
22 The importance of volatility for cross-asset interaction is analyzed in Section 2.5. 
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asset-markets, especially when considering that through their impact on asset prices and returns, 
central banks try to modify economic behaviour in ways that will help to achieve their ultimate 
objectives (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). However, the 2007-2008 financial crisis has casted doubts 
on the ability of central banks to achieve their objectives; due to the shocks to credit markets from the 
financial crisis, the argument is that monetary policy is unable to lower the cost of credit and hence, 
renders central banks ineffective, or to express it differently: 
‘‘We are already, however, well into the realm of what I call depression economics. By that I mean 
a state of affairs like that of the 1930s in which the usual tools of monetary policy - above all the 
Federal Reserve’s ability to pump up the economy by cutting interest rates - have lost all traction’’  
(Krugman, 2008) 
Thus, this chapter contributes to the debate about the (in)effectiveness of monetary policy in 
times of crisis. Although the Keynesian tradition argues against the effectiveness of conventional and 
non-conventional measures during extreme market stress, some recent approaches (see Mishkin, 
2009; Curdia and Woodford, 2011) suggest a greater role for those measures. Along these lines this 
chapter's contribution further concerns the consideration of the recent shift in central bank thinking 
and practice: in this new environment of zero and even negative interest rates, monetary policy is 
conducted by means of central bank balance sheet expansion through the purchase of assets. The 
novelty of the examination is not limited to the evaluation of the impact of monetary policy on asset 
prices and their interaction, it is further extended to the determination of the channel of monetary 
transmission. The adoption of a vector auto-regression (VAR) model with sign restrictions enables for 
the identification of the channel through which non-standard measures are transmitted to asset prices. 
Most importantly, it allows for a consideration of a counterfactual: how monetary transmission 
changes in the event where this channel does not operate? 
The results of this chapter's empirical analysis indicate differences in the timing with which 
information is reflected in the stock, bond and CDS markets. These differences are more evident in 
Europe pre-crisis, and in the US post-crisis where, consistent with ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-
based’’ theories of comovement (see Barberis et al., 1998; 2005; Boyer, 2011), index comovement 
58 
 
appears to be delinked from the underlying fundamentals.23 During these periods, information about 
fundamentals is found to be reflected first in stocks and then transmitted to corporate bonds and 
CDSs. Results also point to a rather low degree of integration in the European financial markets 
before the financial crisis and a moderate improvement thereafter. Thus, the stock index emerges as 
the asset that assumes the central role in the information transmission to the credit and derivatives 
market indices. 
The results further reveal that measures of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy stance 
induce greater movements in the US market indices after the financial crisis, with these post-crisis 
movements generally being greater than the movements induced by similar measures of the ECB's 
policy stance in the European market indices. This in turn lends support to the Federal Reserve's 
implementation of non-standard policies. In addition, measures of banks reserves held with the central 
bank exert a considerable influence on US market indices, providing a rationale for the supply of bank 
reserves as an instrument of US monetary policy. The effect of monetary policy on asset prices is 
primarily transmitted through the stock market. In this respect, the counterfactual analysis reveals that 
when this channel is not operative, the ECB's monetary policy is transmitted distortedly on the 
European corporate bond market. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 sets the hypotheses, Section 
3.3 describes the dataset, Section 3.4 analyzes the joint dynamics between the market indices and 
Section 3.5 analyzes the role of macroeconomic variables. Section 3.6 concludes.  
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and the Merton-originated structural models of default risk maintain 
that in efficient markets the firms' default probability should have already been incorporated in the 
stock market. Thus, in the event of a firm facing unfavourable financial conditions, the probability of 
                                                            
23 For a discussion of the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of comovement see Section 2.1. 
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default on the respective firm's bonds and other obligations goes up, lowering that way the firm's 
financial soundness; this comprises the fundamental basis of arbitrage between equity and debt.24 
Therefore, the choice of the respective assets is based on their potential inter-linkage. 
Furthermore, especially pre-crisis, the increasing use of derivatives in the pursuit of higher yields 
across traditional asset classes has tighten the relationships between various assets, thereby prompting 
the expectation of transmission of volatility and information. Moreover, the credit derivatives market 
has possibly overreacted during the crisis, paving the way for contagion phenomena between different 
markets. According to the IMF (2007), a potential volatility shock or contagion episodes in the 
financial system could trigger a series of drastic portfolio adjustments and disorderly unwinding of 
positions. These developments pre- and during the crisis provide further impetus to the chapter's 
research question. 
Despite this theoretically-expected negative correlation of stocks relative to bonds and CDSs, 
information is expected to be transmitted from the stock and CDS markets to the bond market, i.e., 
from the most liquid market to the less liquid one.25 This is commanded by the flexibility and the 
institutional features of the stock and CDS markets relative to those of the bond market, as well as 
their increased liquidity relative to that of the bond market (Fung et al., 2008; Norden and Weber, 
2009; Corzo et al., 2012). We expect this relationship to be evident in Europe pre-crisis, where we 
anticipate that the stock market leads the less liquid and of a smaller size corporate bond and CDS 
markets. 
Hypothesis 1: In Europe pre-crisis, the stock and CDS market indices lead the bond market 
index. The stock index leads the CDS market index. 
                                                            
24 The Merton-originated structural models of default risk and the theoretical framework governing the 
interaction between stocks, bonds, and CDSs are analyzed in Section 2.2. 
25 An analysis of the previous studies according to which the stock market is expected to lead the information 
transmission process is provided in Sections 2.2 to 2.3.3. Furthermore, the importance of liquidity for the 
information transmission and interaction between the stock, bond, and CDS markets is analyzed in Section 2.4. 
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However there are reasons to expect that these relationships do not automatically hold and 
that they exhibit differences when we move from the pre- to the post-crisis period, or from the US to 
the European market. Therefore, three additional hypotheses are formulated which correspond to the 
pre- and post-crisis periods in the US and the post-crisis period in Europe respectively. 
The greater degree of market integration in the US relative to Europe, combined with the 
greater size and liquidity of the US corporate CDS market predisposes us to expect the existence of 
two-way linkages between all three US indices. This proposition is further supported by the sweeping 
reforms made by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in July 2002 which resulted 
in an improvement in the transparency and liquidity of the corporate bond market (Edwards et al., 
2004; Bessembinder et al., 2006; Goldstein et al. 2007; Downing et al., 2007).26 That leads to a 
different hypothesis about the joint dynamics between the three US markets: 
Hypothesis 2: In the US pre-crisis, there is bidirectional transmission of information between 
the market indices.  
We also anticipate that post-crisis the joint dynamics of the US and European indices are 
different compared to the period before. This is mainly attributed to regulatory changes after the  
financial crisis that impacted negatively on liquidity and diminished the risk appetite by market 
intermediaries. Prominent among these changes are regulatory reforms such as Basel III or the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. These reforms have 
resulted in greater capital and liquidity requirements for banks and financial intermediaries, thereby 
diminishing their ability to maintain large inventories of corporate bonds; they further reduced the 
                                                            
26 In July 2002 the NASD engaged in sweeping reforms of the reporting requirements for over-the-counter 
corporate bond transactions in order to enhance the transparency of the corporate bond market, with these 
reforms resulting in the public transmission of information on most corporate bond transactions through the 
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine, or TRACE (see Downing, 2007). 
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return on capital of market-making activity.27 The end result was a decline in dealer inventories, as 
well as in the ability for dealers to act as effective market-makers.  
Hypothesis 3: In the US post-crisis, the stock index leads the bond and CDS indices. The bond 
index leads the CDS index. 
The lead of the stock index in Hypothesis 3 is based on the previous arguments about the 
implementation and the impact of regulatory reforms. In addition, the decreased liquidity of the 
corporate bond and CDS markets relative to that of the stock market post-crisis, weakens the linkages 
between stocks on the one hand and bonds and CDSs on the other, by decreasing the impediments to 
arbitrage, which are considered by theory as a fundamental factor of the equity-credit market 
integration (Kapadia and Pu, 2012). It is reasonable to expect a greater role of the corporate bond 
market relative to that of the CDS market post-crisis. This argument is only partly based on the 
vertical drop in the size and liquidity of the corporate CDS market post-crisis. It is further supported 
by the reversal of the migration of institutional investors to the CDS market, that rendered the bond 
market less liquid and inactive. In addition, despite its negative impact on the corporate bond market, 
the Dodd-Frank Act is associated with increasing bond returns and decreased stock returns, thereby 
strengthening  the channel flowing from the stock to the bond market, raising the latter market's 
importance for investors (Gao et al., 2011). In any case, we expect a disassociation between the bond 
and CDS indices, since the correlation between similar assets decreases with liquidity (Beber et al., 
2009). 
In Europe the situation is different. On the one hand we would expect the market indices to be 
more integrated post-crisis, mainly due to the ongoing process of financial integration in the EMU. 
This argument is further reinforced by the fact that the comovement between asset prices tends to be 
excessively high during volatile periods.28 However, this expectation is challenged  by the arguments 
                                                            
27 Furthermore, the Volcker Rule proprietary trading prohibition has exerted a significant impact on Over-The-
Counter trading desks, given intermingled activity. 
28 See French and Roll (1986), Hamao et al., (1990), Andersen, (1996). An analysis of the role of volatility for 
the transmission of information between different assets is provided in Section 2.5. 
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about the role of liquidity as a positive contributor to the correlation and integration between similar 
assets. The sovereign debt crisis has adversely affected liquidity in both the European bond and CDS 
markets. This drop in liquidity is further bolstered by the November 2012 ban on short selling, and the 
lack of post-trade transparency, especially in the bond and CDS markets. Thus, the above arguments 
about the deteriorating liquidity in the bond and CDS markets lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: In Europe post-crisis, the stock index leads the bond and CDS indices.  
Since the comovement of different markets might be attributed to a lead-lag relationship 
between the prices of these markets, in the event where macroeconomic or monetary shocks become 
reflected in one market before the other, then price movements in one market could influence price 
movements in the other; this in turn may indicate an indirect channel for the transmission of monetary 
policy to the price of one market via the price of another market (Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009). On the 
empirical front, there is a number of studies examining the relation of macroeconomic fundamentals 
and macroeconomic news to asset pricing dynamics, differentiating on several grounds, such as the 
choice of news, the market under examination (bonds, stocks, or currencies) and the statistical 
approach.29  
However, the nature of the relationship between asset price comovement and monetary policy 
during a period of changing economic and monetary conditions, has not been examined thus far. This 
relationship is nevertheless expected to be considerably strong, since for example, accommodative 
monetary policy may favourably affect asset prices through its effect on liquidity (Garcia, 1989), as 
well as on volatility (Harvey and Huang, 2002) and interest rates (Kuttner, 2001).30 Still, monetary 
policy may have a different effect on financial assets due to fundamental differences between those 
                                                            
29 See inter alia Jones et al. (1998), Engle (1998), Fleming and Remolona (1999), Balduzzi et al. (2001), Kuttner 
(2001), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Boyd et al. (2005), Goyenko and 
Ukhov (2009). 
30 Of course falling asset prices might also induce the central bank to ease its monetary stance, thereby 
highlighting the possibility of reverse causality (see Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009). 
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assets.31 Macroeconomic factors such as unexpected productivity declines and inflationary shocks are 
further expected to affect asset prices directly and indirectly through their effect on liquidity and 
volatility (Strongin, 1995; Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009).32 Whether the response to monetary policy 
shocks and macroeconomic information is different across the three markets is an empirical question 
that this chapter explores. 
Hypothesis 5: The impact of monetary shocks is greater post-crisis. Post-crisis, the impact is 
greater in the US than in Europe.  
It is reasonable to expect a greater role for monetary policy during recessions. This is also 
suggested by models of market segmentation according to which, asset purchases are particularly 
more effective in lowering asset prices when markets are not functioning normally (see among others 
Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010).33 However, differences are further 
expected regarding the impact of monetary policy between the US and Europe, especially when 
considering the non-traditional character of the policies implemented by the Fed and the ECB in 
response to the financial and Eurozone crises.34 In specific, there is evidence that the Fed's Large-
Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) have a significant impact in lowering corporate credit risk, as well as 
in reducing the cost of insuring against default-risk (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2013).  
On the other hand, the ECB's bond purchases and Long-Term Refinancing Operations 
(LTROs) announcements had an effect mostly on sovereign yields, especially on those of the 
periphery countries (Rogers et al., 2014). The hypothesis is further supported by the argument that the 
                                                            
31 Stock prices are affected through the discount rate and potentially expected dividends, bond prices through 
expectations of future short rates and potentially the term premium, and CDS spreads through the discount rate 
and potentially through the probability of default. 
32 While an increase in productivity is expected to increase return on risky investments and therefore, cause an 
outflow from the bond and CDS markets into the stock market, the effect of inflation shocks is still uncertain.  
33 The channels for the transmission of monetary policy are presented in Section 2.6.2. 
34 A description of measures of non-standard monetary policy is provided in Section 2.6.1. 
64 
 
propagation of monetary policy depends on arbitrageur risk.35 Due to the increased risk aversion in 
Europe (as evidenced by the flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity flows to the German government 
bonds) we expect the propagation of monetary policy to be limited relative to the US. Additional 
support comes from the fact that one of the channels of monetary policy transmission is through bond 
yields into the other asset prices, and the evidence that this pass-through is greater for the US (Rogers 
at al., 2014). An additional factor is that the ECB's willingness to implement unconventional policies 
was slowed due to considerations about the “unusual” character of the measures, contrary to the US 
where the Fed's accommodative policy was initiated at an earlier stage.  
 
3.3. Data 
The data employed in the analysis is comprised of daily and weekly mid-prices, i.e., the mid-points 
between bid quotes and ask quotes, for the major stock, bond, and CDS indices in the US and Europe 
over the 2004-2014 period. Since the study is examining the empirical relationship between the three 
markets as this is evolved during the last decade and considering the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
the whole sample is divided into two different sub-periods, the period before and after the financial 
crisis respectively. The cut-off date for the partition of the sample is the 31/08/2008, which 
corresponds to the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers and is associated with the escalation of the 
crisis. This cut-off date is further employed in the literature (see Bai and Collin-Dufresne, 2011) and 
is additionally confirmed by the Bai and Perron test for structural breaks.36 In addition the months 
following the Lehman Brothers' collapse were associated with a repricing in sovereign credit risk and 
a surge in risk aversion within the European context, therefore indicating the spread of the US-
originated crisis to the international financial markets and the materialization of the global financial 
                                                            
35 See model of preferred habitat by Vayanos and Vila, (2009). A discussion of this model can also be found in 
Section 2.6.2. 
36 The Bai and Perron test for structural breaks is presented in Table 3.2. As a robustness check the cut-off date 
is set on 10 May 2010, which corresponds to the ECB's announcement of its securities markets programme 
(SMP) and coincides with the escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
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crisis. Therefore, the first sub-period refers to the period before the main phase of the global financial 
crisis (27/09/2004 (in the US) and 22/06/2004 (in Europe) until 31/08/2008).37 The second is the 
period after the Lehman Brothers collapse and covers the worst effects of the financial crisis on the 
markets (from 01/09/2008 until 31/05/2014).  Section 3.3.1 introduces the indices selected from the 
stock, bond, and CDS markets. Detailed information about the source, and the calculation of the 
market indices is provided in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3.1. The stock market  
The sample contains last prices of the S&P 500 Index, a capitalization-weighted index designed to 
measure the performance of the broad US economy through changes in the aggregate market value of 
500 stocks representing all major industries. For Europe, the FTSE Eurotop 100 Index is selected, an 
index composed of 100 of the most highly capitalized blue chip companies in Europe (based in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom). 
The index measures the collective performance of the most actively traded stocks on the major 
European stock exchanges, representing the European stock market as a whole.38 
 
3.3.2. The bond market 
The dataset consists of last prices of the BofA Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate Master Index, an index 
comprised of publicly-issued, fixed-rate, nonconvertible investment grade dollar-denominated, SEC-
registered corporate debt having at least one year to maturity and an outstanding par value of at least 
$250 million. For the European market the iBoxx Euro Corporate Bond Index, is employed, which is 
comprised of investment grade fixed-coupon bonds, step-ups, rating-driven bonds, and other bonds 
                                                            
37 The starting date for the US is one year after the first CDS index for the US market was launched and 
constitutes the first business day for which data is available for. In Europe, the starting date corresponds to the 
introduction of the first CDS index for the European market. 
38 The information on the S&P 500 Index is provided by S&P Dow Jones Indices and by Bloomberg. The 
information on the FTSE Eurotop 100 Index is provided by FTSE Russell and by Nasdaq. 
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with known cash flows, all with minimum maturity of 1 year, and minimum issue of €500 million. 
The indices are weighted by the market value of their outstanding bonds in order to be representative 
of the market, since no other weighting scheme would permit a uniform portfolio held jointly by all 
investors. In addition, this scheme is perfectly aligned with passive investing strategy; since the 
constituent bonds are at market-value proportions, the weights will evolve over time, automatically 
adjusting, thereby relieving investors of the need to update the portfolios weights.39 
 
3.3.3. The CDS market 
The dataset includes last prices of the Markit CDX North American Investment Grade Index, which is 
composed of 100 liquid North American entities with high yield credit ratings that trade in the CDS 
market. For the European market, the Markit iTraxx Europe Index is employed, the benchmark index 
for Europe, consisting of 125 liquid European entities with investment grade credit ratings that trade 
in the CDS market. The entities comprising the index are primarily from Great Britain, France, and 
Germany (weights of 22%, 21%, and 14% respectively), and secondarily from the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Italy (weights of 9%, 8%, and 6% respectively).For both indices 5-year maturities are 
considered, since the 5-year tenor consists the most liquid and frequently quoted part of the credit 
curve and therefore, the most traded maturity for CDS contracts.40  
 
3.3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 contain descriptive statistics for the price level and the percentage changes (in 
basis points (bps)) in the stock and bond indices, and the spread and the change in the spread of the 
                                                            
39 The countries covered by the European bond index are primarily France, Germany, Italy, and secondarily 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain. The 
information on the BofA Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate Master Index is provided by the ETF Database. The 
information on the iBoxx Euro Corporate Bond Index is provided by Markit. 
40 The information on the Markit CDX North American Investment Grade Index and the Markit iTraxx Europe 
Index is provided by Markit. 
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CDS indices.41 Even though the mean change in the bond index is of the same magnitude in both the 
US and Europe (around 2 basis points), the mean change in the US stock and CDS indices is 2 and 10 
times that of their European counterparts (3 bps versus 1.7 bps, and 0.10 bps compared to 0.01 bps for 
the stock and CDS indices respectively). 
[Insert Tables 3.3 and 3.4 about here] 
In the US, all indices exhibit positive mean changes during the pre- and post-crisis periods; 
interestingly, the post-crisis value of the CDS index is 6 times lower than pre-crisis and close to zero 
(0.035 bps). Similarly, all European indices exhibit positive mean returns (and CDS spread changes) 
during the pre-crisis period. The same pattern is observed post-crisis, with the exception of the CDS 
index where the mean change is slightly negative (-0.019 bps). However, financial markets appear 
more volatile post-2008, with market indices generally exhibiting higher standard deviation compared 
to their pre-crisis values, probably due to the unfolding Eurozone crisis.  
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
Figure 3.1 presents the evolution in the level of the US and European market indices. In the 
US, the onset of the 2007 financial crisis is marked by a significant and steady increase in the spread 
of the CDS index, reaching its peak in mid-2008 during the Lehman Brothers collapse. This rise in 
CDS spreads was accompanied by a steep fall in the price of the stock and bond indices until about 
the spring of 2009, when they started rising back to their previous levels. The turbulence in the 
European financial markets is mainly observed in two stages; the first is during the US-originated  
crisis and on the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2009, while the second begins after the second half of 
2011. The months leading to the Greece debt restructuring in early 2012 managed to temporarily calm 
                                                            
41 In contrast to the stock and bond indices which are comprised of the prices of the constituent stocks and bonds 
respectively, the CDS indices are quoted at a theoretical traded spread in basis points; hence, the change in the 
CDS index is also quoted in basis points. To ensure the comparability of the market indices, as in Fung et al. 
(2008), Norden and Weber (2009), Corzo et al. (2012), the percentage change in each of the stock and bond 
market indices is calculated and converted to basis points, i.e., the following equation is employed:  
ሾሺIndex	Price	at	time	ܶ െ Index	Price	at	time	ܶ െ 1ሻ Index	Price	at	time	ܶ െ 1⁄ ሿ	ݔ	10000. 
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the markets, however a new CDS spread hike occurred until about ECB's verbal intervention in 
September 2012. 
 
3.4. Vector Autoregression Analysis 
3.4.1. Methodology 
This section includes the analysis of the intertemporal comovement of the stock, corporate bond, and 
corporate CDS market indices within the context of the US and European markets. Since this chapter's 
hypotheses are based on the fundamental assumption that information is first reflected in an asset and 
then transmitted to the other with a lag, the econometric specification must account for the dynamic 
structure of the variables selected. For that reason, a three-dimensional vector autoregressive model is 
employed in order to examine the joint interaction of the market indices, due to the particular model's 
ability to capture lead-lag relationships within and between stationary variables in a simultaneous 
multivariate framework.VAR models have also been used extensively in the literature on 
comovements (see Gwilym and Mike, 2001; Engsted and Tanggaard, 2004; Longstaff et al., 2005; 
Blanco et al., 2005; Norden and Weber, 2009; Longstaff, 2010).42 To further check whether the 
market indices are cointegrated and therefore an error correction term should be included in the VAR 
equation the Johansen test for cointegration is employed. The results of the test in Table 3.5 provide 
evidence of zero cointegrating equations, thereby suggesting a VAR model without an error 
correction term.43 
[Insert Tables 3.5 about here] 
Hence, the following VAR model of order p, where ௧ܻ is a (3 × 1) vector, is selected to model 
the lead-lag relationship between the stock, bond, and CDS indices 
 ௧ܻ ൌ ܿ ൅ ∑ Π௜ ௧ܻି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ ,                                                                                                  (3.1) 
                                                            
42 For a review of the literature on asset comovement see Sections 2.2. to 2.3.3. 
43 The results of the Johansen test are presented in Table 3.5. 
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where ௧ܻ = ( ଵܻ௧ , ଶܻ௧ , ଷܻ௧)', c is a  (3 × 1) vector of intercept terms, Π௜ is a (3 × 3) coefficient 
matrix, ߝ௧ is a (3 × 1)  vector of innovations following a multivariate normal distribution with 
variance Σ, and t = 1,........,T. The empirical form of the VAR model is:  
ܱܵܶܥܭ௧ ൌ ܿଵ ൅෍ ߙଵ೔ܱܵܶܥܭ௧ି௜
௣
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ ߚଵ೔߂ܥܦܵ௧ି௜
௤
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ ߛଵ೔ܤܱܰܦ௧ି௜
௥
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝଵ೟   (3.2) 
߂ܥܦܵ௧ ൌ ܿଶ ൅෍ ߙଶ೔ܱܵܶܥܭ௧ି௜
௣
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ ߚଶ೔߂ܥܦܵ௧ି௜
௤
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ ߛଶ೔ܤܱܰܦ௧ି௜
௥
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝଶ೟     (3.3)  
ܤܱܰܦ௧ ൌ ܿଷ ൅෍ ߙଷ೔ܱܵܶܥܭ௧ି௜
௣
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ ߚଷ೔߂ܥܦܵ௧ି௜
௤
௜ୀଵ
൅෍ ߛଷ೔ܤܱܰܦ௧ି௜
௥
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝଷ೟   (3.4) 
Where ܱܵܶܥܭ௧  is the daily return on the stock market index, ߂ܥܦܵ௧ is the daily change in 
the spread of the corporate CDS market index, ܤܱܰܦ௧ is the daily return on the corporate bond 
market index.44 The lag structure and the maximum lag order p, q, r have been determined using the 
Akaike-Information (AIC) and the Schwarz-Information (SIC) criteria.45 The motivation for placing 
the CDS index before the bond index comes from the fact that the CDS market is more liquid and 
hence might induce movements in the bond market of a larger magnitude and at a more frequent rate 
than vice versa (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Blanco et al., 2005).  
 
                                                            
44 As reported in Section 3.3.4, the returns in the stock and bond indices are multiplied by 100, i.e., they are 
percentage changes. The term ''return'' is used for expositional convenience. 
45 The lag length depends on the nature of the series (daily or weekly), the market (US and Europe) and the 
period examined (pre- and post-crisis), and it varies from eight to twelve and from four to seven for the daily 
and weekly frequency respectively. When the AIC and SIC criteria provide different results for the optimum lag 
size, the model is estimated according to both criteria, although a preference is given to the AIC especially when 
the frequency of the data decreases. This is because the AIC tends to produce more accurate impulse responses 
for all realistic sample sizes, particularly in low-frequency data; AIC also results in the highest average 
reduction in mean-squared error compared to other criteria (Ivanov and Kilian, 2005). A Lagrange-Multiplier is 
implemented to test autocorrelation in the residuals at the lag order selected. 
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3.4.2. The Interaction of Stocks, Bond, and CDS Market Indices  
Table 3.6 presents the results from the VAR analysis of the daily series, where there is evidence of 
two-way linkages across market indices. The only case in which we observe a clear lead of one index 
over the other indices is in Europe pre-crisis, where lagged corporate CDS spread changes and lagged 
corporate bond returns have no significant impact on stock returns, thereby confirming the stock 
market's lead over both the corporate CDS and bond markets stipulated in Hypothesis 1. However, 
contrary to Hypothesis 4, post-crisis this one-way relationship is no longer observable, since both the 
corporate CDS and bond indices begin to induce movements in the stock index.46  
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
In the US, there is evidence that stock returns lead corporate bond returns pre-crisis; however 
there is a bidirectional relationship between stock returns and corporate CDS spread changes, since 
the latter do exert some impact (albeit small) on the former, suggesting that Hypothesis 2 is not 
verified. Similarly to Europe, we observe a two-way relationship between all three US indices post-
crisis, although the corporate CDS market's impact is considerably small and occurs at later lags, 
suggesting a significant influence (if not lead) on the part of the stock market. This in turn verifies the 
argument in Hypothesis 3 about the stock-CDS relationship, but not that about the stock-bond 
relationship. Hypothesis 2 is only partially confirmed with regards to the CDS-bond relationship, 
since in the pre-crisis US, corporate CDSs lead corporate bonds; nevertheless, this relationship is 
reversed post-crisis, with the corporate bond index obtaining the lead over the corporate CDS index, 
thereby lending support to Hypothesis 3.  
In Europe however, there is a two-way interaction between the corporate CDS and bond 
markets during both sub-periods. Interestingly, there is a fundamental difference between Europe and 
the US regarding the nature of the impact of bond returns on CDS spread changes. While this impact 
                                                            
46 In particular the corporate CDS index coefficients have both signs, while those of the bond index are positive 
and larger with a size equal to 0.74 at the first lag. 
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is negative in the US, during the pre-crisis period in Europe the corporate bond index impacts 
positively on the corporate CDS index at the first lag (the coefficient is 1.7).47 
To verify the findings from the VAR analysis a Granger causality test is performed for the 
same set of market indices in Europe and the US. The Granger test uses the information from the 
VAR to examine the ability of each of the market indices to induce movements (Granger cause) in 
each of the other market indices. By regressing the dependent variable ݕ on its own lagged values and 
on the lagged values of the independent variable ߯ the Granger causality test examines whether the 
lagged coefficients of ߯ are jointly zero. The test's null hypothesis is that the variable ߯ does not 
Granger cause variable ݕ. In table 3.7 the cell associated with the ݅௧௛		row variable and the ݆௧௛ column 
variable shows the ߯ଶ statistics and corresponding p-values in parentheses. Looking at the US in 
Panel A, the value in the cell (1,3) is 27.936 and significant at the 1% level thereby suggesting that 
during the pre-crisis period the stock market index Granger causes the bond market index. On the 
contrary, the value in the cell (3,1) is 6.569 and statistically insignificant, which indicates that during 
the same period, movements in the US bond market index are not informative for the US stock market 
index. The remaining coefficients from the Granger causality tests in Panels A and B of Table 3.7 are 
interpreted similarly.  
[Insert Table 3.7 about here] 
The results from the Granger causality test provide evidence of two-way causation between 
market indices, thereby standing in contrast to a strand of the literature that argues in favour of the 
stock market's lead in terms of information transmission (see among others Norden and Weber, 2009; 
Forte and Pena, 2009).48 However, there are also cases where causality runs solely from one index 
(mainly the stock) to the other; this is evident in Europe pre-crisis and in the US post-crisis, where 
causality runs strictly from the stock to the corporate CDS and bond markets. Stock returns appear 
informative in predicting corporate bond returns since the stock index Granger causes the corporate 
                                                            
47 This suggests that corporate bond investors in Europe resort instantly to the corporate CDS market for 
protection, thereby bidding CDS spreads up; nevertheless, this relationship is no longer evident post-crisis. 
48 A detailed presentation of the previous studies' findings is provided in Sections 2.2, 2.3.1, and 2.3.2. 
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bond index in Europe pre-crisis, and in US during both sub-periods. Stock returns further contain 
information for corporate CDS spread changes since the stock index appears to Granger cause the 
corporate CDS index in Europe pre-crisis, while there is no causal effect stemming from the corporate 
CDS index. The declining CDS market's importance for the US post-crisis is also verified by the one-
way Granger causality from the stock and bond indices to the CDS index. This is contrary to the 
corporate CDS market's role pre-crisis, where it appears to Granger cause returns in both the US and 
European corporate bond markets, without evidence of reverse causality. In Europe however, 
corporate CDSs Granger cause corporate bonds (and not vice versa), indicating that the corporate 
CDS market still contains information for movements in corporate bond returns after the crisis. 
The implications of these results concern the direction and timing of information transmission 
across the stock, bond, and CDS markets. When these asset-markets are disassociated from 
underlying fundamentals, information primarily stems from the stock market index and directs to the 
corporate bond and CDS market indices, verifying the ability of the stock index in accurately 
reflecting information at the market level. From the investor perspective, this lead of the stock index 
identifies the respective asset as the driver of movements in the bond and CDS market indices and 
constitutes it as the asset to watch in order to forecast/anticipate movements in the bond and CDS 
indices. They additionally reveal that the importance of the corporate CDS market is only confined 
within the European context and not in the US, suggesting that US stock and bond market indices are 
more accurate reflectors of corporate default risk. The overall implications of the VAR analysis are 
discussed in Section 3.4.4. 
 
3.4.3. Robustness Analysis 
The chapter's findings so far suggest that the dynamics between the selected market indices exhibit 
differences when moving from the pre- to the post-crisis period and/or when moving from the US to 
the European market. The present section checks the robustness of these findings. The first robustness 
check allows for the decreased liquidity in the CDS market post-crisis, and places the corporate bond 
market index before the corporate CDS market index in the VAR specification of equations (3.2)-
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(3.4). The results are virtually the same under the alternative ordering. A further test concerns the 
change of the cut-off date for the European market indices to 10 May 2010, which corresponds to the 
intensification of the Eurozone crisis. Results show that although pre-crisis the stock index induces 
movements in the corporate bond and CDS indices of a significant size and at many lags, the latter 
also exert an impact - albeit small - on the former (results are omitted for brevity). This suggests that 
the relatively improved integration in the European markets observed post-crisis is a an ongoing 
process that is enhanced, but not entirely driven, by the sovereign debt crisis. 
[Insert Tables 3.8 and 3.9 about here] 
The VAR analysis is additionally conducted at the weekly frequency with the inclusion of the 
exogenous variables to control for possible influences. Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), the 
following exogenous variables are included in the VAR:  
The 10-Year Government bond yield: This includes weekly series of the 10-year benchmark 
Treasury rates for the US (ΔTRATE), and the 10-year German government bond yield for Europe 
(ΔGDBR).   
The slope of the term structure: The slope of the yield curve is defined as the difference 
between the 10-year and 2-year benchmark Treasury yields for the US (USSLOPE), and the 
difference between the 10-year and 2-year German government bond yields for Europe 
(EURSLOPE). This proxy is considered by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) to serve two purposes; an 
indication of expectations of the future level of short rates, and a measure of overall economic health. 
Implied volatility for the CBOE index: a measure of global risk aversion in the financial 
markets (ΔVIX for both the US and Europe). 
Thus, the alternative ordering becomes: STOCK, ΔCDS, BOND, ΔTRATE, USSLOPE, 
ΔVIX for the US, and STOCK, ΔCDS, BOND, ΔGDBR, EURSLOPE, ΔVIX for Europe. Results in 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 indicate that the lead-lag and the Granger causality relationships still hold for the 
model with exogenous variables. The most notable difference concerns the coefficients' size, which is 
slightly greater in the absence of the exogenous variables; this serves as an indication that the latter 
variables pick up a portion of the impact of the endogenous variables on other endogenous variables 
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in the model.49 In addition, in the pre-crisis US, a bidirectional (instead of a unidirectional) causality 
is observed between the stock and corporate bond indices.  
 
3.4.4. Discussion 
Modern portfolio theory (see Markowitz, 1952) proposes how rational investors should use 
diversification with imperfectly correlated assets in order to optimize their portfolio with respect to its 
expected return and its risk or volatility. Thus, the econometric analysis of Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 
provided information regarding the correlation and the dynamic interaction of a number of selected 
assets in order to assist in the construction of portfolios. This is of particular importance, especially 
when considering passive investment strategies, which are predominantly based on the use of market 
indices. Investors can diversify their portfolios across assets if this appears to be optimal in an 
expected risk-return sense; having all available information about asset comovements, like 
correlations of returns and transmission of shocks between assets, is therefore essential in making 
such an optimal asset allocation decision (Perold, 2004; Brandt and Diebold, 2006).  
It appears that the morphology of the relationship between the market indices examined 
exhibits a number of differences when moving from the pre- to the post-crisis period, or from the US 
to the European market; this morphology is to a moderate degree similar to that suggested by previous 
                                                            
49 As a sensitivity check the VAR analysis is conducted by replacing the selected market indices with a number 
of alternative indices. The additional indices employed for the stock market include the Russell 3000 Index, and 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index for the US, and the FTSEurofirst 300 Index and the EURO STOXX 50 
Index for Europe. For the corporate bond market the indices selected are the Barclays Capital US Corporate 
Investment Grade Index, and the Barclays Capital US Corporate High Yield Index for the US, and the Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch EMU Corporate Bond Index, and the iBoxx Liquid Euro Corporate Index for Europe. 
For the corporate CDS market, the Markit North American High Yield Index and the Markit iTraxx Europe 
HiVol Index are selected for the US, and the European market respectively. The VAR specification with the 
alternative indices yields essentially the same results with the initial indices, probably due to the significantly 
high correlation between intra-asset indices. 
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empirical studies, however considerable deviations from those studies are also manifested.50 The 
econometric results reveal a difference in the timing with which information is reflected in the market 
indices. The importance of the issue of the timing and the amount of information transmitted from one 
index (market) to the other lies in its use for asset allocation purposes, since informational spillovers 
constitute the crux of dynamic cross-market hedging strategies (see Fleming et al., 1998; Kodres and 
Pritsker, 2002). This difference in the reflection of information is more evident in Europe pre-crisis, 
and in the US post-crisis where, consistent with ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of 
comovement (see Barberis et al., 1998; 2005; Boyer, 2011), index comovement appears to be 
delinked from the underlying fundamentals.51 
In particular, the lead of the stock index over the corporate bond and CDS indices in Europe 
pre-crisis, suggests that during this period the corporate bond and CDS markets are not fully 
integrated with the stock market. Thus, information about fundamentals appears to be reflected first in 
stocks and consequently transmitted to corporate bonds and CDSs. This is in line with previous 
studies, as well as with the overall status of financial integration in the pre-crisis EMU, which was 
still at a lower degree compared to the US. Post-crisis however - and still within the EMU -  corporate 
bond and CDS indices begin to impact on the stock index, showing signs of increasing financial 
integration. Part of this is reflected in the post-crisis results, where stock returns affect more 
frequently (and at more lags) corporate bond returns and CDS spreads. This supports the theoretical 
propositions about the role of volatility as an important driver of market integration (see French and 
Roll, 1986; Hamao et al., 1990; Longin and Solnik, 1995; Andersen, 1996). 
In the US, the corporate CDS and bond markets appear to be significantly more integrated 
with the stock market however, daily corporate bond index returns do not affect stock index returns 
pre-crisis. This pre-crisis lack of integration between stock and corporate bonds is largely attributed to 
the period during the crisis (July 2007-September 2009), where unreported results show that corporate 
bond index returns are uninformative for stock index returns, while their correlation is close to zero. 
                                                            
50 A detailed presentation of the previous studies' findings is provided in Sections 2.2, 2.3.1, and 2.3.2. 
51 For a discussion of the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of comovement see Section 2.1. 
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This is not surprising, since there is evidence that at daily or even higher frequencies, the stock-bond 
correlation decreases during periods of high stock market uncertainty, mainly due to the flight-to-
quality phenomenon (Connolly et al., 2005; 2007). Hence, in the event of severe market stress the 
diversification benefits among the stock and bond indices vanish, thus creating the need for alternative 
assets which, when used in combination with stocks, result in greater diversification (Connolly et al., 
2005; Yang et al., 2009).  
It might be the case that the regulatory reforms implemented by ISDA since July 2002 have 
not improved the transparency and liquidity of the corporate bond market (contrary to Edwards et al., 
2004; Bessembinder et al., 2006; Goldstein et al. 2007; Downing et al., 2007). The generally small 
impact exerted by the stock index on that of corporate bonds could be also justified by the fact that the 
information transmission from the stock to the corporate bond index occurs within the same day, as it 
is the case with scheduled macroeconomic announcements. As mentioned above, the post-crisis 
dynamics between the US indices, are in line with those suggested by previous theoretical and 
empirical studies, and also similar to those in Europe pre-crisis, i.e., the stock index leads the 
corporate bond and CDS indices. However, there is also evidence about a relatively low degree of 
integration between the stock index on the hand, and the corporate bond and CDS indices on the 
other, thus lending support to the theoretical notion that a fall in liquidity reduces the impediments to 
arbitrage, which is considered as a fundamental factor of the equity-credit market integration (see 
Kapadia and Pu, 2012). 
A significant and common finding for both the US and European markets after the crisis, is 
the low correlation and decreased interaction between the corporate bond and CDS indices, thereby 
lending support to the arguments that correlation between similar assets decreases with illiquidity 
(Beber et al. 2009). However, while in Europe it is the corporate bond index that appears 
uninformative for movements in the corporate CDS index, in the US the reverse occurs.52 This in turn 
                                                            
52 This might be attributed to the lower liquidity (in terms of the mean and standard deviation of their bid-ask 
spreads and of the transactions volume) of the bond market relative to that of the CDSs within the European 
market, while in the US while the reverse occurs.  
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acts as a limit to the ability of investors to obtain a perfect hedge when investing in the credit market, 
i.e., as a limit to arbitrage (see Schleifer and Vishny, 1997; Duffie, 2010). This occurs through the 
impact on the CDS-bond basis, thereby altering the arbitrage and/or hedging opportunities when 
trading the basis and resulting in significant profit variations; this is also verified by Bai and Dufresne 
(2011), offering as a potential explanation the counterparty risk and the collateral quality (in this case 
the corporate bonds).53 
 
3.5. Macroeconomic Factors 
Hitherto, the study focused on the intertemporal comovement  of the stock, bond and CDS markets at 
the daily level, providing evidence of varying interaction between their returns, and highlighting the 
different way with which this interaction has evolved within the context of the US and European 
economy respectively. The examination's focus is now shifted to a number of standard macro and risk 
premium factors in order to indentify the effect of monetary policy on return movements, particularly 
over longer time horizons where economic state variables are expected to have greater explanatory 
power. The nature of the examination and of the variables selected is motivated by the arguments that 
in a world of uncertainty the feasible outcome achieved by the central bank might be different 
depending on whether it sets the interest rate or the aggregate bank reserves (see among others Pool, 
1970; Goodfriend, 1991; Rudebusch, 1995).  
In their search for a reliable indicator of monetary policy, academic economists in the 
monetarist tradition have long directed their attention to instruments that the central bank controls 
closely on a daily or weekly basis, such as borrowed and non-borrowed reserves or the interbank 
                                                            
53 The sign of the relationship between market indices appears to be time-invariant and generally along the lines 
suggested by the EMH and the Merton-originated structural models of default; thus, the positive stock-bond and 
the negative stock-CDS association is also valid under index investing. However, the expected negative bond-
CDS association is not the case for Europe pre-crisis, where corporate bond returns induce a positive movement 
on corporate CDS spreads one day ahead. This suggests that corporate bond investors resort instantly to the 
corporate CDS market for protection, thereby bidding CDS spreads up. 
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lending rate (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992; Woodford, 1994). Thus, the Federal funds rate (termed 
FED) and the EONIA (termed EONIA) are selected as the primary indicators of the monetary policy 
of the Federal Reserve and the ECB respectively.54 Furthermore, taking into account Strongin's (1995) 
arguments that non-borrowed reserves' innovations can be employed to identify the Fed's monetary 
policy disturbances a measure of non-borrowed reserves is constructed net of the noise resulting from 
the Fed's accommodation of the demand for reserves.55 
However, in recent years we have witnessed a shift in modern central bank thinking and 
practice away from the concept of non-borrowed reserves, towards that of required and excess 
reserves; this shift was marked by the Fed's QE program and the euro area interbank lending market 
impairment which resulted in the banks' currently holding high levels of excess reserves with the Fed 
and the ECB respectively (Bindseil, 2004; 2006; Bindseil and Jablecki , 2011).56 Hence, by employing 
the method for  the construction of the NBRX measure two additional variables are formed, the 
“orthogonalized” required reserves (termed RRX), and excess reserves (termed ERX). The latter 
variables are the main variables employed for the euro area since, due to its short history, the ECB 
never targeted the mix between borrowed and non-borrowed reserves. For that reason, special 
                                                            
54 Even though, the Federal funds rate is considered to be the most reliable indicator of the Fed's monetary 
policy stance (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992), the EONIA is largely influenced by liquidity issues, rather than 
(solely) by monetary policy considerations; this leads to the inclusion of an additional variable (termed 
EURORATE), consisting of the EONIA along with an array of interest rates (Perez-Quiros and Sicilia, 2002; 
Bohl et al., 2007). 
55 The analysis in this section follows Goyenko and Ukhov (2009). To construct this measure the non-borrowed 
reserves and total reserves are normalized by a 36-month moving average of total reserves. Then the normalized 
non-borrowed reserves are regressed on normalized total reserves to distinguish between changes in reserves 
which are the outcome of the Fed's policy innovations and changes in reserves which are due to the Fed's 
accommodation of demand innovations. The residuals are then collected to form the NBRX variable, with 
higher values of the respective variable being associated with accommodative monetary policy. More details can 
be found in Strongin (1995), Patelis (1997), Christiano et al. (1999), and Goyenko and Ukhov (2009). 
56 A discussion of this shift in monetary policy stance is provided in Section 1.2. 
79 
 
attention is also given to the mix between excess (and required) reserves and total reserves, termed 
ER/TR (RR/TR).  
The list of macroeconomic variables further includes measures of the central banks' success at 
achieving their ultimate objectives in the previous periods. In this respect, a measure of inflation 
(termed CPI and HICP in the US and Europe respectively), and a measure of economic activity, such 
as the industrial production index (termed IP), are included. In contrast to the daily market indices 
data, macroeconomic and monetary policy variables are available at lower-frequencies. The 
macroeconomic and monetary policy variables are log-transformed before entering the analysis, and 
the VAR model specified in equation (3.1) is employed.57 More specific, IP, CPI, money market 
interest rates, and measures of orthogonalized reserves are endogenous and placed before the market 
indices, the ordering of which remains the same as in equations (3.2)-(3.4). The specification depends 
on the argument that, while financial markets respond to monetary policy, monetary policy is 
relatively exogenous to the financial market developments (Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009). Examples of 
earlier studies placing monetary policy variables before financial market variables within a VAR 
specification are those of Thorbecke (1997), Chordia et al. (2005) and Goyenko and Ukhov (2009).  
Table 3.10 contains the results of the Granger causality tests, which indicate that 
macroeconomic variables have different predictive ability with regards to movements in all market 
indices. In particular, movements in inflation (CPI - HICP), and in money market rates (FED - 
EONIA) are informative in predicting index movements in the US and Europe pre-crisis.58 The 
primary indicator of US monetary policy (NBRX) shows limited predictive ability, in contrast to the 
alternative measure (ER/TR) which is more informative for changes in the stock and corporate CDS 
indices.  
In Europe, both monetary policy indicators (ERX and ER/TR), Granger cause stock returns 
and corporate CDS spread changes. However, no monetary policy indicator appears able to affect US 
or European corporate bond returns pre-crisis. Post-crisis, US macroeconomic variables show greater 
                                                            
57 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests indicate non-stationarity in the data. 
58 Similar results are obtained with the alternative variable for European market rates, i.e., EURORATE.  
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predictive ability than their European counterparts; this is the case with industrial production (IP), as 
well as with measures of the Fed's policy stance, which include information about future movements 
in US market indices. This is contrary to the situation in Europe, where - excluding IP - most 
variables appear unable to induce movements in all market indices.59  
[Insert Table 3.10 about here] 
The use of impulse response functions (IRFs), presented in Figure 3.2, provides us with a 
more clear picture.60 According to the IRFs, pre-crisis US and European stock returns respond 
positively to a shock to FED and EONIA respectively, suggesting that initially the market perceives 
an interest rate rise as a signal of better-than-expected economic conditions. This response exhibits 
greater persistence in the US, since it is translated into a permanent upward movement in the stock 
index. Relative to interest rate shocks, a rise in the US “orthogonalized” non-borrowed reserves 
(NBRX), or in the ECB's mix of excess and total reserves (ER/TR), exerts a negative impact on the 
stock indices, signifying that central bank reserves act in tandem with interest rates: a rise in the 
former reflects a loosening of monetary policy and therefore, is perceived as a sign of worse-than-
expected economic conditions resulting in a downward movement in stock prices. Productivity and - 
especially - inflationary shocks also exert a moderate impact on US and European stock indices, 
although this impact is relatively weaker than that of monetary shocks.  
[Insert Figure 3.2 about here] 
                                                            
59 However, there is some evidence that indicators of the ECB's monetary policy stance, i.e., ERX, ER/TR, and 
RRX, contain information for movements in the European corporate bond market.  
60 The impulse response function traces the impact of a one-time, unit standard deviation, positive shock to one 
variable on the current and future values of the endogenous VAR variables. This shock is referred to as 
‘‘shock’’ or ‘‘innovation’’ for expositional convenience throughout the text. Since the actual variance-
covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, the errors need to be orthogonalized so to isolate 
shocks to one of the variables in the VAR. The usual practice is to use standard Cholesky decompositions of the 
VAR residuals keeping the ordering of the endogenous variables unchanged, thus allocating any correlation 
between the residuals of any two elements to the variable placed first in the ordering.  
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The response of the credit and derivatives market indices to interest rate shocks generally 
parallels that of the stock index; the only exception is the response of corporate CDS spreads in the 
US, the positive response of which to a Federal funds shock indicates that the US corporate CDS 
market does not perceive the rise in money market rates as a sign of economic recovery. Again, bond 
and CDS market indices appear considerably responsive to bank reserve shocks; among them, the 
CDS indices exhibit stronger reaction than their bond counterparts, with the US CDS index falling by 
almost 2 standard deviations in response to a one standard deviation rise in NBRX, while in Europe 
the CDS index responds (negatively) on a one-to-one basis to a standard deviation positive shock in 
the bank reserve measures. In any case, the CDS market's reaction is relatively greater when 
compared to that of the stock and bond markets' reaction. 
A similar dependence of stock returns to interest rate and bank reserve shocks in both Europe 
and the US is further observed in the post-crisis period, although the response of the US stock index to 
bank reserves shocks is significantly stronger when compared to that of the European index. This 
ability of bank reserves to induce movements in stock returns is of particular importance in the US, 
where the last change in the Federal funds target occurred in late 2008 and thus, the Fed was deprived 
of its main monetary policy tool. Therefore, a policy based on non-borrowed reserves emerges as a 
viable alternative to the Fed's interest-rate policy that was primarily the case at the time. 
In contrast to the stock market however, US and European CDS markets appear more 
responsive to monetary policy shocks in the post-2008 period. This pattern is primarily evident with 
regards to the European CDS market's response where the spreads literally over-react and move 
(downwards) by almost 10 and 6 standard deviations to shocks to interest rates and bank reserves 
respectively. This combined with the relatively weaker post-crisis response of the European corporate 
bond index to monetary policy shocks indicates that the derivatives market has gained in importance 
relative to the bond market in Europe. This over-reaction of the CDS market relative to the pre-crisis 
period is further the case with regards to shocks to macroeconomic variables. However, this reaction 
in significantly greater when the source of shocks is the level of productivity rather than the price 
level, probably due to the low-inflation in the post-2008 period in Europe. 
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On the other hand, the reaction of the US corporate CDS spreads - although weaker than the 
one exhibited by their European counterparts - is nevertheless stronger than pre-crisis, reaching the 
40bps level or one standard deviation when non-borrowed reserves shocks are considered. In addition, 
US corporate bond returns not only exhibit a stronger post-crisis response to monetary policy shocks, 
they now increase following a rise in the amount of non-borrowed reserves, signifying that the supply 
of bank reserves by the Fed is perceived favourably by market participants. This in turn verifies the 
earlier argument about the ability of bank reserves to induce financial asset movements even when a 
zero interest-rate policy is being implemented.  
The examination further allows for the fact that the central bank may respond to 
developments in the financial markets, by placing the monetary policy variables after market indices; 
the new VAR ordering becomes: IP, CPI (HICP), STOCK, CDS, BOND, FED (EONIA), measures of 
“orthogonalized” reserves. Granger causality results and IRFs are generally the same as under the 
previous ordering, thereby verifying the above relationships.61 
 
3.5.1. Discussion 
Overall, the VAR analysis of Section 3.5 suggests that the ability of macroeconomic and 
monetary policy variables in predicting movements in market indices is greater in the US than in 
Europe. Impulse response functions reveal that the response of the US and European market indices to 
macroeconomic and monetary shocks is qualitatively but not always quantitatively similar. 
Quantitatively however, the respective indices exhibit relatively higher sensitivity in the US than in 
Europe in the post-crisis period; the higher sensitivity is mainly observed with regards to the US stock 
and bond markets' reaction to the amount of reserves held with the central bank. This is attributed to 
the timing, the size, and the nature of the measures adopted by the Federal Reserve which are different 
to those adopted by the ECB.  
                                                            
61 Results are omitted for brevity. 
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Contrary to the Fed's asset purchases which included agency debt, mortgage‐backed securities 
and long‐term treasury bonds, the ECB's policy interventions targeted entirely the sovereign bond 
market. However, the ability of declines in sovereign bond yields to be transmitted to other asset 
prices has been questioned (see Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgenson, 2013). Furthermore, even to the extent that the ECB-induced sovereign bond yield 
declines are able to be transmitted to the other asset prices, two facts limit their effectiveness. The first 
refers to the political considerations and the limitations stemming from the Lisbon Treaty on the 
ECB's purchase of sovereign debt.62 Due to these considerations, the ECB's asset purchases were only 
conducted at a limited degree not with the objective of affecting asset prices but of addressing the 
inter-bank market dysfunctions and restoring the transmission mechanism of euro area monetary 
policy. Second, the asset purchases through the SMP adopted in May 2010 were sterilized, therefore 
limiting their ability to ease monetary and financing conditions, while the large-scale asset purchases 
through the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program announced in August 2012 were not 
utilized until the time of the writing. 
On the other hand, the fall of the Federal funds rate to the 0-0.25bps points range, resulted in 
the adoption of non-standard policy measures by the Fed at an earlier stage. In addition, asset 
purchases such as those conducted through the Fed's LSAP primarily targeted the corporate sector. 
This strong impact of the Fed's non-standard measures is largely attributed to the LSAP which 
succeeded in lowering corporate credit risk and reducing the cost of insuring against default-risk that 
was consequently translated to a decline in corporate CDS spreads; it further induced a significant 
easing of financial conditions in both the household and business sectors (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 
2013). These results are further consistent with the findings that the first LSAP lowered significantly 
the CDS spreads on lower-rated corporate bonds (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011), 
as well as with evidence that the Fed's monetary policy shocks exerted a considerable - albeit short 
lived - impact on corporate bond yields during the period of zero interest rates (see Wright, 2012).  
                                                            
62 The Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty prohibits purchases of sovereign debt that function as sovereign bailouts 
of EMU Member States, while Article 123 prohibits monetary financing. 
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An additional factor contributing to this weaker impact of the ECB's monetary policy on asset 
prices concerns the higher degree of risk aversion within the euro area financial markets context. The 
degree of risk aversion is crucial for the propagation of monetary policy, since preferred habitat 
models suggest that central bank interventions and decisions about the short rate are transmitted along 
the term structure of interest rates through the carry trades of arbitrageurs. In the event of high risk 
aversion (e.g., under-capitalization of arbitrageurs), monetary transmission is limited and forward 
rates under-react considerably to changes in the level of expected short rates (Vayanos and Vila, 
2009).63 Therefore, the higher risk aversion across the euro area at both the corporate and sovereign 
level - in the form of higher bond yields and CDS spreads - compared to the US, constitutes an 
additional impediment for the transmission and effectiveness of the ECB's policy measures.  
The above findings are important in the light of US monetary policy, which is ordinarily 
considered solely in terms of choosing an operating target for a short-term nominal interest rate, i.e., 
the Federal funds target rate. Yet, due to the extraordinary nature of the financial crisis and because 
the Federal funds policy rate was promptly dropped to its effective lower bound of near zero percent 
by late 2008, other dimensions of policy have occupied much of the Federal Reserve's - as well as 
other central banks' - attention as a means of stabilizing the financial markets; in this respect, the 
component of the Fed's liabilities constituted by reserves held by depository institutions has increased 
by approximately 280 times since the summer of 2008, suggesting that the main instrument of US 
monetary policy has shifted, from an interest-rate policy to one dubbed as quantitative easing (Curdia 
and Woodford, 2011).  
It further builds a case for Europe, since the ECB's key rates have also been brought near zero 
entering 2014. This is important especially when considering the post-crisis IRFs, where the current 
amount of reserves held with the ECB has not exerted the intended impact on the bond market, 
whereas the CDS market - although exhibiting a very significant response to bank reserves shocks - is 
still heavily dependent on movements on money market rates. Should interest rates cease being the 
ECB's main monetary policy tool, then a greater - relative to the current situation - supply of bank 
                                                            
63 An analysis of the preferred habitat models is provided in Section 2.6.2. 
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reserves might be needed in order to move the European credit and derivatives markets to the 
intended direction. The findings of this section do not suggest that the supply of bank reserves (or 
perhaps the monetary base) can be regarded as a superior operating target for monetary policy, 
however they provide a solid argument that it might be considered as a viable alternative, able to exert 
an impact on financial markets. 
Monetary policy shocks appear to have a greater impact post- rather than pre-crisis in the US, 
which has been the field of an unprecedented monetary expansion under the QE programs. This lends 
support to theoretical arguments that the expansion of the central banks' balance sheet through the 
purchase of assets is more effective in lowering asset prices when markets are not functioning 
normally (see Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Mishkin, 2009; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010). The 
significance of this finding can be seen within the context of the US financial crisis, where the 
predominant view among some participants in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting 
in October 2008 (when the crisis was escalating), was that financial dislocations might diminish the 
effectiveness of the Fed to conduct monetary policy by cuts in the Federal funds target rate; this in 
turn provides a rationale for a risk-management approach on the part of the central banks with the aim 
of offsetting the contractionary effects from financial crises (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2008; Mishkin, 2009). 
Results point to a moderate, albeit significant, sensitivity of market indices to macroeconomic 
variables, such as measures of inflation and industrial productivity, that becomes moderately stronger 
post-crisis. This is explained by the fact that interest rate setting is done judgementally by employing 
a number of macroeconomic signals, but in a way that can be approximated with reference to the 
Taylor rules, according to which interest rates respond more than one for one to inflation changes and 
also to output gap fluctuations; since these macroeconomic signals are indicators of changes in the 
implementation of monetary policy it is logical to be taken into consideration by financial market 
participants and reflected in financial asset prices (Joyce et al., 2012). This sensitivity also carries 
implications for portfolio construction, since it implies that a portfolio dominated by a single index or 
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strategy is more likely to be susceptible to extreme macro-conditions and that combining indices may 
be an effective way to reduce macro-risk exposures. 
Overall, the moderately greater impact of macroeconomic and monetary variables post-crisis, 
combined with the relatively greater responsiveness of US market indices compared to those in 
Europe, provides justification for Hypothesis 5. Results in Section 3.4.2 suggest the presence of two-
way linkages between the stock, bond, and CDS markets; however, when these linkages cannot be 
established, the stock index is the primary channel through which information is transmitted to the 
bond and CDS indices.64 This is also verified by results in section 3.5 with regards to the transmission 
of information contained in macroeconomic variables. The combination of the results in sections 3.4.2 
and 3.5 suggest the existence of an indirect effect of monetary policy on bond and CDS indices. The 
stock index can therefore act as an indirect channel for the transmission of monetary shocks to the 
bond and CDS indices.  
 
3.5.2. The Indirect Effect of Monetary Shocks 
Since an interest rate is typically the instrument set by monetary policy-makers, asset prices on debt 
instruments are a predominant channel through which monetary policy affects the economy. Thus, 
monetary policy should have a direct effect on the bond and CDS indices. However, the analysis in 
the previous section indicates that monetary policy affects the bond and CDS indices primarily 
indirectly through the stock index. This raises the question of whether developments in the 
macroeconomy can be transmitted integral to the credit and derivatives market via the direct channel. 
Thus, this section examines whether certain type of shocks, such as supply shocks, demand shocks, 
and contractionary monetary policy shocks, are transmitted to each of the bond and CDS market 
indices directly, without the indirect assistance of the stock index. 
                                                            
64 The direction and size of the lead-lag relationships between the market indices observed in section 3.4.2 are 
verified by the VAR analysis in the present section. The sign and size of coefficients is generally along the same 
lines with those suggested under the initial VAR ordering with only the financial market variables. 
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To accomplish this, the initial VAR is re-estimated by imposing sign restrictions according to 
the method of Uhlig (2005), and making two independent mutually-exclusive assumptions: a) shocks 
affect the stock market, and thus also affect the bond and CDS markets indirectly through the stock 
market, and b) shocks do not affect the stock market, and thus are only transmitted directly to the 
bond and CDS markets. The last assumption excludes any direct effect of shocks on the stock index, 
thereby enabling the identification of the direct transmission of the shocks into the bond and CDS 
market indices. The method is explained in detail in Appendix 3.B. 
[Insert Figure 3.3 about here] 
Figure 3.3 reports the IRFs for the weekly series during the 2004-2014 period. The IRFs are 
obtained from the estimation of two VARs; one where the shock is transmitted to all endogenous 
variables (although the sign of the endogenous variables' response varies), and one where the shock 
has a zero impact on the stock market (zero-sign). In the US, the response of the bond and CDS 
markets to all three type of shocks is essentially the same between the two VARs, both in terms of 
direction and magnitude. In Europe however, the exclusion of the stock index from the transmission 
of shocks, causes the bond index to respond either in the opposite direction (supply shock),  relatively 
stronger (demand shock), or only instantly (monetary policy shock). This highlights the importance of 
the stock market for the transmission of macroeconomic and monetary policy shocks within the 
European context, in contrast to the US, where this transmission occurs without frictions even in the 
absence of the stock market, probably owing to the greater size of the corporate bond and CDS 
markets relative to that in Europe.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the joint dynamics of the stock, bond, and CDS markets in Europe and the US 
over the 2004-2014 period. The analysis differentiates from previous studies by employing a number 
of market indices. This allows for the separation of the idiosyncratic risks that are present in single-
name contracts and that impact on cross-asset information flow from the market-wide risks, thereby 
enabling the examination to concentrate on market risk solely. An additional differentiation concerns 
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the consideration of the recent trend in central bank practice of quantitative easing and the expansion 
of the central bank's balance sheet. In this respect the chapter identifies the role of this new monetary 
stance for the generation of order flow in these markets, as well as the channel of monetary 
transmission. 
The empirical results indicate differences in the timing with which information is reflected in 
the stock, bond, and CDS markets, with these differences being more evident in Europe pre-crisis, and 
in the US post-crisis where, consistent with ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of 
comovement (see Barberis et al., 1998; 2005; Boyer, 2011), index comovement appears to be 
delinked from the underlying fundamentals. During these periods, information about fundamentals is 
found to be reflected first in stocks and then transmitted to corporate bonds and CDSs. The stock 
market additionally emerges not only as an efficient, but also as a necessary channel for the 
transmission of the ECB's monetary policy to the European bond market, since in the absence of the 
former, shocks to demand and supply, as well as monetary shocks are transmitted distorted to the 
latter market. The analysis further reveals that monetary policy induces greater movements in the US 
market indices after the financial crisis, with these post-crisis movements generally being greater than 
the movements of the European indices, thereby lending support to the Federal Reserve's 
implementation of non-standard policies. In addition, measures of banks reserves held with the central 
bank exert a considerable influence on US market indices, providing a rationale for the supply of bank 
reserves as an instrument of US monetary policy.  
An important implication arising from this study concerns the optimal asset allocation 
decisions in the context of passive investment strategies which primarily involve the trading of market 
indices. In particular, in times of crisis when informational efficiency deteriorates, the stock index 
retains its ability to reflect first and transmit information to the bond and CDS indices This points to 
the need for monitoring the stock index for anticipating movements in the corporate bond and CDS 
indices. Furthermore, in periods of heightened market stress the lag in the information transmission 
across the market indices limits the diversification benefits across stocks, bonds and CDS contracts, at 
least at the market level. This in turn prompts investors to search for alternative assets with a higher 
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degree of comovement in order to achieve greater diversification when trading market indices. In a 
similar vein, the post-crisis disassociation between corporate bond and CDS spreads raises attention to 
the limited ability of investors to obtain a perfect hedge when investing in the corporate debt and 
credit derivatives market. 
This study further carries implications for the risk-management conducted by central banks in 
times of financial market turmoil and particularly when interest rates are at the zero lower bound. The 
strong impact exerted by the measures of bank reserves on financial asset-prices indicates that when 
the effectiveness of cuts in the central policy rate are diminished by financial dislocations, the supply 
of bank reserves constitutes an efficient means of intervention in the financial markets. By rejecting 
the early Keynesian arguments about the ineffectiveness of monetary policy during crises, the analysis 
of this chapter suggests that (aggressive) non-standard monetary policy is able to lower the cost of 
credit and therefore ease the contractionary effects of a recession. The results of the analysis further 
concern the timing for the conduct of non-standard policy interventions; they suggest that the 
expansion of the central banks' balance sheet through the purchase of assets is more effective in 
easing financial market stress when markets are not functioning normally, thereby confirming the 
relevant theoretical propositions (see Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Vayanos, 2010 for models of preferred 
habitat, and Mishkin, 2009).  
The differences in the impact of monetary policy on asset prices when moving from the US to 
the European financial markets are relevant for the conduct of euro area monetary policy. In the event 
of an interest rate drop to the zero or negative level, a greater - relative to the current - expansion of 
the ECB's balance sheet emerges as the principal means for intervening in the European debt and 
credit derivatives markets. This is further reinforced by the chapter's findings about the dependence of 
the European corporate bond market on the stock market, since without the latter the effect of 
monetary policy on the former is transmitted distortedly. 
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Table 3.1 
List of Variables and Definitions 
VARIABLE FREQUENCY SOURCE DEFINITION 
 
 
 
STOCK  
(US) 
 
 
 
 
 
STOCK 
(EUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOND 
(US) 
 
 
 
 
 
BOND 
(EUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CDS 
(US) 
CDS 
(EUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bloomberg 
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main Variable: The percentage change in the S&P 500 index. Robustness Section: The percentage change in the Russell 3000 index. The percentage change in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average Index. 
 
Main Variable: The percentage change in the FTSE Eurotop 100 Index. Robustness Section: The percentage change in the FTSEurofirst 300. The percentage change in the 
EURO STOXX 50 Index. 
 
The calculation of the stock indices involves the multiplication of each stock in the index by the number of shares used in the index calculation; the product is then by a 
factor (divisor) in order to be scaled down to a more easily handled number. In the event of a stock addition or deletion, the divisor is adjusted in order to exclude the 
possibility of a change in the index’s value or level, thereby offsetting the change in the market value of the index. The divisor is further adjusted in the event of any 
corporate action that induces changes in the market value of the constituent stocks. 
 
Main Variable: The percentage change in the BofA Merill Lynch U.S. Corporate Master Index. Robustness Section: The percentage change in the Barclays Capital US 
Corporate Investment Grade Index (formerly called The Lehman Brothers US Corporate & Investment Grade Index). The percentage change in the Barclays Capital US 
Corporate High Yield Index.  
 
Main Variable: The percentage change in the Markit iBoxx. Robustness Section: The percentage change in the iBoxx Liquid Euro Corporates Index. 
 
The calculations of the bond indices are based on quotes from multiple market-makers. These quotes are ordered separately from the highest to the lowest and then their 
maximum dispersion is checked, i.e. the distance between the highest and the lowest quote, in order to determine their eligibility for consolidation. From the eligible 
quotes, the highest and lowest quotes are eliminated, and the arithmetic average of the remaining eligible quotes is calculated to determine the consolidated quote. In cases 
where no observable data is available or where the data's depth/quality is insufficient, either the last index price will be carried forward, or a curve-based pricing model will 
be calculated from end-of-day prices. 
 
Main Variable: The change in the Markit CDX North America Investment Grade Index. Robustness Section: The change in the Markit North American High Yield Index.  
 
Main Variable: The change in the Markit iTraxx Europe. Robustness Section: The change in the Markit iTraxx Europe HiVol. 
 
The Markit CDX is broken into five sub-sect indices, i.e. consumer cyclical, energy, financials, industrial, and telecom, media and technology. The major sectors 
contributing to the iTraxx are consumer products (14%), banks (13%), manufacturing (11%), retail (10%), and basic industries (10%). 
 
The pricing of the CDS indices involves the calculation of the index constituents using  linear interpolation of the two closest terms for which composites are available. 
Once the survival probabilities of each constituent are calculated at each coupon payment date, the Present Value (PV) of each index constituent is calculated using the 
trade details of the index. This in turn allows for the calculation of the PV of the Index (Weighted Average of the PVs of the constituents) and the Accrued Interest on the 
Index, which is employed to solve for the curve that gives the theoretical spread of the index. 
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ΔTRATE: The change in the 10-year benchmark U.S. Treasury rate. 
 
ΔGDBR: The change in the 10-year German government bond yield. 
 
USA: The change in the difference between the 10-year U.S. benchmark Treasury yield and the 2-year U.S. benchmark Treasury yield. 
 
Europe: The change in the difference between the 10-year German government bond yield and the 2-year German government bond yield. 
 
The change in the implied volatility for the CBOE index. 
 
The change in the effective Federal funds rate. 
 
The change in the orthogonalized non-borrowed reserves of U.S. depository institutions with the Federal Reserve. The variable is constructed as follows: Non-borrowed 
reserves and total reserves are normalized by a 36-month moving average of total reserves. Then, normalized non-borrowed reserves are regressed on normalized total 
reserves. The residuals from this regression are collected to form the orthogonalized non-borrowed reserves. Non-borrowed reserves are equal to total reserves minus 
borrowed reserves. 
 
The change in the orthogonalized required reserves of U.S. depository institutions with the Federal Reserve. The method for the calculation of this variable is the same as in 
the NBRX variable with required reserves replacing non-borrowed reserves. Required reserves  are the amount of funds that a depository institution must hold in reserve 
against specified deposit liabilities. 
 
The change in the orthogonalized excess reserves of U.S. depository institutions with the Federal Reserve. The method for the calculation of this variable is the same as in 
the NBRX variable with excess reserves replacing non-borrowed reserves. Excess reserves equal total reserve balances less required reserves. 
 
ER/TR: The change in the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves. 
 
RR/TR: The change in the ratio of required reserves to total reserves. 
 
The change in the EONIA. The EONIA is computed as a weighted average of the interest rates on euro-denominated unsecured overnight lending transactions, as reported 
by a panel of contributing banks. 
 
The change in a set of interest rates. The method for the calculation of this variable is analyzed in detail in Appendix 3.A. 
 
The change in the orthogonalized required reserves of euro area credit institutions with their national central bank. The method for the calculation of this variable is the 
same as in the NBRX variable with required reserves replacing non-borrowed reserves.  
 
The change in the orthogonalized excess reserves of euro area credit institutions with their national central bank. The method for the calculation of this variable is the same 
as in the NBRX variable with excess reserves replacing non-borrowed reserves.  
92 
 
ER/TR 
RR/TR 
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US-EUR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HICP1 
 
Weekly/Monthly 
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Monthly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
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Bureau of 
Labour 
 
Federal 
Reserve  
Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
Eurostat 
 
ER/TR: The change in the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves. 
RR/TR: The change in the ratio of required reserves to total reserves. 
 
The change in the log of CPI. 
 
 
 
USA: The change in the log of the US IP Index. 
 
Europe: The change in the log of the euro area IP Index. 
 
 
The change in the log of HICP.  
* All percentage changes in the stock and bond indices are expressed in basis points.  
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Table 3.2 
Bai and Perron Test for Structural Breaks 
This table presents the results of the Bai and Perron test for the presence of structural breaks for the time series of each of the 
STOCK, BOND, and CDS. A regression is run for each of the STOCK, BOND, and CDS where each of this variable is 
regressed on the other two and on a vector of exogenous variables. Then the Bai and Perron test is run. Null hypothesis is 
that there is a structural break. The Wald test is then performed for the break date for each of the series of the STOCK, 
BOND, and CDS. Null hypothesis is that there is no structural break. STOCK is the percentage change on the S&P 500 (US) 
and on the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). BOND is the percentage change on the BofA ML U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) 
and on the iboxx (EUR). CDS is the change in the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx (EUR). Exogenous 
variables include the 10-year government bond yield, the slope of the term structure, and the implied volatility for the CBOE 
index. Variables are at the daily frequency for the US and Europe during the 2004-2014 period. Data is from Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters and cover the period from September 2004 (US), and from 22 June 2004 (Europe), to 21 May 2014. 
Panels A and B include results for the US and Europe respectively for the 2004-2014 period. ***, **, and * marks denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. USA                                                                                         
STOCK BOND CDS 
 
Break test F-statistic 5% critical value F-statistic 5% critical value F-statistic 5% critical value 
0 vs. 1 32.8445 25.652 42.1215 39.877 34.0898 35.232 
1vs. 2     26.1228** 32.481     33.1989** 35.481     26.9860** 24.051 
2 vs. 3 21.3452 24.631 25.5602 26.101 20.6551 21.080 
3 vs. 4 11.4632 15.745 18.4020 19.098 15.0623 18.049 
  
Break date Chi2 p-value Chi2 p-value Chi2 p-value 
31082008 152.1244*** 0.0000 137.0634*** 0.0000 125.9720** 0.0025 
  
Panel B. Europe                                                                                         
STOCK BOND CDS 
 
Break test F-statistic 5% critical value F-statistic 5% critical value F-statistic 5% critical value 
0 vs. 1 27.3201 24.012 36.4320 32.158 37.1508 36.081 
1vs. 2     20.4501** 21.105     29.2443** 28.212     31.9465** 33.239 
2 vs. 3 17.3277 17.953 24.5402 25.199 27.0589 29.982 
3 vs. 4 14.0654 14.485 21.0548 21.095 25.9071 26.109 
  
Break date Chi2 p-value Chi2 p-value Chi2 p-value 
31082008 134.6410*** 0.0000 152.6845*** 0.0000 139.2992*** 0.0000 
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Table 3.3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table shows daily and weekly means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums of STOCK, ΔSTOCK, BOND, 
ΔBOND, CDS, and ΔCDS. STOCK is price of the S&P 500 (US) and of the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). ΔSTOCK is the 
percentage change (i.e. the return multiplied by 100) on STOCK. BOND is the price of the BofA ML U.S. Corporate Master 
Index (US) and of the iboxx (EUR). ΔBOND is the percentage change (i.e. the return multiplied by 100) on BOND. CDS is 
the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx (Europe). ΔCDS is the change in CDS. Market indices prices and 
spreads are from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters and cover the period from September 2004 for the US, and from 22 June 
2004 for Europe, to 21 May 2014. Panel A includes descriptive statistics for daily data, and Panel B includes descriptive 
statistics for weekly data. 
Panel A. Daily Data  
Variable 
              
Obs.           Mean St. Dev. min max 
USA 
STOCK 2430 1306.7670 231.6565 676.5302 1897.4500 
ΔSTOCK 2429 3.0533 130.2400 -9.0352 11.5809 
BOND 2489 1901.7450 348.1216 1434.9800 2543.7270 
ΔBOND 2488 2.16173 32.21027 -227.9158 198.5459 
CDS 2196 89.7261 42.4450 29.0303 280.4165 
ΔCDS 2195 0.1015 5.1745 -45.5062 122.5000 
Europe 
STOCK 2548 2443.7650 401.9015 1411.6500 3377.2000 
ΔSTOCK 2547 1.6951 122.9243 -786.4486 1032.7030 
BOND 2546 158.4375 21.0315 129.3133 204.7844 
ΔBOND 2545 1.81468 17.9349 -102.7225 70.5872 
CDS 2545 86.9986 47.7338 20.1484 214.5417 
ΔCDS 2544 0.01089 4.1547 -36.2499 26.3583 
 
 
Panel B. Weekly Data 
 
Variable 
             
Obs.           Mean St. Dev. min max 
USA 
STOCK 503 1306.8610 231.6848 683.3840 1881.1400 
ΔSTOCK 502 13.3860 255.1910 -1819.6080 1202.5081 
BOND 504 1903.5790 349.7290 1435.4860 2541.5400 
ΔBOND 503 10.8511 72.7034 -521.3704 322.2068 
CDS 503 89.5834 44.8436 29.0303 280.4165 
ΔCDS 502 0.0236 9.3284 -49.0833 81.0250 
Europe 
STOCK 517 2444.9300 404.0824 1420.2100 3370.8100 
ΔSTOCK 516 8.2231 270.0470 -2223.4910 1339.7020 
BOND 518 158.5510 21.1636 129.7173 204.4647 
ΔBOND 517 8.90317 47.0845 -335.6796 145.4094 
CDS 517 87.0445 47.8025 20.4108 209.8333 
ΔCDS 516 0.0533 8.4854 -33.8690 51.3333 
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Table 3.4 
Descriptive Statistics. Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods. Daily Series 
 
This table shows daily means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums of STOCK, ΔSTOCK, BOND, ΔBOND, CDS, and ΔCDS in the US and Europe for the periods 2004-2008 and 
2008-2014. STOCK is price  of the S&P 500 (US) and of the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). ΔSTOCK is the percentage change (i.e. the return multiplied by 100) on STOCK. BOND is the price of 
the BofA ML U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) and of the iboxx (EUR). ΔBOND is the percentage change (i.e. the return multiplied by 100) on BOND. CDS is the spread on Markit CDX 
(US) and on Markit itraxx (Europe). ΔCDS is the change in CDS. Market indices prices and spreads are from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters and cover the period from September 2004 for 
the US, and from 22 June 2004 for Europe, to 21 May 2014. Panel A includes descriptive statistics for daily data in the US for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and the post-crisis (2008-2014) periods. 
Panel B includes descriptive statistics for daily data in Europe for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and the post-crisis (2008-2014) periods. 
Panel A. USA 
 PRE-CRISIS  POST-CRISIS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
STOCK 990 1320.728 115.413 1094.806 1565.153  1440 1297.169 284.9629 676.5302 1897.45 
ΔSTOCK 989 1.9226 89.4616 -347.271 424.0978  1440 3.8300 152.0679 -903.518 1158.0850 
BOND 1015 1591.635 67.07004 1488.27 1723.23  1474 2115.287 299.502 1434.98 2543.727 
ΔBOND 1014 1.0825 27.6194 -109.2720 96.6339  1474 2.9042 35.0106 -227.916 198.5459 
CDS 831 61.28564 32.91069 29.0303 193.344  1365 107.0403 38.0433 62.06219 280.4165 
ΔCDS 834 0.210238 4.2902 -27.241 84.75  1365 0.035016 5.647593 -45.5062 122.5 
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Panel B. Europe  
 PRE-CRISIS  POST-CRISIS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
STOCK 1078 2747.5 358.1983 2052.5 3377.2  1470 2221.025 261.9972 1411.65 2771.91 
ΔSTOCK 1077 1.76281 92.6764 -618.3543 552.1077  1469 1.6454 41.0582 -786.4486 1032.7031 
BOND 1078 140.9547 3.40908 129.3133 145.4071  1468 171.2757 19.21701 132.2357 204.7844 
ΔBOND 1077 0.9716 16.6673 -060.2431 60.9895  1467 2.4331 18.7922 -102.7225 70.5872 
CDS 1074 43.91442 24.36291 20.1484 160.9167  1471 118.4551 34.11158 65.5 214.5417 
ΔCDS 1073 0.0515338 2.738032 -25.50002 24.2535  1470 -0.0187681 4.939517 -36.24998 26.35834 
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Table 3.5 
Johansen Test for Cointegrating Equations 
This table presents the results of the Johansen test for the number of cointegrating equations in the equation for the stock 
market index, the CDS market index, and the bond market index (all in levels). Null hypothesis is that at each rank there are 
as many cointegrating equations as the number of the rank. Variables are at the daily frequency for the US and Europe 
during the 2004-2014 period. The stock market index is the value of the S&P 500 (US) and of the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). 
The CDS market index is the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx (EUR). The bond market index is the value 
of the BofA ML U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) and the iboxx (EUR). Data is from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters and 
cover the period from September 2004 (US), and from 22 June 2004 (Europe), to 21 May 2014. Panels A and B include 
results for the US and Europe respectively for the 2004-2014 period. ** mark denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Panel A. USA                                                                                         
Maximum rank Log-likelihood Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5% critical value 
0 115.7454     84.0544** 65.33 
1 108.1687 0.3265 50.1477 24.07 
2 105.2755 0.2647 42.3988 20.44 
3 94.7322 0.0944 
Panel B. Europe                                                                                         
Maximum rank Log-likelihood Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5% critical value 
0 207.1644     95.1511** 65.33 
1 155.9856 0.4451 74.9844 53.89 
2 142.1145 0.3874 61.3532 41.32 
3 117.7642 0.3025 
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Table 3.6 
VAR Results. Daily Series 
Table 3.6 presents the coefficients (row 1) and the corresponding p-values (row 2) of the endogenous VAR variables at the 
daily frequency for the US and Europe during the 2004-2008 and 2008-2014 periods. The ordering of the VAR variables is 
STOCK, CDS, BOND. STOCK is the percentage change on the S&P 500 (US) and on the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). CDS 
is the change in the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx (EUR). BOND is the percentage change on the BofA 
ML U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) and on the iboxx (EUR). Data is from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters and cover 
the period from September 2004 (US), and from 22 June 2004 (Europe), to 21 May 2014. Panels A and B include results for 
the US for 2004-2008 and 2008-2014 respectively. Panels C and D include results for Europe for 2004-2008 and 2008-2014 
respectively. The Table further presents the Jarque-Bera test for normally distributed residuals and the Lagrange-multiplier 
test for autocorrelation of residuals at different lag order. ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. 2004-2008. USA 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1)   0.0671*** 
   (0.0248) 
STOCK (t-2)  -1.838***  
  (0.305)  
STOCK (t-3)    
    
STOCK (t-4)    
    
STOCK (t-5)   -0.0653** 
   (0.0310) 
STOCK (t-6)    
    
STOCK (t-7) 0.184*   
 (0.0974)   
STOCK (t-8) 0.294***  -0.0789*** 
 (0.0973)  (0.0298) 
STOCK (t-9)  0.791**  
  (0.354)  
STOCK (t-10)    
    
CDS (t-1) 0.0430*  -0.0237*** 
 (0.0238)  (0.00729) 
CDS (t-2) -0.0571** 0.261***  
 (0.0273) (0.0964)  
CDS (t-3)    
    
CDS (t-4) 0.0520**   
 (0.0260)   
CDS (t-5)    
    
CDS (t-6) 0.130*** -0.166* -0.0170** 
 (0.0264) (0.0933) (0.00807) 
CDS (t-7) 0.0656**   
 (0.0271)   
CDS (t-8) -0.0763***  0.0230*** 
 (0.0290)  (0.00886) 
CDS (t-9)   -0.0235*** 
   (0.00786) 
CDS (t-10)   0.0217*** 
   (0.00795) 
BOND (t-1)    
    
BOND (t-2)   -0.177** 
   (0.0740) 
BOND (t-3)    
    
BOND (t-4)   -0.133* 
   (0.0713) 
BOND (t-5)    
    
BOND (t-6)    
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BOND (t-7)    
    
BOND (t-8)   0.132* 
   (0.0764) 
BOND (t-9)   -0.261*** 
   (0.0741) 
BOND (t-10)  -1.754**  
  (0.828)  
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
1,016 
 
0.05641 
 
0.4515 
 
3.541 
(0.214) 
1,016 
 
0.01624 
 
0.5136 
 
2.128 
(0.332) 
1,016 
 
0.00457 
 
0.4672 
 
2.784 
(0.257) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
 
Lag 1     chi-squared: 7.5684                                   Lag 2     chi-squared: 5.1174                           Lag 3     chi-squared: 6.1255 
                                  (0.512)                                                                      (0.746)                                                             (0.657) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 9.5604                                   Lag 5     chi-squared: 5.5336                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 6.152 
                                  (0.264)                                                                      (0.702)                                                             (0.631) 
    
                                   
 
 
Panel B. 2008-2014. USA 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1) -0.0901**  0.0420*** 
 (0.0369)  (0.0100) 
STOCK (t-2) 0.105*** -1.914***  
 (0.0362) (0.0586)  
STOCK (t-3) -0.104* -0.225** 0.0336** 
 (0.0562) (0.0910) (0.0153) 
STOCK (t-4)    
    
STOCK (t-5) -0.124**  0.0369** 
 (0.0545)  (0.0148) 
STOCK (t-6)    
    
STOCK (t-7)    
    
STOCK (t-8)    
    
CDS (t-1)    
    
CDS (t-2)  -0.0684**  
  (0.0341)  
CDS (t-3)    
    
CDS (t-4)    
    
CDS (t-5) -0.0396*   
 (0.0217)   
CDS (t-6) -0.0391**   
 (0.0195)   
CDS (t-7)    
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CDS (t-8) -0.0214* -0.0585***  
 (0.0125) (0.0202)  
BOND (t-1)  -0.442**  
  (0.220)  
BOND (t-2) 0.316** -0.466**  
 (0.135) (0.219)  
BOND (t-3)    
    
BOND (t-4)    
    
BOND (t-5)    
    
BOND (t-6)    
    
BOND (t-7)    
    
BOND (t-8)   0.0613* 
   (0.0371) 
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
1,478 
 
0.01321 
 
0.5404 
 
4.132 
(0.165) 
1,478 
 
0.09128 
 
0.5387 
 
2.959 
(0.224) 
1,478 
 
0.04562 
 
0.4944 
 
2.265 
(0.248) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
 
Lag 1     chi-squared: 5.1452                                   Lag 2     chi-squared: 6.1567                           Lag 3     chi-squared: 6.1240 
                                  (0.797)                                                                      (0.611)                                                             (0.619) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 4.9830                                   Lag 5     chi-squared: 8.5414                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 7.1415 
                                  (0.851)                                                                      (0.397)                                                             (0.595) 
    
 
 
 
Panel C. 2004-2008. Europe 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1) -0.0803** -0.947*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0943) (0.00212) 
STOCK (t-2)   0.00682*** 
   (0.00228) 
STOCK (t-3)    
    
STOCK (t-4)    
    
STOCK (t-5)    
    
STOCK (t-6)    
    
STOCK (t-7)    
    
STOCK (t-8)    
    
CDS (t-1)   -0.00333*** 
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   (0.000782) 
CDS (t-2)   -0.00287*** 
   (0.000789) 
CDS (t-3)  -0.0869** -0.00403*** 
  (0.0350) (0.000786) 
CDS (t-4)   -0.00306*** 
   (0.000792) 
CDS (t-5)   -0.00251*** 
   (0.000801) 
CDS (t-6)   -0.00174** 
   (0.000781) 
CDS (t-7)   -0.00268*** 
   (0.000789) 
CDS (t-8)   -0.00152** 
   (0.000726) 
BOND (t-1)  1.664***  
  (0.529)  
BOND (t-2)    
    
BOND (t-3)   -0.0198* 
   (0.0118) 
BOND (t-4)    
    
BOND (t-5)    
    
BOND (t-6)    
    
BOND (t-7)   0.0286** 
   (0.0116) 
BOND (t-8)    
    
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
1,085 
 
0.00451 
 
0.4462 
 
2.154 
(0.325) 
1,085 
 
0.01145 
 
0.4925 
 
3.055 
(0.164) 
1,085 
 
0.05457 
 
0.4218 
 
2.989 
(0.232) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
 
Lag 1     chi-squared: 7.1744                                   Lag 2     chi-squared: 4.8590                           Lag 3     chi-squared: 7.1656 
                                  (0.565)                                                                      (0.875)                                                             (0.577) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 5.7845                                  Lag 5     chi-squared: 5.4640                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 7.9145 
                                  (0.649)                                                                      (0.672)                                                             (0.391) 
    
 
 
Panel D. 2008-2014. Europe 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1)  -1.581*** 0.0421*** 
  (0.0959) (0.00270) 
STOCK (t-2)  -0.322*** 0.0163*** 
  (0.107) (0.00301) 
STOCK (t-3)   0.0105*** 
   (0.00300) 
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STOCK (t-4) 0.0854*** -0.214** 0.0115*** 
 (0.0290) (0.107) (0.00301) 
STOCK (t-5) -0.0663**   
 (0.0289)   
STOCK (t-6)  -0.263** 0.00794*** 
  (0.107) (0.00301) 
STOCK (t-7) 0.0590** -0.364*** 0.00510* 
 (0.0287) (0.106) (0.00298) 
STOCK (t-8)    
    
STOCK (t-9) -0.0777*** 0.253**  
 (0.0289) (0.107)  
CDS (t-1)  -0.277*** -0.00187** 
  (0.0295) (0.000830) 
CDS (t-2)   -0.00453*** 
   (0.000849) 
CDS (t-3) 0.0238*** -0.0838***  
 (0.00828) (0.0306)  
CDS (t-4)   -0.00206** 
   (0.000867) 
CDS (t-5)   -0.00284*** 
   (0.000868) 
CDS (t-6) 0.0199** -0.0640**  
 (0.00836) (0.0309)  
CDS (t-7)    
    
CDS (t-8) -0.0154*  -0.00204** 
 (0.00842)  (0.000874) 
CDS (t-9)  -0.0547**  
  (0.0274)  
BOND (t-1) 0.737***   
 (0.203)   
BOND (t-2)   0.0415** 
   (0.0210) 
BOND (t-3)  -1.282* 0.0443** 
  (0.749) (0.0211) 
BOND (t-4)    
    
BOND (t-5)    
    
BOND (t-6)   0.0453** 
   (0.0209) 
BOND (t-7)    
    
BOND (t-8)  -1.474**  
  (0.734)  
BOND (t-9)   0.0758*** 
   (0.0198) 
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
1,579 
 
0.09561 
 
0.4180 
 
4.658 
(0.146) 
1,579 
 
0.01654 
 
0.4966 
 
2.967 
(0.202) 
1,579 
 
0.03548 
 
0.4089 
 
2.598 
(0.290) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
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Lag 1     chi-squared: 9.1454                                   Lag 2     chi-squared: 7.1979                           Lag 3     chi-squared: 5.1654 
                                  (0.264)                                                                      (0.475)                                                             (0.778) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 5.3610                                   Lag 5     chi-squared: 4.8721                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 8.6562 
                                  (0.804)                                                                      (0.854)                                                             (0.318)                                 
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Table 3.7 
Granger Causality Tests. Daily Series 
 
Table 3.7 presents ݔଶ statistics (row 1) and the corresponding p-values (row 2) of pair-wise Granger causality tests between 
endogenous VAR variables at the daily frequency for the US and European markets pre- and post-crisis. Null hypothesis is 
that row variable does not Granger cause column variable. The ordering of the panel VAR endogenous variables is STOCK, 
CDS, BOND. STOCK is the percentage change on the S&P 500 (US) and on the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). CDS is the 
change in the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx (EUR). BOND is the percentage change on the BofA ML 
U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) and on the iboxx (EUR). Market indices prices and spreads are from Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters and cover the period from September 2004 for the US, and from 22 June 2004 for Europe, to 21 May 
2014. Panel 1 and 2 include results for daily data in the US and Europe respectively. ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. USA 
PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
STOCK CDS BOND STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK 44.689*** 27.936*** 107.08*** 29.686*** 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
CDS 53.604*** 35.712*** 11.31 5.6532 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.185) (0.686) 
BOND 6.569 10.449 10.058 14.175* 
(0.765) (0.402) (0.261) (0.077) 
Panel B. Europe 
PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
STOCK CDS BOND STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK 111.32*** 35.844*** 297.58*** 276.65*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CDS 9.5784 79.482*** 20.616** 47.646*** 
(0.296) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
BOND 3.8362 10.253 14.673 13.532 
(0.872) (0.248) (0.100) (0.140) 
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Table 3.8 
VAR Results. Robustness Analysis 
 
Table 3.8 presents the coefficients (row 1) and the corresponding p-values (row 2) of the endogenous and exogenous VAR 
variables at the weekly frequency for the US and European markets during the 2004-2008 and 2008-2014 periods. The 
ordering of the panel VAR endogenous variables is STOCK, CDS, BOND. STOCK is the percentage change on the S&P 
500 (US) and on the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). CDS is the change in the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx 
(EUR). BOND is the percentage change on the BofA ML U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) and on the iboxx (EUR). 
Exogenous variables are placed at the end of the VAR ordering and include the 10-year government bond yield, the slope of 
the term structure, and the implied volatility for the CBOE index. Market indices prices and spreads are from Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters and cover the period from September 2004 for the US, and from 22 June 2004 for Europe, to 21 May 
2014. Panels 1 and 2 include results for weekly data in the US for 2004-2008 and 2008-2014 respectively. Panels 3 and 4 
include results for weekly data in Europe for 2004-2008 and 2008-2014 respectively. The Table further presents the Jarque-
Bera test for normally distributed residuals and the Lagrange-multiplier test for autocorrelation of residuals at different lag 
order. ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel 1. 2004-208. US 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1) -0.340***   
 (0.0643)   
STOCK (t-2)    
    
STOCK (t-3)  0.818*** 0.0352** 
  (0.285) (0.0177) 
STOCK (t-4)  -0.610** 0.0705*** 
  (0.284) (0.0177) 
CDS (t-1)   -0.0157*** 
   (0.00462) 
CDS (t-2)   -0.0116** 
   (0.00458) 
CDS (t-3)    
    
CDS (t-4)   -0.00890* 
   (0.00469) 
BOND (t-1) 0.685***  -0.506*** 
 (0.201)  (0.0558) 
BOND (t-2)   -0.102** 
   (0.0490) 
BOND (t-3)    
    
BOND (t-4) 0.309*   
 (0.173)   
ΔTRATE 5.340***  -6.110*** 
 (1.436)  (0.398) 
USSLOPE  27.98***  
  (7.124)  
VIX -0.712*** 1.694*** -0.0659*** 
 (0.0698) (0.311) (0.0194) 
Constant   0.0850*** 
   (0.0263) 
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
200 
 
0.06489 
 
0.5930 
 
4.155 
(0.126) 
200 
 
0.00785 
 
0.4952 
 
2.955 
(0.230) 
200 
 
0.03565 
 
0.6123 
 
2.599 
(0.289) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
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Lag 1     chi-squared: 5.1232                                   Lag 2     chi-squared: 5.5894                          Lag 3     chi-squared: 6.4985 
                                  (0.694)                                                                      (0.621)                                                             (0.597) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 6.9530                                   Lag 5     chi-squared: 7.1894                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 7.3224 
                                  (0.571)                                                                      (0.546)                                                             (0.533)                                 
    
 
 
 
Panel 2. 2008-2014. US 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1) -0.130** -0.341* 0.0614*** 
 (0.0565) (0.186) (0.0166) 
STOCK (t-2)  -0.840*** 0.0651*** 
  (0.184) (0.0164) 
STOCK (t-3) -0.138**   
 (0.0576)   
STOCK (t-4)  -0.614***  
  (0.188)  
STOCK (t-5) 0.142** 0.327* -0.0364** 
 (0.0581) (0.192) (0.0171) 
STOCK (t-6) 0.157*** -0.791***  
 (0.0579) (0.191)  
CDS (t-1)  -0.279*** -0.0129** 
  (0.0570) (0.00507) 
CDS (t-2) 0.0538*** -0.259***  
 (0.0172) (0.0567)  
CDS (t-3)   -0.0227*** 
   (0.00483) 
CDS (t-4) 0.0564*** -0.200*** -0.00892* 
 (0.0168) (0.0554) (0.00494) 
CDS (t-5) 0.0318*  -0.00839* 
 (0.0172)  (0.00505) 
CDS (t-6) 0.0572*** -0.132** -0.00828* 
 (0.0159) (0.0525) (0.00468) 
BOND (t-1) 0.956*** -1.498** -0.240*** 
 (0.206) (0.681) (0.0606) 
BOND (t-2) 0.315*  0.158*** 
 (0.179)  (0.0526) 
BOND (t-3)  1.402**  
  (0.604)  
BOND (t-4)   0.0910* 
   (0.0519) 
BOND (t-5)   -0.178*** 
   (0.0508) 
BOND (t-6)  -2.370***  
  (0.524)  
ΔTRATE 9.350*** -34.36*** -2.506*** 
 (2.129) (7.022) (0.626) 
USSLOPE  17.70** -2.019*** 
  (8.173) (0.728) 
VIX -0.531*** 1.840*** -0.0876*** 
 (0.0502) (0.166) (0.0148) 
Constant   0.124*** 
   (0.0372) 
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
298 
 
0.00278 
 
0.4297 
298 
 
0.07894 
 
0.5005 
298 
 
0.00965 
 
0.5337 
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Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
 
4.011 
(0.115) 
 
2.965 
(0.233) 
 
2.004 
(0.324) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
 
Lag 1     chi-squared: 10.1667                                 Lag 2     chi-squared: 9.1635                          Lag 3     chi-squared: 9.1124 
                                  (0.297)                                                                      (0.311)                                                             (0.327) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 5.1477                                   Lag 5     chi-squared: 6.1184                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 5.9984 
                                  (0.763)                                                                      (0.671)                                                             (0.701)                                 
    
 
 
Panel 3. 2004-2008. Europe 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1) -0.238***   
 (0.0610)   
STOCK (t-2)    
    
STOCK (t-3)    
    
STOCK (t-4) 0.127** -0.629*** 0.0294* 
 (0.0571) (0.195) (0.0150) 
STOCK (t-5)    
    
STOCK (t-6)    
    
STOCK (t-7)  -0.564***  
  (0.196)  
CDS (t-1)    
    
CDS (t-2) -0.0717*** 0.237***  
 (0.0210) (0.0717)  
CDS (t-3) 0.0444**   
 (0.0214)   
CDS (t-4)   0.0101* 
   (0.00541) 
CDS (t-5)   -0.0182*** 
   (0.00568) 
CDS (t-6) 0.0452** -0.186***  
 (0.0211) (0.0722)  
CDS (t-7)  -0.152** 0.0105* 
  (0.0720) (0.00554) 
BOND (t-1)  6.876***  
  (2.566)  
BOND (t-2)  1.571*  
  (0.893)  
BOND (t-3)  -2.131**  
  (0.868)  
BOND (t-4)  1.571*  
  (0.875)  
BOND (t-5)    
    
BOND (t-6) 0.487*   
 (0.260)   
BOND (t-7)   -0.127* 
   (0.0666) 
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ΔGDBR  32.45***  
  (12.32)  
EURSLOPE  -12.72**  
  (5.979)  
VIX -0.760*** 1.423*** 0.0288* 
 (0.0658) (0.225) (0.0173) 
Constant    
    
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
211 
 
0.01561 
 
0.4078 
 
4.991 
(0.119) 
211 
 
0.07844 
 
0.4988 
 
4.065 
(0.174) 
211 
 
0.06974 
 
0.5081 
 
3.357 
(0.249) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
 
Lag 1     chi-squared: 5.1270                                   Lag 2     chi-squared: 6.8921                          Lag 3     chi-squared: 10.187 
                                  (0.594)                                                                      (0.381)                                                             (0.197) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 8.1654                                   Lag 5     chi-squared: 7.1688                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 7.0057 
                                  (0.241)                                                                      (0.484)                                                             (0.463)                                 
    
 
Panel 4. Weekly Data. 2008-2014. Europe 
VARIABLES STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK (t-1) -0.382***  0.0328*** 
 (0.0617)  (0.0124) 
STOCK (t-2)  -0.909*** 0.0235* 
  (0.211) (0.0124) 
STOCK (t-3) -0.232***   
 (0.0624)   
STOCK (t-4)    
    
STOCK (t-5) 0.153**   
 (0.0621)   
STOCK (t-6)    
    
CDS (t-1)  -0.179**  
  (0.0789)  
CDS (t-2)  -0.155**  
  (0.0691)  
CDS (t-3) -0.0586***   
 (0.0204)   
CDS (t-4) 0.0427**   
 (0.0199)   
CDS (t-5) 0.0480**   
 (0.0198)   
CDS (t-6)    
    
BOND (t-1) 1.061**  0.299*** 
 (0.427)  (0.0856) 
BOND (t-2)    
    
BOND (t-3)  2.793***  
  (1.035)  
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BOND (t-4)    
    
BOND (t-5)   -0.142** 
   (0.0603) 
BOND (t-6)    
    
ΔGDBR 6.089***  1.268*** 
 (2.173)  (0.435) 
EURSLOPE    
    
VIX -0.679*** 1.970*** -0.0513*** 
 (0.0465) (0.159) (0.00932) 
Constant   0.0919*** 
   (0.0288) 
Observations 
 
RMSE 
 
R-squared 
 
Jarque-Bera Normality Test  
(H0: Normally Distributed Residuals) 
298 
 
0.07901 
 
0.4140 
 
1.990 
(0.108) 
298 
 
0.08962 
 
0.4877 
 
2.648 
(0.218) 
298 
 
0.09207 
 
0.5015 
 
4.187 
(0.409) 
 
 
Lagrange-multiplier for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
(H0: no autocorrelation at lag order) 
 
Lag 1     chi-squared: 6.8922                                   Lag 2     chi-squared: 5.0074                           Lag 3     chi-squared: 5.1707 
                                  (0.553)                                                                      (0.597)                                                             (0.562) 
 
Lag 4     chi-squared: 9.7087                                   Lag 5     chi-squared: 7.2736                           Lag 6     chi-squared: 7.0043 
                                  (0.294)                                                                      (0.405)                                                             (0.454) 
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Table 3.9 
Granger Causality Tests. Weekly Series 
Table 3.9 presents ݔଶ statistics (row 1) and the corresponding p-values (row 2) of pair-wise Granger causality tests between 
endogenous VAR variables at the weekly frequency for the US and European markets pre- and post-crisis. Null hypothesis is 
that row variable does not Granger cause column variable. The ordering of the panel VAR endogenous variables is STOCK, 
CDS, BOND. STOCK is the percentage change on the S&P 500 (US) and on the FTSE Eurotop 100 (EUR). CDS is the 
change in the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx (EUR). BOND is the percentage change on the BofA ML 
U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) and on the iboxx (EUR). Exogenous variables are placed at the end of the VAR ordering 
and include the 10-year government bond yield, the slope of the term structure, and the implied volatility for the CBOE 
index. Market indices prices and spreads are from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters and cover the period from September 
2004 for the US, and from 22 June 2004 for Europe, to 21 May 2014. Panels A and B include results for weekly data in the 
US and Europe respectively for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) and the post-crisis (2008-2014) periods. ***, **, and * marks 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. USA 
PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
STOCK CDS BOND STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK 18.338*** 21.216*** 62.985*** 53.851*** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CDS 1.8336 22.566*** 41.009*** 31.263*** 
(0.766) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BOND 17.171*** 3.6924 28.354*** 28.894*** 
(0.002) (0.449) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
Panel B. Europe 
PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
STOCK CDS BOND STOCK CDS BOND 
STOCK 21.232*** 28.2293*** 25.376*** 29.115*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
CDS 28.136*** 20.263*** 24.129*** 31.302*** 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
BOND 7.441 20.749*** 12.691** 9.9509 
(0.384) (0.004) (0.048) (0.127) 
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Table 3.10 
Granger Causality Tests. Macroeconomic Variables 
Table 3.10 presents ݔଶ statistics (row 1) and the corresponding p-values (row 2) of pair-wise Granger causality tests between 
endogenous VAR variables at the weekly frequency for the US and European markets pre- and post-crisis. Null hypothesis is 
that row variable does not Granger cause column variable. The ordering of the VAR endogenous variables in the 
examination for the US is IP, CPI, FED, NBRX (alternatively ER/TR), STOCK, CDS, BOND. The ordering of the VAR 
endogenous variables in the examination for Europe is IP, HICP, EONIA (alternatively EURORATE), ER/TR (alternatively 
ERX), STOCK, CDS, BOND. STOCK is the percentage change in basis points in the S&P 500 (US) and in the FTSE 
Eurotop 100 (EUR). CDS is the change in the spread on Markit CDX (US) and on Markit itraxx (EUR). BOND is the 
percentage change in basis points in the BofA ML U.S. Corporate Master Index (US) and in the iboxx (EUR). IP is the 
Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization index (Europe) and Industrial Production index (US). HICP is the 
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. CPI is the CPI inflation. EONIA is the EONIA rate. EURORATE is a basket of 
weekly interest rate data including the EONIA, the EONIA-swap with maturities of one-week, one, two and three-months, 
and the closest three-month EURIBOR futures. FED is the Federal funds effective rate. ER/TR is the mix between excess 
and total reserves. NBRX is the orthogonalized non-borrowed reserves. ERX is the orthogonalized excess reserves. Market 
indices prices and spreads are from Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters. Data on industrial production, inflation, money 
market rates, and aggregate reserves are from the ECB, the Federal Bank of New York, the Federal Bank of St. Louis, and 
Thomson Reuters. The examination period is from September 2004 for the US, and from 22 June 2004 for Europe, to 21 
May 2014. Panels A and B include results for weekly data in the US and Europe respectively for the pre-crisis (2004-2008) 
and the post-crisis (2008-2014) periods. ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A. USA 
PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
STOCK CDS BOND STOCK CDS BOND 
IP 10.445 6.2158 9.9172 19.427** 37.902*** 29.146*** 
(0.235) (0.623) (0.271) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
CPI 15.577*** 12.123 14.774* 16.507** 13.600* 12.349 
(0.049) (0.146) (0.064) (0.036) (0.093) (0.136) 
FED 48.642*** 91.479*** 2.5821 7.1485 42.993*** 19.850** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.958) (0.521) (0.000) (0.011) 
NBRX 8.7765 13.102 8.9576 47.678*** 27.002*** 11.547*** 
(0.362) (0.108) (0.346) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
ER/TR 17.132** 50.327*** 4.721 71.131*** 35.374*** 34.743*** 
(0.029) (0.000) (0.787) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B. Europe 
PRE-CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
STOCK CDS BOND STOCK CDS BOND 
IP 11.768 26.804*** 11.123 51.936*** 22.936*** 24.396*** 
(0.162) (0.001) (0.195) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) 
HICP 20.849*** 31.873*** 14.661* 10.122 6.8354 8.032 
(0.008) (0.000) (0.066) (0.257) (0.554) (0.430) 
EONIA 16.171** 35.346*** 11.852 9.7374 8.7123 20.931*** 
(0.040) (0.000) (0.158) (0.284) (0.367) (0.007) 
ER/TR 19.195** 49.050*** 9.9726 12.291 11.380 14.670* 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.267) (0.139) (0.181) (0.066) 
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Figure 3.1 
Daily Time-Series of Market Indices 
 
This Figure presents the daily time-series of the Stock, Bond, and CDS indices in the US and Europe for the 2004-2014 
period. Graph A presents the daily time-series of the price level of the S&P 500 and of the BofA ML U.S. Corporate Master 
Index, and of the spread level of the Markit CDX over the 2004-2014 period (the Markit CDX is scaled up by 10 to enhance 
comparability between the indices). Graph B presents the daily time-series of the price of the FTSE Eurotop 100 and of the 
iboxx, and of the spread level of Markit itraxx over the 2004-2014 period (the iboxx, and the Markit itraxx are scaled up by 
10 to enhance comparability between the market indices). Market indices prices and spreads are from Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters and cover the period from September 2004 for the US, and from 22 June 2004 for Europe, to 21 May 
2014.  
 
Graph A. USA 
CDX is scaled up by 10.  
Graph B. Europe 
iboxx, and itraxx are scaled up by 10.
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Figure 3.2 
Response to Endogenous Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Graph A. Response of US Market Indices to Macroeconomic Shocks. Pre-Crisis. Weekly Series 
 
Stock Index 
 
     Response of STOCK to CPI                          Response of STOCK to IP                             Response of STOCK to FED                          Response of STOCK to NBRX 
  
Bond Index 
 
     Response of BOND to CPI                            Response of BOND to IP                                Response of BOND to FED                            Response of BOND to NBRX 
 
CDS Index 
 
   Response of CDS to CPI                                 Response of CDS to IP                                    Response of CDS to FED                               Response of CDS to NBRX 
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Graph B. Response of European market indices to macroeconomic shocks. Pre-Crisis. Weekly Series 
 
Stock Index 
 
   Response of STOCK to HICP                         Response of STOCK to IP                            Response of STOCK to EONIA                     Response of STOCK to ER/TR 
 
Bond Index 
 
    Response of BOND to HICP                         Response of BOND to IP                              Response of BOND to EONIA                       Response of BOND to ER/TR 
   
CDS Index 
 
    Response of CDS to HICP                             Response of CDS to IP                                   Response of CDS to EONIA                           Response of CDS to ER/TR 
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Graph C. Response of US Market Indices to Macroeconomic Shocks. Post-Crisis. Weekly Series 
 
Stock Index 
 
    Response of STOCK to CPI                       Response of STOCK to IP                            Response of STOCK to FED                        Response of STOCK to NBRX 
 
Bond Index 
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Graph D. Response of European Market Indices to Macroeconomic Shocks. Post-Crisis. Weekly Series 
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Figure 3.3 
Response to Endogenous Monetary Variables 
 
Graph A. Response of US Bond and CDS Market Indices to Supply Shocks, Demand Shocks, and Monetary Policy Shocks. Weekly Series (2004-2014) 
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Monetary Policy Shock 
 
                       
 
Graph B. Response of European  Bond and CDS Market Indices to Supply Shocks, Demand Shocks, and Monetary Policy Shocks. Weekly Series (2004-2014) 
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Appendix 3.A 
Principal Components Analysis and information on the calculation of the EURORATE interest 
rate variable  
Principal components analysis (PCA) captures the common variation pattern from a set of time series 
in the form of one or more linear combinations. The aim is to summarize in one variable the 
information context of a set of interest rates. This is feasible by estimating the eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues from the variance-covariance matrix of our set of interest rates. The eigenvectors form 
linear combinations of the set of interest rates and the eigenvalues indicate the proportion of total 
variance explained by each combination. These combinations, also termed principal components, are 
then ranked according to their contribution to the total variance of the original set of interest rates. In 
this chapter we are interested in that combination which is able to better capture the common variation 
of the EONIA times series and the EURIBOR future; thus, only the first principal component is 
selected. Before proceeding to the PCA all interest rates are standardized in order to prevent the most 
volatile rate from dominating the analysis. The following method can be found in Perez-Quiros and 
Sicilia (2002). 
In particular, the selected set of interest rates includes: weekly and monthly changes in the 
EONIA, the EONIA swap of 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, and 3 months and the EURIBOR future of 3 
months. We form a vector ܺ ൌ ሺ ଵܺ௧, ܺଶ௧, ܺଷ௧, ܺସ௧, ܺହ௧, ܺ଺௧ሻ, where  
ଵܺ௧= The EONIA rate. 
ܺଶ௧= The 1-week EONIA swap. 
ܺଷ௧= The 1-month EONIA swap. 
ܺସ௧= The 2-month EONIA swap.   
ܺହ௧= The 3-month EONIA swap. 
ܺ଺௧= The 3-month EURIBOR future. 
The interest rates are grouped into four vectors:  
PCୱ୦୭୰୲, which includes the EONIA, the 1-week EONIA swap, and the 1-month EONIA swap. 
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PC୪୭୬୥, which includes the 2-month EONIA swap, the 3-month EONIA swap, and the 3-month 
EURIBOR future. 
PCୟ୪୪, which includes all 6 interest rates. 
PC୬୭ିୣ୭୬୧ୟ, which is equal to PCall without the EONIA.  
The combination that captures best the common variation in the vector  of interest rates is 
the combination ܲܥ௝, such that ܲܥ௝ ൌ Xܥ௝, where j= 1,...,4 and stands for PCୱ୦୭୰୲, PC୪୭୬୥, PCୟ୪୪, and 
PC୬୭ିୣ୭୬୧ୟ, and ܥ is a (6x1) vector.  
For the calculation of the value of the vector ܥ a maximisation problem is solved subject to 
the fact that the weights must add to one. This results in a vector ܥ ൌ ሺܥଵ, ܥଶ, ܥଷ, ܥସ, ܥହ, ܥ଺ሻ, which is 
the characteristic vector associated with the highest eigenvalue of X′X.  
The estimated weights of the series are:  
Cୱ୦୭୰୲= (0.2416, 0.6837, 0.6886, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000) 
C୪୭୬୥= (0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.6658, 0.6728, 0.3225) 
Cୟ୪୪= (0.1079, 0.3955, 0.5173, 0.508, 0.528, 0.1653)  
C୬୭ିୣ୭୬୧ୟ= (0.5192, 0.3978, 0.5112, 0.208, 0.203, 0.183) 
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Appendix 3.B 
VAR with sign restrictions 
Given a VAR specified as:65 
௧ܻ ൌ ܿ ൅ ∑ ܤ௜ ௧ܻି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ݑ௧,                                                                                                              (B3.1) 
where ௧ܻ is a ݉ ൈ 1 vector, at time ݐ ൌ 1, … , ܶ, ܤ௜ are coefficient matrices of size ݉ ൈ݉ with 
݅ ൌ 1,… , ݌, and ݑ௧ is the one-step ahead prediction error. The innovation of the specific method, is 
the decomposition of the prediction error ݑ௧ into economically meaningful or fundamental 
innovations. If there are e a total of ݉ independent and normalized with variance 1, fundamental 
innovations can be written as a vector ݒ of size ݉ ൈ 1 with ܧሾݒݒᇱሿ ൌ ܫ௠. By adopting the 
independence assumption, we need to find a matrix ܣ such that ݑ௧ ൌ ܣݒ௧. The only restriction 
imposed on ܣ is:  
ߑ ൌ ܧሾݑ௧ݑ′௧ሿ ൌ ܧሾݒ௧ݒ′௧ሿܣ′ ൌ ܣܣ′,                                                                                                (B3.2) 
where ߑ is the variance-covariance matrix of the prediction error, ݑ௧. 
In order to find the innovation corresponding to a monetary policy shock, Uhlig (2005) 
identifies a single column ߙ ∈ Թ௠ of the matrix	ܣ in equation (B3.2). This vector ߙ ∈ Թ௠ is called an 
impulse vector, if and only if there is a matrix ܣ, such that ܣܣᇱ ൌ ߑ and so that ܽ is a column of ܣ. If 
ܣሚܣሚᇱ ൌ ߑ is the Cholesky decomposition of ߑ, then	ܽ is an impulse vector if and only if there is an ݉-
dimensional vector ܽ of unit length so that ܽ ൌ ܣሚܽ. Then given an impulse vector ܽ, the appropriate 
impulse response is calculated by letting ݎ௜ሺ݇ሻ ∈ Թ௠ be the vector response at horizon k to the ith 
shock in a Cholesky decomposition of ߑ. Hence, the impulse response ݎ௔ሺ݇ሻ for ܽ is given by: 
ݎ௔ሺ݇ሻ ൌ ෌ ߙ௜ݎ௧ሺ݇ሻ௠௜ୀଵ .                                                                                                                    (B3.3) 
For a vector ෨ܾ ് 0 with ሺߑ െ ߙߙᇱሻ ෨ܾ ൌ 0 normalized so that ܾᇱܽ ൌ 1, the real number  
ݒ௧ሺ௔ሻ ൌ ܾ′ݑ௧ is the scale of the shock at date ݐ in the direction of the impulse vector ܽ, and ݒ௧ሺ௔ሻܽ is a 
part of ݑ௧, which is attributable to that impulse vector. Hence, ܾ is the appropriate row of ܣିଵ. The 
above proposition along with the proof is included in Uhlig (2005). 
                                                            
65 The VAR specification, the proposition and the associated information are taken from Uhlig (2005). 
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Below are the sign restrictions imposed on the VAR in the case of: a) a supply shock, b) a 
demand shock, c) a monetary policy shock. In each matrix, the first column refers to the first period 
from which the restriction is imposed , the second column refers to the last period to which the 
restriction is imposed, and the third column defines the sign of the restriction. The first model is the 
full restricted VAR, i.e., the shock is transmitted to the stock market and then indirectly to the bond 
and CDS markets (without excluding any direct transmission of the shock to bond and CDS markets). 
The second model is the restricted VAR without restrictions on the stock market , i.e., the shock is 
transmitted directly to the bond and CDS markets and not indirectly through the stock market.  
 
Supply Shock  
 
VAR with Full Restrictions                                    VAR with no Shock through the Stock Market 
 
ሾ									1														2				 						‐1										Inflation																																										ሾ			1						2									 	‐1										Inflation																																															
     1								 2										‐1													 Productivity																																											 1						2									 ‐1										Productivity 
					1						2								 			‐1										Interest	Rate																																						1						2										 								‐1												 		Interest	Rate	
					1						2								1										Bank	Reserves																																		 						1						2														 	1										Bank	Reserves	
					1						2								 		 ‐1										Stock																																																					0						0									 	0										Stock	
					1						2										 ‐1										Bond																																																					1						2									‐1										Bond	
					1						2							1			ሿ								 CDS																																																						 			1						2										 							1			ሿ								CDS 
													 
 
Demand Shock                                                  
 
VAR with Full Restrictions                                    VAR with no Shock through the Stock Market 
 
ሾ			1						2																		1										Inflation																																										ሾ				 1						2					 					1										Inflation 
       1																2						1										Productivity																																							 		1												2													 	1										Productivity 
					1														2															1										Interest	Rate																																						1						2													1										Interest	Rate	
					1						2							 ‐1										Bank	Reserves																																							 		1							 2														 ‐1										Bank	Reserves	
					1						2						1										Stock																																																							 			0						0											 0															 		Stock	
					1						2					 	1										Bond																																																					1						2											1										Bond	
					1						2								 ‐1			ሿ					CDS																																																												 		1						2						 ‐1			ሿ					CDS 
 
 
Monetary Policy Shock  
 
VAR with Full Restrictions                                    VAR with no Shock through the Stock Market 
 
ሾ			1						2					‐1										Inflation																																										ሾ			1						2					‐1													 Inflation 
       1																						2				 			‐1										Productivity																																									1						2										 	‐1										Productivity 
								 			1												2																									1														Interest	Rate																																					 				 1																		2						1												 		Interest	Rate	
				 					1															2								 ‐1															Bank	Reserves																																								 		1																		2										 		‐1											Bank	Reserves	
										1														2									 								‐1										Stock																																																											0									0									 0																									Stock	
					1											2						 ‐1																			Bond																																																												 	1								2												‐1										Bond	
					1								 2												 		1			ሿ							 			CDS																																																															 			1									 							2								 											1			ሿ							 		CDS	
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Chapter II 
 
 
Sovereign Bond and CDS Market Liquidity. Arbitrage Activities and Central 
Bank Interventions 
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4.1. Introduction  
‘‘The notion that financial assets can always be sold at prices close to their fundamental values is 
built into most economic analysis, and before the crisis, the liquidity of major markets was often 
taken for granted by financial market participants and regulators alike. The crisis showed, 
however, that risk aversion, imperfect information, and market dynamics can scare away buyers 
and badly impair price discovery’’ 
(Bernanke, 2010) 
Liquidity, defined as the ease of trading a security without affecting its price, is a fundamental 
concept in finance and thus incorporated into a number of asset pricing models (Amihud et al., 
2005).66 In this respect, fluctuations in market liquidity affect real and financial investment decisions, 
causing investors to demand higher returns for less liquid assets.  However, as the recent financial 
crisis revealed, in the event of extreme market conditions liquidity can drastically decrease or dry-up. 
Such liquidity shocks constitute a potential channel through which financial asset prices are linked by 
liquidity, thereby giving rise to phenomena of liquidity comovements.67 These liquidity dry-ups and 
the resulting liquidity comovements act as impediments to trade and consequently investment, thereby 
hampering the efficient allocation of risk and capital across the economy; they thus ultimately pose a 
threat to financial market stability. The liquidity-induced interaction between financial assets is also 
supported by theoretical approaches which support the notion that the liquidities of different assets 
                                                            
66 Those models include among others, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the arbitrage pricing theorem 
(APT), the consumption CAPM, and the international CAPM. A discussion on the concept of liquidity and the 
sources of liquidity is provided in Section 2.4. 
67 Theoretical arguments about the impact of liquidity on asset prices are provided by Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), Jacoby et al. (2000), and Lo et al. (2004). Empirical studies include those by Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001), Amihud (2002), Jones (2002), Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) for stocks, Longstaff et al. (2005) Chen et al. (2007).Bao et al. (2011), for corporate bonds, 
Huang et al. (2001), Brandt and Kavajecz (2002), Fleming (2003) for Treasury bonds, Chen et al. (2005), Chen 
et al. (2007), Tang and Yan (2007), Bengaerts et al. (2007), and Buhler and Trapp (2009) for CDSs. 
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display comovements.68 These comovements are of time-variant nature and can be the outcome of 
supply shocks related to funding constraint of financial intermediaries (Coughenour and Saad, 2004; 
Hameed et al., 2010), demand shocks related to international and institutional investors' trading 
behaviour (Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Kamara et al., 2008; Koch et al., 2009), 
to the incentives to trade individual securities (Morck et al., 2000), as well as to changes in the 
investor sentiment (Huberman and Halka, 2001).69 
However, liquidity comovements also arise due to shocks specific to the liquidity supply in 
one asset class propagating to other asset classes.70 According to the liquidity propagation mechanism 
(see Cespa and Foucault, 2014), a drop in the liquidity of one asset causes that asset's price to become 
less informative for liquidity providers in the other asset, thereby causing the other asset's liquidity to 
drop as well; the end result is that the liquidity of those two assets becomes interconnected.71 Leaving 
aside market-wide factors, this propagation of liquidity from one asset to the other mainly occurs 
through market-making activities and arbitrage activities (Pelizzon et al., 2015). While the former 
type of activities is pertinent to all types of assets and drives liquidity transmission through changes in 
the quoted bid-ask spreads or the quoted quantity, arbitrage activities pertain only to those assets 
linked via arbitrage, such as a derivative and the underlying security: when a deviation from the 
equilibrium level occurs, arbitrage activity restores the no-arbitrage condition. 
This chapter investigates the liquidity comovements between the bond and CDS markets 
through changes in the bid-ask spreads focusing on the no-arbitrage relationship between those 
markets, i.e., the CDS-bond basis, the role of which helps identify whether the movements in liquidity 
                                                            
68 For an excellent survey see Amihud et al. (2005), and Vayanos and Wang (2012). 
69 A detailed analysis of the sources of liquidity comovements is provided in Section 2.4. Additional information 
can be found in Karolyi et al. (2012).  
70 See Chordia et al. (2005) and Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) for an empirical examination of liquidity 
propagation between the US stock and bond markets.  
71 This liquidity propagation mechanism is discussed in detail in Section 2.4. 
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arise from a change in the information available to investors or from the actions of arbitrageurs.72 The 
analysis is in the context of the European and US sovereign markets, taking into account the recent 
financial and the European sovereign debt crises. This allows for the further examination of the 
impact of central banks' non-conventional policy actions, as well as of the naked CDS ban - that 
targeted specifically the government bond and CDS markets in Europe - and thus serve as natural 
experiments for the examination of the liquidity movements between the two assets. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the liquidity dynamics between sovereign bonds and 
CDSs and how these dynamics relate to arbitrage activities and also to the actions of central banks and 
regulatory authorities. 
The examination of liquidity is of considerable relevance since it has evolved into a factor 
sufficient to trigger or aggravate a crisis giving rise to the phenomenon commonly referred to as 
flight-to-liquidity (Beber et al., 2009). Most importantly, illiquidity is a fundamental feature of the 
recent financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis.73 During the US-originated crisis the 
stoppage in interbank market lending and the collapse in the asset-backed and mortgage-backed 
securities markets caused liquidity to dry up; as the crisis intensified, most of the decline in bank 
credit production was attributed to liquidity risk exposure (see  Cornett et al. (2011) for evidence). 
The immediate regulatory reaction to the crisis was the imposition of bans on short-selling, which 
resulted in an additional disruption in liquidity (Beber and Pagano, 2013). 
In Europe, the financial and macroeconomic imbalances of the periphery states, i.e., Greece,  
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, were reflected in rising spreads on those states' sovereign bonds. 
The strong interdependence between banks and the heavy cross-border exposure to sovereign debt 
induced the transmission of sovereign default risk to the banking sector and then across the 
Eurozone.74 However, despite that the roots of the Euro debt crisis can be found in the imbalances 
                                                            
72 Moe information on the CDS-bond basis is provided in Section 2.3. 
73 Earlier events include the Russian bond default, the fall of Long-Term Capital Management. 
74 Note that the term Eurozone is used by most authors and commentators synonymously with the term EMU, 
which stands for Economic and Monetary Union. In the present Thesis the two terms are used interchangeably. 
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inherent in the financial and macroeconomic position of the periphery states, the speculative attacks 
launched by investors via the CDS market were considered by EU officials as the driving force behind 
the liquidity dry-up in the European sovereign debt markets. Regulatory authorities in Europe also 
responded with a ban on short selling, giving rise to a central policy debate over the impact of naked 
CDSs on the liquidity of the underlying sovereign bond market. 75 
Hence, the European sovereign debt crisis provides the ideal setting for the examination of 
liquidity interaction across assets, with the sovereign bond and CDS markets emerging as the most 
suitable candidates since not only they are linked via a no-arbitrage condition, but also due to the 
sovereign bond-CDS interaction being at the crux of the Eurozone crisis.76 Their candidacy is further 
reinforced by the fact that they have been continuously exposed to changes in the information set, as 
well as to fiscal- and macroeconomic-related shocks mainly due to the heightened market uncertainty 
and the fiscal developments during the Eurozone crisis. 
In addition, the bond-CDS pair has also been the target of an unprecedented series of 
interventions carried by a central bank within the European context. With the aim of injecting 
liquidity in the sovereign bond market and restore the trust in the economy and the private sector the 
ECB intervened directly in the sovereign bond market primarily through the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP), as well as indirectly through the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs).77 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
In reality, these two technical terms differ slightly. On January 1, 1999, all 15 EU countries were members of 
EMU, however only 11 became members of the Eurozone. 
75 As stipulated in the legislative act, naked is the purchase of CDSs “without having a long position in 
underlying sovereign debt or any assets, portfolio of assets, financial obligations or financial contracts the value 
of which is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt”. More details can be found in Regulation (EU) No 
236/2012. 
76 The difference between the bond yield over the LIBOR/swap rate should be approximately equal to the CDS 
spread (assuming equal maturities); if it is more than this, arbitrageurs profit by buying the bond and buying 
protection. More information is provided in Section 2.3 and in Appendix 5.A 
77 A presentation of the ECB's non-standard monetary policy measures is provided in Section 2.6.1. 
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Thus, the ECB interventions should inevitably have affected the liquidity mechanics between the 
European sovereign bond and CDS markets.78 However, the European sovereign debt crisis is not the 
only case where monetary policy has been employed to restore liquidity in the financial markets. In 
response to the US-originated liquidity crunch, the Federal Reserve unleashed its Quantitative Easing 
(QE) programme, which involved the purchase of long-term securities through an increase in reserve 
balances; since reserve balances are a more liquid asset than long-term securities, QE aimed at 
increasing liquidity in the hands of investors, thereby decreasing the liquidity premium on the most 
liquid bonds (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).79 
Therefore, the examination of the sovereign bond-CDS liquidity dynamics within the US 
context is of particular relevance, especially when considering that QE2 (November 2010 - June 
2011) targeted specifically the government bond market, by involving only Treasury purchases, thus 
exerting a substantial impact on Treasury rates (ibid).80 Furthermore, the ECB has also introduced 
(effective from March 2015) its massive €1.1 trillion QE programme, which primarily involves the 
purchase of euro area central government bonds, so a firm understanding of the mechanisms affecting 
market liquidity in the sovereign debt and credit derivatives markets is essential. This understanding is 
also required given that ultimately the unconventional monetary policy measures of the ECB and the 
Fed will cease, giving their place to conventional measures.  
The results of this chapter's empirical analysis suggest that sovereign bond liquidity exerts a 
stronger and longer-lasting impact on the liquidity of the sovereign CDS market than the reverse. 
Liquidity linkages are found to be stronger in the European North, where shocks to the liquidity of the 
CDS market also appear able to induce movements in bond illiquidity (even of a limited size), while 
in the European South, liquidity shocks stemming from the CDS market appear to exert a rather 
                                                            
78 For an analysis of how non-standard monetary policy is transmitted to financial markets see Section 2.6.2  
79 Additional information about the Federal Reserve's QE programmes can be found in Section 2.6.1. 
80 According to the October 8 2010 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statement “... the Committee 
intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 
2011.” 
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insignificant impact on the level of bond liquidity. This asymmetric relationship between the two 
assets grants sovereign bonds a more direct and efficient role in pricing sovereign credit risk - 
especially in countries under fiscal strain - relative to sovereign CDSs, which may have been 
disassociated from the underlying fundamentals. This is in contrast to the nature of sovereign CDS 
contracts, which by construction are thought to be the most accurate reflectors of sovereign default 
risk, while also points to the fact that - in line with Longstaff et al. (2011) - sovereign CDSs are driven 
primarily by systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk.  
Liquidity in the European sovereign bond market is found to exert a significant impact on the 
CDS-bond basis; this owes to the illiquidity and liquidity risk in the bond market (in terms of the 
mean and volatility of the quoted bid-ask spread) being greater relative to those in the CDS market. 
Hence, bond illiquidity in Europe appears to be the major driver of the deviations from the theoretical 
one-to-one no-arbitrage relationship between bonds and CDSs, thereby supporting the arguments that 
the most illiquid asset acts as a limit to arbitrage (see Roll et al., 2007; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011; 
Nashikkar et al., 2011). The analysis also provides evidence that the ECB interventions during the 
Eurozone crisis have affected these liquidity dynamics and relieved the pressure on the CDS-bond 
basis exerted by bond illiquidity; this result not only verifies the predictions of the preferred habitat 
theory, but also provides a solid argument for the ECB's large-scale government bond purchases 
adopted in early 2015.81 It further resembles the US case, where the Fed's QE2 programme appears to 
have strengthened the impact of the bond market over the CDS market. The chapter's findings further 
question Beber and Pagano's (2013) predictions and lend support to the EU's decision to ban the 
purchase of uncovered CDS protection, since in the period after the ban's implementation, a 
deterioration in the CDS market's liquidity leads to an improvement in the liquidity of the bond 
market in most EMU countries. 
The main novelty of this chapter pertains to the understanding of the effectiveness of non-
standard monetary policy with regards to the relief of tensions in the European sovereign bond and 
                                                            
81 See Vayanos and Vila (2009), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), Acharya et al. (2011), Gromb and Vayanos 
(2012). 
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CDS markets. This is an issue of intense interest to policy makers, since to this date the effectiveness 
of non-standard monetary policy was judged only against the predictions of theoretical foundations.82 
However, the adoption of non-standard measures was neither governed by theoretical foundations nor 
was the outcome of intellectual fermentation. It was rather the logical response to the exceptional 
conditions prevailing during the financial and Eurozone crises. Within the European context, non-
traditional monetary policy was employed in order to address the liquidity shortage in the sovereign 
financial markets. However, due to the unique character of those measures no evidence exists with 
regards to the outcome of these central bank interventions. Hence, this chapter conducts the first 
empirical investigation of the impact of non-standard monetary policy on sovereign financial market 
liquidity. It does so, by assessing the ability of those measures to enhance the liquidity transmission 
between the sovereign bond and CDS markets. It further evaluates the success of central banks to 
promote the efficient pricing of sovereign bonds and CDS contracts by limiting the price distortions 
between the two assets.  
Thus far, traditional monetary policy was firmly based on empirical evidence on how changes 
in the official central banks rate are transmitted to financial asset prices; the understanding of this 
transmission implied that interest rate setting was based on reaching the appropriate level of interest 
rates expected to produce the desirable outcome (Joyce et al., 2012). The transition to an era of non-
traditional policy interventions however, such as asset purchases and liquidity providing operations, 
gave rise to the need of understanding the impact of this transition. It is imperative that central banks 
incorporate and capitalize on information from the recent crises in order to evaluate whether this shift 
in monetary policy stance can provide future guidance on the optimal conduct and formulation of non-
standard policy actions. The empirical analysis conducted in the present chapter fills exactly this gap. 
This chapter's contribution further concerns the examination of the intertemporal association 
between sovereign bond and CDS market liquidity and the CDS-bond basis thereby highlighting an 
additional driver of liquidity. Through this examination it provides a further reason why liquidity is 
                                                            
82 The theoretical foundations for the transmission of non-standard monetary policy are presented in Section 
2.6.2. 
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important for financial theory, i.e., to guarantee the equilibrium between assets linked by a no-
arbitrage condition and limit the cross-asset price distortions. In this respect, this chapter's analysis 
constitutes the first empirical investigation of whether sovereign bond and CDS market liquidity 
affects and is affected by the CDS-bond basis, and how liquidity is related to the deviations from the 
CDS-bond equilibrium price.  
The chapter also contributes on the regulatory front by evaluating the implications of the EU's 
naked CDS ban for sovereign bond liquidity. On the practical front, the evaluation of this regulatory 
change is hampered by the simultaneous causality between the bond and CDS liquidity measures, and 
between the liquidity measures with the ban itself. The isolation of the ban from previous periods and 
its examination within a VAR framework identified by Cholesky decomposition, enables for the 
identification of the ban's occurrence, while addresses simultaneity concerns. It further addresses the 
asymmetric impact of the ban, by differentiating between countries. Thus, the analysis offers an 
evaluation of the validity of the IMF's arguments according to which, deteriorating CDS liquidity in 
the post-ban period will affect negatively bond market liquidity. The following section discusses how 
these contributions relate to previous studies and how they extend those studies' findings. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 sets the hypotheses and 
discuss related studies. Section 4.3 describes the liquidity measures and the methodological 
framework. Section 4.4 performs the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis. Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
This study is related to the literature on liquidity comovements and spillovers between different 
markets. So far the empirical evidence is scarce and restricted mainly to the stock-bond relationship: 
Chordia et al. (2005) document covariation in liquidity and volatility between the stock and Treasury 
bond markets, while De Jong and Driessen (2012), find that liquidity risk from the stock and Treasury 
bond markets exerts an impact on corporate bond returns. They are followed by Goyenko and Ukhov 
(2009), who report a cross-market effect of liquidity affecting returns in both markets; they further 
establish a link between monetary policy and financial markets illiquidity and document that central 
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bank reserves are an important driver of financial market liquidity. In a joint examination of credit and 
liquidity risk by Calice et al. (2013), liquidity linkages are also observed between a number of 
European government bonds and CDSs during the early phase of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, 
with the CDS market being the driver in most cases. Their findings also include a positive and 
significant lagged transmission from the CDS market's liquidity spread (proxied by the bid-ask 
spread) to the credit spread in the bond market. 
The analysis in this chapter goes even further and examines assets that are linked via a no- 
arbitrage condition providing evidence that deviations from that equilibrium matter for cross-asset 
liquidity interaction and vice versa. It additionally considers the effect of central bank interventions, 
and most importantly the asset purchase interventions within the ECB's SMP and the Fed's QE2. In 
this respect, it supplements Goyenko and Ukhov (2009), by showing that extreme central bank 
interventions are effective in changing the cross-asset liquidity interactions in the financial markets. 
An additional differentiation from the previous studies concerns the impact of a regulatory change 
(i.e., the European short-selling regulation) that specifically targeted the two assets included in the 
analysis; the empirical results suggest that a potential fall (due to the regulation) in sovereign CDS 
liquidity is not detrimental to sovereign bond liquidity, thereby justifying the EU's decision to enact 
the regulation. The examination further reveals that - in contrast to Calice et al. (2013) - liquidity (and 
price) movements in the sovereign bond market are more important for the periphery of the Eurozone 
compared to the core.  
This chapter also extends the literature on the CDS-bond basis, as well as the relative price 
discovery mechanism in the bond and CDS markets.83 These studies suggest that overall, the no-
arbitrage relation holds fairly well. However when the equilibrium breaks down, the market in which 
the price discovery takes place is state dependent, citing as one of the important determinants the 
                                                            
83 Studies on price discovery include those by Blanco et al. (2005), and Norden and Weber (2009) for the 
corporate bond and CDS markets, and Fontana and Scheicher (2010), Calice et al. (2011), and Arce et al. 
(2012), for the sovereign bond and CDS markets. Blanco et al. (2005), and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011), 
examine the CDS-bond basis. These studies are discussed in more detail in Sections 2.3. to 2.3.3. 
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relative liquidity in these markets, although without including any liquidity proxies in their empirical 
examination. The present chapter specifically includes the CDS-bond basis in conjunction with 
liquidity in the empirical analysis and provides evidence that bond illiquidity prevents the basis from 
converging to its equilibrium value. 
This work is also related to the studies examining the relationship between CDS and the 
issuer of the underlying security on which the CDS contract is written. At the corporate level, 
liquidity in the bond market appears unaffected by the beginning of the CDS trading in Das et al. 
(2013), while in Massa and Zhang (2012) and in Shim and Zhu (2014), the CDS market results in an 
increase in bond market liquidity. This chapter provides evidence for the sovereign market, where the 
liquidity of the underlying bond matters more for the liquidity of the derivative written on it, rather 
than the reverse; however, in times of heightened uncertainty the CDS appears to increase its 
influence on the underlying security for debt-distressed issuers.  
In what follows, certain hypotheses are developed to explore the liquidity dynamics between 
the sovereign bond and CDS markets, and how these dynamics relate to central bank interventions 
and the CDS-bond basis. The first hypothesis concerns the nature of the liquidity transmission 
between the two markets and states that this transmission is not limited to a mere comovement 
between them. The other two hypotheses specify how illiquidity and central bank interventions affect 
the equilibrium relationship between the sovereign bond and CDS markets. 
Hypothesis 1: Liquidity in one market spills over to the other market. 
There are reasons to expect the existence of liquidity linkages between the bond and CDS 
markets; since theoretical and empirical studies confirm the role of liquidity as a risk factor priced in 
each market, and since liquidity conditions in each market depend on- as well as reflect systematic 
risk factors arising from a common source (e.g., macroeconomic developments, monetary conditions, 
demand and/or supply shocks, market frictions, investor beliefs), this leads us to expect a bi-
directional interaction of liquidity in the two markets (Amihud et al., 2005; Goyenko and Ukhov, 
2009; Karolyi et al., 2012; Cespa and Foucault, 2014).84 This in turn might have implications for the 
                                                            
84 The sources and mechanisms of liquidity propagation are discussed in detail in Section 2.4. 
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nature of the relationship between liquidity conditions in the two markets; we expect this relationship 
not to be limited to the comovement of liquidities, but also that liquidity spills from one market over 
to the other, i.e., current CDS liquidity is affected by past bond liquidity, and vice versa. This dual 
nature comprises the main hypothesis to be examined in this chapter. 
Hypothesis 2: Central bank interventions drive the CDS-bond basis towards its equilibrium 
(zero) value. 
More specific, the asset purchases under the ECB’s SMP targeted the bonds of the EMU 
South and aimed at lowering the illiquidity yield premium required by investors due to the absence of 
trading activity in situations of high credit risk (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016). The SMP’s sizable 
purchases resulted in a windfall gain for the periphery countries due to an immediate increase in their 
bond prices and thus are expected to have - at least temporarily - increased the CDS-bond basis 
(Acharya et al., 2016). This is further motivated by the long-term horizon of the SMP's portfolio and 
the fact that the bond purchases were not reversed through the repo market (Corradin and Maddaloni, 
2015). Furthermore, during periods of market stress asset purchases are anticipated to reduce the costs 
faced by short-sellers for borrowing the bond in the reverse repo channel, and through that to decrease 
the associated net liquidity premium (see Banerjee and Graveline, 2011). To this end, the ECB 
interventions are likely to have alleviated short-selling pressures, thereby limiting the negative basis 
in the EMU periphery. 
Central bank interventions are further expected to limit funding problems and ‘‘slow-moving 
capital” which are considered to be leading to asset pricing distortions (see Duffie, 2010) and giving 
rise to price gaps (i.e., the CDS-bond basis) due to causing securities with nearly identical cash flows, 
but different margins, to trade at a different price (Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011). In addition, 
monetary policy contributes to the transmission of information during periods of heightened market 
stress by increasing market liquidity and enabling the efficient pricing of assets through a reduction in 
the risk aversion of market-makers and traders. This is attained through the ability of monetary policy 
to affect investor sentiment (broadly defined as the propensity to speculate and which is usually 
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negatively correlated with the market-wide risk aversion), as well as through the restoration of the 
inventory channel (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).85 
Hypothesis 3: It is the less liquid asset that prevents the basis from converging to its 
equilibrium value. 
The motivation for this hypothesis is derived from earlier studies where arbitrage activities in 
the cash and futures contracts may be affected by those contracts' liquidity (see Kumar and Seppi, 
1984). Furthermore, if the mispricing is extensive then a negative shock to liquidity may exert a 
persistent impact on the cash-futures basis as investors attempt to exploit this mispricing and drive the 
basis to zero: this persistency in turn prevents the exploitation of the arbitrage opportunity (Roll et al., 
2007). When the reverse direction is considered, market-wide order imbalances arising from arbitrage 
trades due to a wide basis may have a contemporaneous, as well as a lasting impact on liquidity (Stoll, 
1978; O'Hara and Oldfied, 1986; Chordia et al., 2002). Most importantly, the effect of illiquidity on 
arbitrage activities is stronger in the relatively less actively traded longer-term contracts (Roll et al., 
2007; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Nashikkar et al., 2011). This is particular relevant for the 
sovereign bond and CDS contracts which are primarily employed in the context of long-horizon 
strategies and therefore their equilibrium relationship is likely to be affected by their liquidity. 
The hypothesis about the link between market liquidity and the level of the basis is further 
based on the trading traits of the bond and credit derivatives contracts. The CDS-bond basis is used in 
a basis strategy - as is frequently the case with hedge funds - which is part of a number of different 
strategies that depend on bonds and CDSs and cause an allocation of funds between them. These 
                                                            
85 It is reasonable to expect this relationship to be firm, since for example, accommodative monetary policy may 
favourably affect liquidity through its effect on volatility (Harvey and Huang, 2002) and interest rates (Kuttner, 
2001). Of course falling liquidity might also induce the central bank to ease its monetary stance, thereby 
highlighting the possibility of reverse causality. Monetary policy may have a different effect on liquidity in the 
bond and CDS markets due to fundamental differences between those assets. Bond prices are affected through 
expectations of future short rates and potentially the term premium, and CDS spreads through the discount rate 
and possibly through the probability of default. 
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strategies mainly include dynamic hedging and are further promoted by the changes in the contractual 
features of the CDSs, which make the trading and closing out of positions considerably easier.86 
Along these lines, the greater CDS-induced trading activity during the crisis is an additional driver of 
movements in the level of the basis: speculating on the variation of the basis in a short leg of time (the 
so called ‘‘convergence-trading”) is considered to have led to a negative basis during the post-2008 
period (Fontana and Scheicher, 2016). The negative basis in the EMU South during the best part of 
this period and the assertions at the EU level about the speculative actions targeting that bloc's 
countries further reinforce this argument. 
Following these ideas, this chapter explores the liquidity spillover between the sovereign 
bond and CDS contracts. It further examines the intertemporal associations between central bank 
interventions and market liquidity on the one hand, and the divergence of the sovereign bond and 
CDS markets from their no-arbitrage relationship (i.e., the CDS-bond basis) on the other. 
 
4.3. Data and Methodology  
The data employed is comprised of daily and weekly bid-ask spreads for on-the-run sovereign bonds 
and CDSs with 5 years to maturity. On-the-run issues are the most frequently traded securities of their 
maturity, and although on-the-run bonds constitute only a small fraction in some markets, e.g., that of 
Treasury bonds, they account for the largest portion of the activity in the interdealer market. These 
issues trade at higher prices (lower yields) than more seasoned securities with similar cash flows, with 
these higher prices thought to be reflecting a liquidity premium. This superior liquidity of the on-the-
run securities also makes them as ideal securities for market intermediaries who are interested in 
creating short positions, due to the fact that they are particularly easy to borrow and sell when 
initiating a short position, and also to repurchase when closing one out.87 
                                                            
86 From May 2009 onwards, CDS prices consist of an upfront payment and a regular fixed coupon (Barclays 
Capital, 2010).  
87 Evidence on the characteristics of the on-the-run securities are provided by Amihud and Mendelson (1991), 
Furfine and Remolona (1998), Fabozzi and Fleming (2000), Strebulaev (2003), Pasquariello and Vega (2009).  
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The time to maturity chosen for sovereign CDSs is based on the fact that the 5-year tenor 
consists the most liquid and frequently quoted part of the credit curve and therefore, the most traded 
maturity for CDS contracts. Daily bid-ask quotes are from the Bloomberg Generic Quote (BGN) and 
Composite Bloomberg Bond Trade (CBBT) pricing sources.88 The sample consists of all the EMU 
member countries at the time of the introduction of the euro, i.e., Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain; it further includes the USA.89 
Sovereign bond and CDS bid-ask spreads are available since 31 January 2006, therefore the 
examination covers the period from January 2006 to June 2014. 
In contrast to the ECB's and the Fed's asset purchases programmes under the SMP and the 
QE2 respectively, the UK's QE did not target government bond yields. The Bank of England (BoE) 
designed its asset purchase operations with the aim of affecting the yields (or prices) on a wide range 
of private sector assets, especially on bonds issued to finance lending to corporations and households 
(Joyce et al., 2012). Contrary to the non-standard operations in the Eurozone and the US, the BoE's 
operations were not concerned with restoring a liquidity problem within the banking system or easing 
the pressures on the government's sovereign bond issues. Hence, due to this differences in the 
objectives of the BoE's non-standard policy operations, the UK is not included in the analysis. 
Since the bid-ask spread, due to being based on widely available data, is highly correlated 
with price impact (Fleming, 2001), the analysis in this chapter follows Chordia et al. (2000) and 
                                                            
88 BGN prices are computed as a weighted average of quotes from participating dealers and include indicative 
and executable quotes. CBBT also provides average bid-ask quotes; it is only based on executable quotes that 
are listed on Bloomberg’s trading platform. BGN spreads are further employed in the literature by inter alia 
Chen et al. (2007), Longstaff et al. (2005), Bao et al. (2011). As in the previous studies the analysis in the 
present chapter employs executable quotes. 
89 The euro was introduced on January 1, 2002. Data for Luxembourg is unavailable, thus the country is not 
included in the examination despite being an EMU member on that date. Due to the Greek debt restructuring 
deal in March 2012, data on Greek bonds and CDSs is not available for the major part of the post-March 2012 
period. 
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Goyenko and Ukhov (2009), and employs the quoted bid-ask spread as the primary liquidity measure 
for the bond market, which is computed as: 
ܳS ൌ ୅ୗ୏	ି	୆୍ୈభ
మሺ୅ୗ୏	ା	୆୍ୈሻ
                                                                                                                   (4.1) 
where ASK and BID are ask and bid prices respectively for the security on a given day.90 A higher 
value of this measure is associated with less liquidity (i.e., greater illiquidity). For the CDS market, 
the absolute bid-ask spread is employed (i.e., ask price - bid price), since CDS premiums are already 
expressed in basis points per annum of the notional amount of the contract; thus, further dividing the 
CDS bid-ask spread by the denominator in equation (4.1) might bias the liquidity comparison between 
different securities. An intuitive example provided by Pires et al. (2015) can help illustrate this 
point:91  
Assume that bond A trades at €99.50 - €100.50 (i.e., bid price at €99.50, and ask price at 
€100.50). The absolute spread is thus €1.00, the denominator in equation (4.1) is €100.00, and the 
quoted bid-ask spread is 1%, or 100 basis points (bps). An investor buying that bond at  €100.00 and 
immediately selling it back to the market maker, suffers a transaction cost of  
ሺ99.50	 െ 	100.50ሻ 100.50⁄ , which is approximately equal to 1% of the initial €100.00. Bond B that 
trades at €199.00 - €201.00, has a larger absolute spread (€2.00), but the same quoted spread (1%, or 
100bps). The same roundtrip transaction would again cost to the investor approximately 1% of 
€200.00. These two bonds have the same liquidity costs and this cost is captured by their identical 
quoted bid-ask spreads. Hence, a comparison by means of absolute spreads would provide misleading 
results; in this regard it is appropriate to use  quoted bid-ask spreads to examine liquidity in the bond 
market.92 
                                                            
90 Section 5.6.2 includes a discussion on alternative liquidity measures. 
91 This example is taken from Pires et al. (2015) and adjusted for the purposes of the present chapter. 
92 The same argument can be employed to justify the use of the relative bid-ask spread, which is expressed as 
ሺask	price	 െ 	bid	priceሻ mid	price⁄ . 
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The fact that CDS premiums are already expressed in basis points, reverses the above 
example  when the CDS market is concerned: Assume that the CDS contract on bond A trades at 
95.00bps - 105.00bps, i.e., the absolute bid-ask spread is 10 bps, and the quoted bid-ask spread is 
10%, or 1000bps. A roundtrip transaction for one CDS contract would entail a cost of 105.00 - 95.00 
= 10.00 (for ease of comparisons, the premium is assumed to be paid annually). The CDS on bond B 
that trades at 190.00 - 210.00, has a larger absolute spread of 20bps, but the same quoted spread of 
10%, or 1000bps. Thus, the same roundtrip transaction would result in a larger annual cost of 210.00 - 
190.00 = 20.00. Therefore, while the quoted bid-ask spreads of both CDS contracts are equal, these 
liquidity measures fail to provide an accurate representation of the incurred transaction costs; the 
latter are only captured by the absolute bid-ask spread, which in turn qualifies as the most precise 
measure of liquidity in the CDS market.  
The difference in the information reflected in the two liquidity measures can further lead to 
ambiguous results in the context of the statistical examination of liquidity. Adopting the same 
example - and assuming a number of CDS contracts large enough to conduct the analysis - the 
regression of the CDS premia on quoted bid-ask spreads would produce a horizontal slope, since the 
rise in the CDS premia leaves quoted bid-ask spreads unchanged (Pires et al., 2015). In reality 
however, there is a positive relationship between CDS premia and absolute bid-ask spreads, since 
higher CDS premia (in the same example) are associated with higher transaction costs and 
deteriorating liquidity.93 Since, the focus of this study is the interaction between liquidity in the 
sovereign bond and CDS markets, a regression of bond quoted spreads on CDS quoted spreads (and 
vice versa) could yield the same misleading results. This provides an additional justification for the 
                                                            
93 As Pires et al. (2015) point out, in the event where the absolute bid-ask spread does not grow faster than the 
CDS premium on a contract (the mid quote, or in our case the denominator in Equation (4.1)), a regression of 
the CDS premium on the quoted (or the relative) bid-ask spread will be biased towards producing a zero or 
negative slope. They further attribute some of the negative relations evidenced in Acharya and Johnson (2007) 
and Tang and Yan (2007) to the choice of liquidity measures. 
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employment of the absolute bid-ask spread as liquidity measure for the CDS market. As is the case 
with the quoted bid-ask spread, a higher value of this measure is associated with greater illiquidity.  
Since there is evidence that asset return and volatility affect liquidity in the given asset, they 
are included as additional variables along with the liquidity measures.94 These variables include the 
sovereign bond returns and CDS spread changes (denoted as BONDRET and CDS respectively), and 
the volatility of bond returns and CDS spread changes (denoted as BONDVOL and CDSVOL 
respectively) computed as the standard deviation of daily returns (spread changes) over each week. 
The data used to calculate the CDS-bond basis for Europe are the daily (and weekly) series of the 24-
months Eonia swap rate obtained from Datastream, which are extrapolated to match the maturity of 
the bond and CDS data (5-year), while for the US the series used is the 5-year interest-rate swap 
obtained from the Federal Reserve (Hull et al., 2004; Choudry, 2006). 
Panels A and B of Table 4.2 present country-specific summary statistics for bond returns, 
CDS spread changes, bond quoted spreads, CDS absolute spreads, and the CDS-bond basis at the 
daily frequency. As expected, CDS liquidity is higher than the liquidity of the bond market, with CDS 
bid-ask spreads ranging from approximately 3.7 to 18.5 basis points in all EMU countries. At the 
same time, bond quoted spreads are significantly wider, assuming very large and negative values in 
the case of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain that range from minus 932.3 to minus 108.1 
basis points. In this same group of countries, both liquidity measures exhibit the higher volatility, a 
pattern also evident when looking at bond returns and CDS spread changes.  
With regards to the difference between the CDS spread and the excess of the bond yield over 
swap rate, this difference is relatively greater in France and Germany, owing to the very low yields 
offered by the bonds of these countries. On the contrary, the skyrocketing yields of the Greek, Irish, 
and Portuguese bonds cause this difference to be negative. In terms of volatility, again the highest 
standard deviation is observed in the countries of the European South, suggesting greater possibilities 
of observing a movement of the basis away from, or towards to its equilibrium value.  
                                                            
94 See inter alia Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Longstaff et al. (2005), Chen et al. (2005;2007), Yang and Tan 
(2007), and Bai et al. (2011).  
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[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
According to the earlier arguments about liquidity comovement and spillovers, we expect a 
bidirectional movement and causality of present and past values of liquidity in the two markets. 
Therefore, the following five-equation vector autoregression model is adopted for each of the 11 
EMU countries and the US:  
௧ܻ ൌ ܿ ൅ ∑ Π௜ ௧ܻି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                                                    (4.2) 
Where ௧ܻ = ( ଵܻ௧ , ଶܻ௧ , ଷܻ௧ , ସܻ௧ , ହܻ௧)', is the vector of endogenous variables in the VAR. 
These variables are respectively the return in the sovereign bond market (BONDRET), the quoted bid-
ask spread in the sovereign bond market (BONDLIQ), the change in the spread of the sovereign CDS 
market (CDS), the quoted bid-ask spread in the sovereign CDS market (CDSLIQ), and the CDS-bond 
basis (BASIS). Two additional endogenous variables are included at the weekly frequency, namely 
volatility in the bond and CDS markets, denoted as BONDVOL and CDSVOL respectively. The 
vector c is a  (5 × 1) vector of intercept terms, Π௜ is a (5 × 5) coefficient matrix, and ߝ௧ is a (5 × 1)  
vector of innovations following a multivariate normal distribution with variance Σ, and t = 1,........,T. 
The identifying assumption in the VAR is that if a variable ଵܻ appears earlier in the system than a 
variable ଶܻ, then ଵܻ is weakly exogenous with respect to ଶܻ in the short-run.95 The lag structure and 
the maximum lag order p have been determined using the Akaike Information (AIC) and the Hannan-
Quinn Information (HQIC) criteria.96 
 
                                                            
95 On the one hand there are arguments about placing the CDS market first since it is the most liquid market (in 
the present analysis the CDS market) that induces movements in the other market (the bond market) in the short-
run (see inter alia Blanco et al., 2005; Fung et al., 2008; Norden and Weber, 2009; Corzo et al., 2012). However, 
since the price of the CDS contract is by construction derived from the value of the underlying bond issues, it is 
changes in the bond yield that induce changes in the spread of the CDS contract (Duffie, 1999; Hull and White, 
2000; 2001). Both orderings however provide identical results. 
96 Since, the number of observations is greater than 120, preference is given to HQIC; in any case, the smallest 
of the number of lags suggested by the two criteria is chosen.  
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4.4. Vector Autoregression Analysis 
This section includes the examination of liquidity dynamics between the sovereign bond and CDS 
markets at the country-level. Table 4.3 reports the Granger causality tests between the endogenous 
variables in the VAR at the daily frequency.97 Looking at Austria in Table 4.3, the value in the cell 
(2,4) is 43.665 and significant at the 1% level, thereby indicating that liquidity in the bond market 
Granger causes liquidity in the CDS market. The results suggest a two-way relationship between bond 
liquidity and CDS liquidity in Austria since CDS liquidity also Granger causes bond liquidity; the 
value in the cell (4,2) is 19.091 and statistically significant at the 1%. The remaining coefficients from 
the Granger causality tests in Table 4.3 are interpreted similarly. Overall, it appears that country-
specific liquidity dynamics present substantial differences when we move from the countries of the 
European South (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) to the countries that belong to the core of 
the Eurozone. These differences are further present when the interaction of liquidity with the rest of 
the endogenous variables are considered. 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
The stronger liquidity linkages between the sovereign bond and CDS markets are mainly 
observed in the countries hit the most by the European sovereign debt crisis, such as Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In these countries liquidity is transmitted bidirectionally between CDSs and 
bonds, since bond liquidity Granger causes CDS liquidity and vice versa. In the rest of the Eurozone 
however, it appears that liquidity only stems from the bond market, as it is bond liquidity that Granger 
causes CDS liquidity and not the reverse. The only European country in which there is cross-asset 
liquidity interaction is the Netherlands, a pattern also evident in the US, where bond liquidity is 
disassociated from liquidity in the CDS market. 
                                                            
97 For the null hypothesis that variable ߯ does not Granger-cause (the dependent) variable ݕ variable y, is 
regressed on its own lagged values and on lagged values of x in order to test whether the lagged coefficients of x 
are jointly zero. The cell associated with the ݅௧௛		row variable and the ݆௧௛ column variable shows the ߯ଶ statistics 
and the level of statistical significance. 
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Considerable differences are observed between the European South and North with regards to 
the interaction of liquidity with the other endogenous variables in the VAR, as well as between bond 
returns and CDS spreads. Again, bond liquidity is evolved into a major determinant of not only CDS 
liquidity, but of the level of CDS spreads as well, since bond liquidity Granger causes movements in 
the CDS spreads in all 11 EMU countries. Similar to the cross-asset liquidity examination earlier, the 
CDS market appears to play a greater role in the countries that triggered or affected the most by the 
debt crisis, i.e., in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; in these countries, along with Germany, 
- besides being affected by bond liquidity - CDS spreads also induce movements in the liquidity of the 
bond market. On the other hand, CDS liquidity is not a significant factor for bond returns, as there is 
no interaction between liquidity in the CDS market and returns in the bond market; the only exception 
being Greece, Germany, and Italy. Hence, it appears that the return provided by a sovereign's bond is 
not a prerequisite for an active and liquid sovereign CDS market.  
Overall, findings suggest a unidirectional, and bidirectional in some cases, transmission of 
liquidity between the two markets. Liquidity is also found to interact with the other endogenous 
variables in the system, with a distinctive pattern being that movements in CDS liquidity (spreads) 
contain information for movements in bond returns (liquidity) only in the Eurozone periphery. In the 
Eurozone core however, bond liquidity (returns) are more important for the evolution of CDS spreads 
(liquidity). To obtain a clearer picture impulse response functions (IRFs) are computed, which depict 
the reaction of one variable to a one-time, unit standard deviation, positive shock to another variable 
in the system (termed simply a ‘‘shock’’ or ‘‘innovation’’).98 
Graphs 1 to 12 of Figure 4.1 present the IRFs for each of the 11 EMU member states and the 
USA. For the sake of brevity the figure presents the response of illiquidity in one market to a positive 
                                                            
98 Since the actual variance-covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, the errors need to be 
orthogonalized in order to isolate shocks to one of the variables in  the system. The usual practice is to use 
standard Cholesky decompositions of the VAR residuals keeping the ordering of the endogenous variables 
unchanged, thus allocating any correlation between the residuals of any two elements to the variable placed first 
in the ordering. The ordering of the endogenous variables remains the same as in the Granger causality tests. 
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shock to illiquidity (represented by an increase in the bond quoted bid-ask spread or in the CDS 
absolute bid-ask spread) in the other market, and the response of CDS spreads (bond returns) to a 
shock to illiquidity in the bond (CDS) market.99 
[Insert Figure 4.1 about here] 
According to the graphs, there is evidence of cross-market liquidity dynamics. It appears that 
a positive shock to illiquidity in one market results in the comovement of illiquidity in the other 
market. As a general result, cross-market illiquidity shocks are significantly greater in size and 
duration when they are transmitted from the bond market to that of CDSs. However, in the countries 
of the Eurozone core, CDS illiquidity shocks also appear able to induce movements in bond illiquidity 
(albeit of a lower magnitude compared to the case where the shocks have the opposite direction, i.e., 
from bonds to CDSs); this is in contrast to the Eurozone periphery, where an exogenous shock to the 
level of CDS illiquidity has a rather minor impact on the level of illiquidity in the bond market.  
Certain patterns are evident from the impulse response analysis. First, there is an inverse 
relationship between illiquidity in the one market and illiquidity in the other, i.e., a deterioration in 
liquidity conditions in the bond (CDS) market results in an improvement in the liquidity of the CDS 
(bond) market. Second, and most important, illiquidity shocks stemming from the bond market exert a 
considerably greater (negative) impact on the illiquidity of the CDS market. This is particularly the 
case in the European North, where shocks to bond illiquidity appear able to induce large movements 
in the illiquidity of the CDS market. These movements are between 1 to 1.5 standard deviations of 
their sample means (such as in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany), and can be as high as 2.5 
standard deviations (in Finland). In the European South and Ireland however, CDS illiquidity is less 
dependent on bond illiquidity, since the impact of the latter on the former is in the 0.3 to 0.6 range (in 
units of standard deviation).  
                                                            
99 Therefore the IRFs are presented with the following ordering: The response of Bond Liquidity to CDS 
Liquidity, the response of Bond to CDS Liquidity, the response of CDS Liquidity to Bond Liquidity, and the 
response of CDS to Bond Liquidity. 
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On the other hand the impact of CDS illiquidity shocks on the level of bond illiquidity is 
limited, and (as is the case regarding the impact of bond illiquidity on CDS illiquidity) primarily 
concentrated in the countries of the Eurozone core, where the response of bond illiquidity to a positive 
CDS illiquidity shock ranges from approximately 5% of standard deviation (in Belgium, Finland, and 
Germany) to as high as half of standard deviation in Austria. In the rest of the EMU countries, the 
same response is again significantly weaker, with only Ireland, and Italy reacting somewhat (by about 
5% of standard deviation).  
In the US, bond illiquidity is evolved into a major determinant of movements in CDS 
illiquidity, causing a response of about 1 standard deviation, however the response of the bond quoted 
spreads to illiquidity shocks stemming from the CDS market is insignificant. Illiquidity shocks also 
exert a cross-market impact on returns and spreads. In particular an increase in bond illiquidity is 
associated rising CDS spreads, which suggests that less activity in the bond market is considered as a 
negative prospect for the sovereigns' debt. 
However, while a rise in bond illiquidity leads to higher CDS spreads in all EMU countries, 
the impact of CDS illiquidity shocks on bond returns is dependent on the bloc that each EMU country 
belongs. In specific, countries in the core of the Eurozone see their bond returns falling in response to 
a positive illiquidity shock in their CDSs.100 On the other hand, worsening liquidity in the Eurozone 
periphery countries, leads to rising bond returns, suggesting that an active and liquid CDS market is 
perceived as a good sign by investors considering to gain exposure in those countries' bonds. This is 
further derived from the fact that, in contrast to the impact of CDS illiquidity shocks on bond 
illiquidity, these illiquidity shocks now cause a significantly greater reaction to bond returns in the 
periphery countries than in the Eurozone core. While in the latter countries, the bond return's reaction 
is generally within the 1 to 1.5 range (in standard deviations units), in the periphery, bond returns 
overreact to CDS-originated illiquidity shocks and assume values as high as 3 (see Italy, Spain) or 
even 6 (see Ireland).   
                                                            
100 The only exception is Austria, where bond returns exhibit  a surprising positive response of almost 2 standard 
deviations.  
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Overall, there is evidence of liquidity comovement, and particularly of liquidity spillover, 
between the two markets, with illiquidity shocks exerting a greater cross-market impact when they are 
generated in the sovereign bond market. This highlights the importance of analyzing sovereign bond 
and CDS market liquidity, and also brings attention to the importance of bond liquidity for price 
movements in the European sovereign debt and credit derivatives markets. In addition, it points to the 
different role played by the sovereign CDS market in countries under increased fiscal strain compared 
to countries with sound public finances, as was the case with the Southern and the Northern European 
countries respectively during the recent sovereign debt crisis.  
 
4.4.1. Robustness 
The analysis so far suggests the interaction of liquidity across the sovereign bond and CDS markets, 
with the nature of this interaction exhibiting considerable differences when moving from the 
Eurozone periphery to the core. To test the robustness of those findings the VAR examination is 
conducted by employing weekly series. The VAR specification of equation (4.2) is augmented into a 
seven-equation model with the order of endogenous variables being: BONDRET, Bond Liquidity, 
BONDVOL, CDS, CDS Liquidity, CDSVOL, Basis. The results are roughly the same when 
compared to those  from the daily-level examination.  
In particular, movements in bond liquidity continue to be the main drivers of movements in 
CDS liquidity, with the impact of bond market-stemming illiquidity shocks being greater in the EMU. 
Asset liquidity also appears responsive to that asset's return (or spread in the case of CDSs) and 
volatility. Bond illiquidity remains the variable exerting the stronger influence on the CDS-bond 
basis. The order of the VAR is also changed, by placing the CDS market variables in front of the bond 
market variables, thus accounting for the possibility that the liquidity of the bond market (as measured 
by other measures, e.g., volume of trades, and/or number of contracts outstanding) is greater than that 
of the CDS. However, results do not present significant variations compared to the initial VAR 
ordering.  
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An additional robustness test includes the assessment of the ability of each market in one 
country to forecast movements in the other market in the same country.101 To this end, an in-sample 
forecasting exercise is performed by estimating the same VAR of Section 4.4 for the daily series and 
calculating the predicted series for each market over the last year of the estimation period, i.e., from 
20/06/2013 to 20/06/2014. In Figure 4.2, the predicted series of bond (CDS) liquidity from the VAR 
(red line) is plotted against the actual bond (CDS) liquidity series (blue line) in each country.102  
[Insert Figure 4.2 about here] 
According to the graphs, the evolution of the predicted series for the CDS bid-ask spreads  
matches closely that of the actual series for the total of the EMU countries and the US. This finding is 
consistent with that of Section 4.4 where sovereign bond liquidity appears informative for movements 
in sovereign CDS liquidity. On the other hand, the forecasted series of the bond liquidity although 
directionally similar to the actual series, they nevertheless exhibit considerable difference with regards 
to their size. These differences are in turn particularly evident in the countries of the EMU South, 
since in the EMU North the difference between the two series is of a relatively weaker magnitude.  
Therefore, the results of the previous section where liquidity in the CDS market incorporates 
limited information for movements in bond market liquidity are further confirmed by the forecasting 
exercise. In addition, this deviation between the predicted and the actual series in the Eurozone 
periphery is in line with the weak impact exerted by CDS liquidity on bond liquidity that is observed 
in the IRFs of Section 4.4. Common feature in all graphs of Figure 4.2 is that the predicted series is 
relatively more volatile than the actual ones in all countries, thereby posing some limitations on the 
forecasting ability of the model when short-run movements are considered. In the long-run however, 
the behaviour of the predicted series is similar to the actual evolution of the liquidity measures in each 
market, suggesting that the dynamics of the actual series are well-captured by the VAR. 
 
                                                            
101 I am grateful to the examiners for the suggestion of this test. 
102 Bid-ask spreads for Greece are not available for the total of the forecasting period and therefore Greece is 
omitted from Figure 4.2. 
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4.4.2. Arbitrage Activities 
This section focuses on the role of arbitrage activities in the liquidity dynamics between the sovereign 
bond and CDS markets by analyzing the results of the VAR estimation in the previous section. The 
main variable of interest is the CDS-bond basis (henceforth the basis), which represents the arbitrage 
opportunities created by the pricing discrepancy between sovereigns bonds and CDSs. The aim is to 
determine whether the level of liquidity impacts on the basis and hence, creates opportunities for 
arbitrageurs. Only the results at the daily frequency are considered, since any arbitrage opportunities 
are likely to be diminished at lower frequencies.  
Figure 4.3 presents the response of the basis to a positive shock to illiquidity (represented by a 
widening of the quoted bid-ask spread or the absolute bid-ask spread) in the sovereign bond and CDS 
markets for each of the 11 EMU member states and for the US. Similar to the cross-asset liquidity 
examination of the previous section, the results of the IRFs point to a distinction between the Southern 
and the Northern EMU member-states. Thus, in the European South, illiquidity shocks generated in 
the bond market appear to be exerting a greater impact on the basis, compared to the case where the 
same shocks are generated in the CDS market. The former type of shocks induce a reaction in the 
basis that is double in magnitude compared to the reaction induced by the latter type of shocks, with 
the strongest reaction being observed in Greece, where the basis responds by approximately 1 
standard deviation to any bond illiquidity shock. In these countries, bond illiquidity shocks lead to an 
increase of the basis (or to a decrease in the cases where the average value of the basis is negative, 
such as in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal), forcing it away from its zero equilibrium value.  
This behaviour is not verified for the rest of the EMU countries, where (with the exception of 
Finland) those countries basis' response to CDS illiquidity shocks is at the same level with the 
response to bond illiquidity shocks (e.g., France), or greater (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Netherlands); in this last group of countries, the difference in the magnitude of the basis' response to 
the two type of shocks is again about double in size. However, while in the Eurozone periphery 
countries the greater impact of bond illiquidity shocks relative to CDS illiquidity shocks cause a 
widening of the basis and thus act as limits to arbitrage, in the Eurozone core countries the CDS 
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illiquidity shocks' greater impact move the basis towards - and not away of - its equilibrium value (the 
same is true for Finland, while Austria is the only country where CDS illiquidity acts as a limit to 
arbitrage by leading to a widening of the basis).  
Thus, it might be the case that illiquidity in the periphery countries' bond market leads to an 
overpricing of credit risk in the CDS market (or an underpricing in the bond market) and hence, to a 
positive basis in countries such as Italy, and Spain. However, credit risk might be underpriced in the 
CDS markets (or overpriced in the bond markets) of Greece, Ireland, and Italy, thus leading to a 
negative basis, instead of a positive basis. In those cases where a widening of the basis is observed, 
approximately 6 to 8 days are required before the basis' reaction is stabilized, suggesting that price 
deviations are persistent and need time to correct. This in turn prompts arbitrageurs to act and restore 
the basis (near) to its equilibrium value during the following days. In the US, bond illiquidity appears  
to act as a limit to arbitrage, however CDS illiquidity causes a greater, and negative, impact on the 
basis thus, causing a tightening of the basis and a move towards its zero market-clearing value.  
[Insert Figure 4.3 about here] 
The implications of these findings can be better understood from an investor perspective. The 
large (in absolute terms) values of the basis in the countries of the EMU South are associated with the 
higher volatility and greater illiquidity in both the sovereign bond and CDS markets of that bloc's 
countries. This combination of higher volatility and illiquidity on the one hand, and the large 
deviations from the no-arbitrage price on the other indicates that a part of the CDS-bond basis is 
compensation for this higher volatility and illiquidity. In other words, the exploitation of the widening 
of the mispricing between the sovereign bond an CDS contracts carries a volatility and illiquidity 
premium. This in turn dictates that the horizon of the trading strategy adopted in order to profit from 
this mispricing must be long enough for two reasons: a) to account for the liquidity and volatility risk 
of the sovereign assets, since holding costs can have disproportionately large effects when they are 
incurred by a sequence of short-horizon arbitrageurs (see Tuckman and Vila, 1992,1993; Dow and 
Gorton, 1994) and b) in the case of a negative basis (such as in Greece, Ireland, and Italy) to 
withstand the fire-sales from a potential deterioration of the fiscal position of the underlying issuer 
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and the resulting increase in the issuer's sovereign default risk (see Gromb and Vayanos, 2002). 103 In 
any case the long-horizon condition must be met for the strategy to be profitable. 
This latter case where the basis assumes persistently negative values is further important from 
a monetary policy perspective. When the basis is negative, the exploitation of arbitrage requires a 
strategy of buying the bond (at price ܤ) and buying insurance (the CDS contract) on the bond. The 
purchase of the bond is funded via the repo market where investors are faced with a haircut ݄ on the 
bond; this in turn means that the buyer of the bond (and prospective arbitrageur) will have to provide 
݄ܤ dollars of ‘‘risk-capital’’ funded at Libor൅݂, where ݂ is the funding spread over Libor that the 
buyer faces (Bai and Collin-Dufresne, 2011). The level of this haircut is central for achieving 
equilibrium: if the haircut is too large it deters investors from stepping in and eliminating the pricing 
discrepancy. Thus, the central bank by lowering the haircuts on the bonds that accepts for its reverse 
repo transactions can encourage investors to exploit the arbitrage opportunity and restore equilibrium 
in the market.104 These large deviations of the basis from its equilibrium value further prompt for  
intervention - through liquidity providing operations - by the central bank, an option that is examined 
in the following section. 
 
4.4.3. Central Bank Interventions 
To examine whether central bank interventions affect the relationship between liquidity in the 
sovereign bond and CDS markets, the VAR analysis is conducted by employing the autoregressive 
model of equation (4.2) and including the same endogenous variables employed in the initial analysis 
of Section 4.4.105 In Europe, the panel starts from September 30 2008, i.e., shortly after the Lehman 
Brothers default and the Irish government guarantee provided to six large Irish banks; these events 
mark the beginning of a significant re-pricing of European sovereign debt by international investors.  
                                                            
103 This strategy will be further unprofitable in the case of an eventual default of the issuer. 
104 In a reverse repo transaction the holder of cash agrees to purchase the asset (e.g., bond) and concurrently 
agrees to resell the asset for an agreed price in the future. That way the seller can obtain short-term funding. 
105 The analysis in this section follows that of Pelizzon et al. (2015) for the Italian sovereign bond market. 
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The panel is further split in three samples, with the first cut-off date being May 10 2010, 
which represents the onset of the ECB's SMP, and the second is on December 21 2011, i.e., the 
introduction of the LTROs.106 Thus, in Europe, the first period of examination represents the onset of 
the 2008 financial crisis and also includes the build-up and the first stage of the European sovereign 
debt crisis. It is also a period free of large-scale central bank interventions, similar to those observed 
in the other two examination periods, when the SMP and the LTROs programmes were implemented 
respectively. In the US, the cut-off point is on November 3 2010, which corresponds to the 
announcement of the Fed's QE2 and the purchase of Treasury securities. To control for the EU short 
selling ban, a dummy variable equal to one (otherwise zero) is included for all the observations after 
the adoption of the ban, i.e., after November 1 2012. The resulting IRFs are presented in Figure 4.4. 
[Insert Figure 4.4 about here] 
An initial interpretation of the graphs is that cross-market liquidity dynamics exhibit certain 
differences between the three periods of examination in Europe. Differences are also observed with 
regards to the impact of asset illiquidity shocks on the no-arbitrage relationship between the European 
sovereign bond and CDS markets. In particular, during the pre-ECB interventions period, we can see 
signs of the imminent (when being back in late 2008) Eurozone debt crisis in the significant impact 
exerted by bond illiquidity on the illiquidity of the CDS market in the countries later hit the most by 
this crisis. This is in contrast to the picture observed in the Northern European countries, where the 
illiquidity of the CDS market exhibits a rather weak response to bond illiquidity shocks, which lies 
around the 0.2 to 0.6 level (in units of standard deviation). This is observed in Finland, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, and is considerably lower than their full-sample response (where it 
was between 1 and 1.5 standard deviations).  
However, this is not the case in the weaker economies of the European North, such as Austria, 
and Belgium. In these countries, along with the Southern European countries, and Ireland, shocks to 
bond illiquidity induce movements in CDS illiquidity significantly higher than their full-sample 
                                                            
106 The Bai and Perron test for structural change breaks gives roughly similar cut-off points for the European and 
US markets. 
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values. These movements increase from the range of 0.3 to 0.6 standard deviations in the full panel to 
1, 1.7 and 2.5 in Spain, Italy, and Greece respectively (or rise from 1 to 2 in Austria, and Belgium), 
thus pointing to a period of extreme bond market influence and/or increased sensitivity on the part of 
the CDS market. There is also an increasing influence of the CDS market in all EMU states, since 
CDS-originated illiquidity shocks exert a greater impact on the basis relative to bond illiquidity 
shocks. The increasing pressure and the repricing on the European sovereign debt is evident in the 
Eurozone periphery countries and Germany, where bond and CDS illiquidity shocks act as a limit to 
arbitrage (bond illiquidity widens the basis in Italy, Germany, and Spain, while CDS illiquidity in 
Greece, and Portugal).  
When moving to the period during which the ECB's SMP programme was being 
implemented, the cross-market liquidity dynamics are relatively weaker; both the impact of CDS 
illiquidity on bond illiquidity, as well as the reverse, are now relatively weaker compared to the period 
before the ECB' interventions. The impact of cross-market illiquidity shocks is still stronger when 
these shocks are generated in the bond rather than in the CDS market, however they are not able to 
induce movements in CDS illiquidity above 0.2 and 0.5 standard deviations in the Eurozone's core 
and periphery respectively, i.e., less than half in magnitude compared to the pre-interventions 
period.107 
The transition from the SMP to the LTROs is marked by an increase in the cross-market 
influence of both the bond and CDS market illiquidity shocks in the periphery, as well as in the core 
countries. However, as it is also the case in the previous two periods, illiquidity shocks stemming 
from the bond market continue to exert the stronger cross-market impact on illiquidity relative to 
those shocks that stem from the CDS market. The size of this impact generally lies between the values 
assumed during the pre-interventions and the SMP period.  
                                                            
107 Due to the fact that the Greek government bonds have not been trading for the major part of the period 
following the LTROs, the results for Greece during the particular period should be interpreted with caution. In 
addition, from September 2011 to February 2012 only €7 million of Greek bonds changed hands. 
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The same pattern is further observed with regards to the impact of illiquidity shocks on the 
CDS-bond basis: their impact weakens during the SMP period, and strengthens with the introduction 
of the LTROs. This pattern however, only concerns the core countries, those in the periphery follow 
the reverse course with regards to the illiquidity shocks that originate in the bond market. This 
difference in the effect of bond and CDS market illiquidity when moving from the core to the 
periphery becomes apparent in the LTROs period. In particular, while in the former bloc of countries, 
this effect is stronger than in the SMP period, in the latter bloc, the basis is less responsive to bond 
and CDS illiquidity shocks.  
The SMP programme also appears to have affected the pricing in the European sovereign debt 
markets and to have also corrected certain price discrepancies. In specific, bond illiquidity's role as a 
limit to arbitrage in the periphery is counter acted by CDS illiquidity, which appears to drive the basis 
towards the exact opposite direction.108 Thus, the impact of illiquidity shocks that stem either from the 
bond or the CDS market on the basis not only has generally decreased relative to the pre-SMP period, 
their net effect on the basis is also smaller. The transition to the LTROs period, although has further 
limited the pressure on the basis exerted by illiquidity shocks in the countries of the EMU South, it 
nevertheless coincided with a significant increase in the same pressure exerted by illiquidity shocks in 
the EMU North. Furthermore in the same bloc, the cases where the widening of the basis is caused by 
CDS illiquidity shocks have increased in number.   
In the US, the distinction concerns the periods before and after the onset of the QE2 
programme, however the general characteristics are unchanged during both periods: Bond illiquidity 
shocks are the major determinants of movements in CDS illiquidity and the basis, and further act as 
limits to arbitrage during the pre- and post-interventions periods. However the cross-market impact of 
both bond and CDS illiquidity shocks, as well as their impact on the basis is relatively greater after the 
                                                            
108 Bond illiquidity continues to cause a widening of the basis in the periphery countries, as well as in France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, however in these latter countries CDS illiquidity also appears to cause a 
widening of the basis.  
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Fed's QE2. This suggests that the purchase of Treasury securities resulted in a stronger connection 
between the liquidity of the two assets examined.  
These findings are consistent and extend those of Brunnermeier (2009) and Pedersen (2009), 
who illustrate the role of insufficient liquidity in aggravating the financial crisis: the analysis of this 
section reveals that insufficient liquidity constitutes a negative factor for the Eurozone crisis as well. 
It does so by showing that liquidity injection improves the cross-asset information transmission, while 
also moves the CDS-bond basis towards its equilibrium value, thereby contributing to the efficient 
pricing of sovereign bonds and CDS contracts. Thus, the role of central bank as liquidity provider is 
successful in limiting the price discrepancies where it is most needed, i.e., in the stressed markets of 
the EMU South. 
Overall, two implications arise with regards to the ability of central bank interventions to 
affect the cross-asset liquidity dynamics. First, bond market-stemming illiquidity shocks have a 
weakening impact not only on CDS illiquidity, but most importantly on the CDS-bond basis during 
the SMP's implementation period. This acts as supporting evidence about the favourable effect of 
asset purchases on restoring the information transmission during crises. It further provides a rationale 
for the massive purchases of public sector securities under the ECB's quantitative easing from January 
2015 onwards. Second, this effect appears to be somewhat reversed following the end of the SMP and 
the transition to the LTROs. This implies that the provision of loans by the central bank should be 
accompanied by the simultaneous intervention in the cash market through the purchase of government 
bonds. Otherwise, the fiscal stress and the rise in the borrowing costs - especially in the periphery - is 
likely to crowd out the provision of cheap credit through the refinancing operations. 
Hence, according to this section's analysis the central bank purchases of government bonds 
are qualified as the preferred means for injecting liquidity and facilitating the efficient pricing in the 
European sovereign credit and derivatives markets. This is further implied for the US, where the bond 
market leads liquidity discovery and also exerts the stronger impact on the CDS-bond basis. Therefore 
although the QE mainly targeted private sector securities, that portion of the QE series that included 
the purchase of government bonds appears to have restore equilibrium between the bond and CDS 
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markets. In this case however, the impact of US monetary policy on the convergence of the basis is 
transmitted through the CDS rather than the bond market. 
 
4.4.4. Uncovered CDS Ban 
Under the suspicion that sovereign CDSs aggravated serial European debt crises, EU regulators 
banned uncovered positions in sovereign CDSs; the ban was effective November 2012.109 However, 
this ban was opposed by IMF on the grounds that a liquid sovereign CDS market, will react faster and 
incorporate information quicker in times of financial market stress compared to the bond markets. 
This was further reinforced by the “covered” CDS notion: the availability of CDS protection for the 
investors' sovereign bond holdings is likely to attract traders in the sovereign bond market and thus, 
cause an increase in sovereign bond market liquidity. Hence, the IMF's argument was based on the 
hypothesis that the increase of CDS liquidity due to naked CDS trading, acts as an indirect channel for 
the increase in bond market liquidity.  
To examine in practice the validity of the above arguments and identify the nature of the 
relationship between the European sovereign bond and CDS market liquidity after the introduction of 
the ban, the VAR model in equation (4.2) is employed, splitting the panel in two samples, one for the 
period after the ban, i.e., after November 1 2012, and one for the period before. A dummy variable 
equal to one (otherwise zero) is additionally used for all observations for which the ECB's 
unconventional policy measures analyzed in Section 4.4.3 (the SMP and the LTROs) were effective, 
i.e., from May 10 2010 onwards. 110  
The IRFs in Figure 4.5 provide evidence of an inverse relationship between shocks to the 
illiquidity of the CDS market and movements in bond illiquidity for most of the EMU member-states 
in the sample. In particular, a deterioration in the liquidity of the CDS market increases the liquidity in 
                                                            
109 The EU's decision was formed on the basis that by allowing investors to bet on and profit from a sovereign 
default without even owning the underlying government bonds, the sovereign debt market was prone to 
speculation and overshoot; this in turn discourages investors and accelerates  bailouts and/or sovereign defaults. 
110 Greece is omitted from the examination due to the non-availability of bid-ask spreads in the post-ban period. 
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the bond market. The only case where a positive CDS illiquidity shock leads to an increase in bond 
illiquidity is in Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain; however, in the last two countries the effect is 
rather small and insignificant.  
[Insert Figure 4.5 about here] 
In the rest two of the periphery countries, which may have been the target of speculative 
attacks, there is no evidence of CDS illiquidity exerting a positive impact on bond illiquidity: in Italy 
a widening of its CDS absolute bid-ask spreads leads to a significant tightening of its bond quoted 
bid-ask spreads that reaches the 4 basis points (or about 0.4 standard deviations). The same is true for 
Portugal where bond liquidity improves by about 2 basis points (or 0.1 standard deviations) following 
an increase in the illiquidity of the Irish CDS. In the EMU's two largest economies, i.e., Germany, and 
France, CDS liquidity is also inversely (albeit weakly) related to bond liquidity. Finally, in the least 
strong economies of the Eurozone's core, such as in Austria, and Belgium, which the analysis thus far 
has shown that in some cases behave like the debt-laden countries of the periphery, a rise in CDS 
illiquidity also leads to an improvement of liquidity in the bond market by approximately 0.3 and 0.6 
standard deviations.  
 
4.4.5. Discussion 
The econometric analysis of Sections 4.4 confirms the existence of liquidity linkages between the 
sovereign bond and CDS contracts. Results suggest that the sovereign bond market leads liquidity 
discovery relative to the SDS market in all EMU member-states and the US, since cross-market 
illiquidity shocks are significantly greater in size and duration when they are transmitted from the 
bond market to that of CDSs. This persistency in the transmission of sovereign bond liquidity is in 
line with the expectation about the cross-asset liquidity dynamics stipulated in Hypothesis 1. The 
analysis further provides evidence of an asymmetric interaction between liquidity developments in the 
European sovereign bond and CDS markets. In particular, while in the countries of the European 
North, CDS illiquidity shocks also appear able to induce movements in bond illiquidity (even of a 
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limited size), in the European South, CDS illiquidity has a rather insignificant impact on the level of 
illiquidity in the bond market.  
One interpretation for this varying relationship is that before the crisis the cash market was 
considerably more liquid than the CDS market for most European sovereigns (see BIS 2010; Delatte 
et al., 2012). The onset of the Eurozone crisis however was marked by a significant increase of 
outstanding CDSs, especially for those member-states under market pressure, and by a consequent 
increase in the liquidity of those sovereigns' CDS contracts, that might have led to a disassociation 
between (liquidity) movements in the sovereign bond and CDS markets. This disassociation might 
have further been exacerbated by the use of CDSs as a speculative tool, a use that could have driven 
their prices and liquidity up, and thus weakened their link with the underlying fundamentals and /or 
actual risks. 
This significant responsiveness of CDS liquidity to liquidity movements in the periphery's 
bonds verifies the notion about a prominent liquidity effect - in this case stemming from the sovereign 
bond market - being exerted on sovereign CDSs, especially during periods of tightening financial 
conditions (see Gomez-Puig, 2006; Beber et al., 2009). One major implication for policy makers and 
investors is that during periods of market stress, sovereign bond markets appear to incorporate 
information faster and more accurately than sovereign CDS markets for countries under fiscal strain. 
This suggests that bond yields can perform better as indicators of those countries' credit risk than their 
respective CDS spreads, which might contain an element of exaggeration.  
When the role of arbitrage activities is taken into account, sovereign bond liquidity appears to 
exert the largest influence on the basis. The impulse response analysis suggests that a positive shock 
to bond illiquidity generally leads to a widening of the basis. Hence, bond illiquidity appears to be the 
major driver of the deviations from the theoretical one-to-one no-arbitrage relationship between bonds 
and CDSs, thereby confirming Hypothesis 3. The analysis also confirms that the no-arbitrage 
condition is not affected in a uniform manner during the different phases of the European sovereign 
debt crisis. During the evolution, as well as the main stage of the crisis, bond illiquidity emerges as 
the variable exerting the strongest pressures on the basis. This is a rather unsurprising result, 
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considering the funding constraints, i.e., the limited ability of financial institutions to borrow against 
their securities, and the mispricing in financial markets, which is a direct consequence of the 2008 
financial crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011). 
The central bank purchases during the main stage of the crisis however, appear to have 
limited the price deviation caused by bond illiquidity, a result in line with the preferred habitat theory 
(Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010; Gromb and Vayanos, 2012). During the 
same period the presence of CDS illiquidity as an additional factor affecting (albeit moderately) the 
basis is also explained by the vast changes in the information set during that period that are primarily 
manifested through the CDS market. The ECB's large-scale liquidity facilities and loose collateral 
policy in the later period of the crisis seem to have further relieved the pressures on the basis, 
especially with regards to the EMU periphery countries. These findings confirm Hypothesis 2 and are 
also supportive of a more expansionary monetary policy on the part of the ECB, such as the €1.1 
trillion government bond purchases programme, in order to further improve sovereign bond market 
liquidity with the goal of restricting its role as a limit to arbitrage and thus, helping the CDS-bond 
basis converge (near) to its equilibrium value. 
When notable focus is given to the periods during which the ECB interventions have taken 
place, the nature of the liquidity dynamics between the sovereign bond and CDS markets exhibit 
considerable differences with regards to the “non-interventions” period. In specific, sovereign bonds 
continue to retain a lead in liquidity discovery, however their impact of illiquidity shocks are 
considerably contained during the SMP period, and relatively stronger thereafter. It appears that the 
ECB's open market purchases have exerted the intended impact on the cash market, since when these 
type of interventions target a specific security (e.g., sovereign bonds), they are expected to affect the 
price of those securities when market stress and capital constraints are high. These results are not only 
consistent with the recent predictions of the revised preferred habitat theory, but also supportive of the 
arguments that in periods of financial crises and interbank lending stoppage, the central banks - 
through open market purchases - are more efficient in injecting (and transferring liquidity) in the 
market (Vayanos and Vila, 2009; Acharya et al., 2012; Gromb and Vayanos, 2012).  
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To this end, they might have been effective in inducing a strong enough (positive) shock to 
primary dealer funding liquidity in order to force market-makers to increase their inventories and thus 
provide more liquidity to the markets, which would further result in a consequent increase in market 
liquidity.111 The end result is that, shocks to the bond market have ceased to induce excessive 
movements in the liquidity of the CDS market during the period of the open market purchases. In this 
point it should be noted that bond and CDS markets exhibit varying sensitivity to different factors; 
CDS contracts tend to be more dependent on institutional factors, such as specific settlement 
procedures, and most importantly, on differing definitions of credit events (debt restructuring or 
outright defaults).112 Since the likelihood of credit events occurring has been significantly greater for 
the periphery countries during the initial and the main stage of the crisis, this likelihood might have 
been better reflected in the increase in the impact of CDS illiquidity shocks on the level of bond 
liquidity during the respective periods (although this impact is weaker than that of bond liquidity on 
CDS liquidity).  
The inverse relationship between bond and CDS market liquidity in most EMU countries 
during the post-ban period lends support to the ECB's decision to stop the trading in uncovered CDS 
protection. The fact that after the ban, the fall in CDS illiquidity can lead to an improvement - rather 
than to a deterioration - in bond liquidity, challenges the dissidents who oppose the EU's decision on 
the grounds that the ban could negatively affect sovereign bond market liquidity, as well as cause 
dislocation in other markets.113 It further casts doubt on the view that bans on short selling are 
generally viewed as merely reducing market liquidity and hindering price discovery (Beber and 
Pagano, 2013). 
                                                            
111 For a detailed analysis of the mechanics see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
112 Such settlement procedures include cash or physical settlement, with or without “cheapest-to-deliver” options 
for protection buyer. In fact, on March 9 2012, Greece agreed to a restructuring deal with 95.7% of private 
holders of Greek government bonds; this percentage increased to 96.9% on April 20 2012.  
113 The critique on the ban on naked sovereign CDSs was originated by the IMF (see inter allia IMF Global 
Financial and Stability Report, April 2013). 
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Overall, the strong influence of the sovereign bond market is consistent with the fact that a 
liquidity shock that comes solely from funding constraints or from central bank interventions, will 
likely move from the cash to the derivative market (Pelizzon et al., 2015). On the other hand, a change 
in liquidity that is due to a change in the information set available to investors, will probably move 
from the derivatives market to the cash market. This last proposition is compatible with the relative 
increase in the sovereign CDS market's influence during the main stage of the sovereign debt crisis. 
However, the ample availability of central bank-provided liquidity combined with the easing in the 
ECB's collateral policy managed to contain the impact of sovereign CDSs, and contributed to the 
already substantial lead of the sovereign bond market in liquidity discovery. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the joint dynamics of sovereign bond and CDS liquidity in Europe and 
the US from January 2006 to June 2014. The choice of the particular assets and markets is not 
arbitrary, since bonds and CDSs are linked by arbitrage and are also employed in a number of 
different trading strategies, with this trading occurring in considerably liquid markets. Furthermore, 
the European and US markets were subject to numerous informational shocks, primarily, due to the 
fiscal developments in the Eurozone. To this end, they were the target of an unprecedented 
intervention by the central banks as the crux of an attempt to inject liquidity and ease market stress. 
They have further been the subject of a heated debate initiated by the IMF with regards to the decision 
of European authorities to prohibit uncovered purchases of sovereign CDS protection and the 
resulting consequences of this prohibition for the liquidity of the underlying sovereign bond market.  
The findings of this chapter suggest that sovereign bonds and CDSs are linked via liquidity. 
The liquidity linkages are found to be stronger in the EMU North, where liquidity is primarily 
transmitted from the bond market to that of CDSs, although shocks in the latter also appear able to 
induce movements in bond illiquidity (even of a limited size). The opposite situation is evident in the 
EMU South, where liquidity shocks stemming from the bond market are the only determinants of 
cross-market liquidity interaction. Overall, sovereign bond liquidity exerts a stronger and longer-
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lasting impact on the liquidity of the sovereign CDS market than the reverse. Hence, the sovereign 
bond market appears to have replaced the SCDS market as the most efficient indicator of sovereign 
credit risk, especially in countries under significant fiscal strain. It might be the case that SCDSs 
might have over-reacted to underlying fundamentals, thereby suggesting that are driven primarily by 
idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk (an argument in line with Longstaff et al., (2011)). 
Liquidity in the European sovereign bond market is found to exert a significant impact on the 
difference between the spread of the sovereign bond over the swap rate and the spread of the CDS 
contract written on it; this is due to the higher illiquidity and liquidity risk in the sovereign bond 
market (in terms of the mean and volatility of the quoted bid-ask spread) relative to that in the CDS. 
This greater illiquidity imposes a limit to the arbitrage mechanism between sovereign bonds and 
CDSs, with a consequent impediment on the frictionless transmission of liquidity from one asset to 
the other, that is expected to occur in any assets linked by arbitrage. This in turn verifies in practice 
the arguments that between any two assets, it is the less liquid one that acts as a limit to arbitrage (see 
Roll et al., 2007; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011;Nashikkar et al., 2011).  
The empirical analysis suggests that the ECB interventions, and in particular the asset 
purchases under the SMP, have affected the bond-CDS liquidity dynamics and most importantly, 
relieved the pressure on the CDS-bond basis exerted by bond illiquidity. This is in line with the 
prediction of the preferred habitat theory and provides a justification for the large-scale government 
bond purchases under the ECB's quantitative easing programme. Of particular importance is also the 
finding that the period following the naked CDS ban in Europe, a deterioration in the CDS market's 
liquidity leads to an improvement in the liquidity of the bond market in most EMU countries. This is 
in contrast to Beber and Pagano's (2013) predictions and additionally implies that the purchase of 
credit derivatives without owning the underlying security has a destabilizing effect on the liquidity of 
the underlying market. 
The implications of the present study further concern the ability of monetary policy to affect 
the sovereign bond-CDS equilibrium relationship, and through this relationship the efficient pricing of 
sovereign bonds and CDS contracts. Despite that expansionary monetary policy shocks prevents 
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illiquidity from acting as a limit to arbitrage, as Section 4.4.2 revealed these limits to arbitrage are 
present in the long run, especially in the countries of the EMU South. This points to the need that the 
quantity of the government securities purchased under the ECB's QE be increased and specifically 
target the debt-laden countries of the Eurozone periphery. It thus, provides an argument in favour of 
the ECB's imminent 1.1.€ trillion asset purchases programme. Second, since the European sovereign 
CDS contracts are denominated in US dollars, the ECB could adjust the provision of US dollars 
through its US dollars standing swap arrangement, i.e., a bilateral swap line with the Federal Reserve. 
By increasing the frequency and maturity of these US dollar liquidity-providing operations, the ECB 
can provide the necessary funding liquidity in US dollars and re-establish the no-arbitrage condition 
across the European sovereign credit and derivatives markets.  
On the regulatory front and still within the ECB's scope of responsibility, the ECB through 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has assumed the supervision of the euro area banking 
system. In this respect, new regulatory proposals - along with an increase in the level of 
countercyclical capital buffers - should entail the upward revision of the current requirements for 
holding liquid assets and extend these requirements to the sovereign issues of the Southern EMU 
countries regardless of their credit rating. This would stimulate demand, and consequently trading, for 
those countries' government securities and thus increase their liquidity. Lastly, the positive impact of 
CDS illiquidity on sovereign bonds serves as supporting evidence of the EU's decision to ban the 
purchase of uncovered CDS protection. It further constitutes a guide for the future regulatory 
treatment of the disequilibrium between financial assets linked by arbitrage.  
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Table 4.1 
List of Variables and Definitions 
VARIABLE 
Bond Liquidity 
 
 
CDS Liquidity 
 
 
BONDRET 
 
CDS 
BONDVOL 
 
CDSVOL 
 
Basis (Europe) 
 
FREQUENCY 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
Daily/Weekly 
Weekly 
 
Weekly 
 
Daily/Weekly 
 
SOURCE 
BLOOMBERG 
 
 
BLOOMBERG 
 
 
BLOOMBERG 
 
BLOOMBERG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definition 
The quoted bid-ask spread for the 5-year on-the-run sovereign bond. Calculated by collecting the bid price and the 
ask price for the on-the-run bond. To compute the quoted bid-ask spread we subtract the bid price from the ask 
price and we divide it by the half of the sum of the ask price plus the bid price. The ratio is the quoted bid-ask 
spread for the bond.  
The quoted bid-ask spread for the 5-year sovereign CDS contract. Calculated by collecting the bid price and the 
ask price for the CDS. To compute the quoted bid-ask spread we subtract the bid price from the ask price and we 
divide it by the half of the sum of the ask price plus the bid price. The ratio is the quoted bid-ask spread for the 
CDS.  
The return on the 5-year on-the-run sovereign bond. Calculated by collecting the mid price for the on-the-run 
bond. To compute the return we subtract the price on day (week) t from the mid price on day (week) t-1 and we 
divide it by the mid price on day (week) t. The ratio is the return on the bond. 
The change in the spread on the 5-year CDS contract. Calculated by collecting the spread on the CDS contract.  
The volatility of the return on the 5-year on-the-run sovereign bond. Calculated as the standard deviation of the 
daily returns on the bond during the week. 
The volatility of the changes in the spread on the 5-year CDS contract. Calculated as the standard deviation of the 
daily changes in the spread on the CDS during the week.  
The CDS-bond basis. Calculated by collecting the 24-month Eonia swap rate from Datastream. The swap rate is 
extrapolated to match the maturity of the bond and CDS data, i.e. 5-year. To compute the basis we subtract the 
swap rate from the yield on the bond, this is the spread of the bond. Then we subtract the spread of the bond from 
the spread on the CDS.  
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Basis (US) Daily/Weekly  The CDS-bond basis. Calculated by collecting the 5-year interest-rate swap from the Federal Reserve. To compute 
the basis we subtract the swap rate from the yield on the bond, this is the spread of the bond. Then we subtract the 
spread of the bond from the spread on the CDS. 
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 reports daily means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums of Bond Return, CDS Spread Change, Bond 
Quoted Bid-Ask Spread, CDS Bid-Ask Spread, CDS-Bond Basis. Bond Return is the return on 5-year on-the-run sovereign 
bonds. CDS Spread Change is the spread change in 5-year sovereign CDSs, Bond Quoted Bid-Ask Spread is defined in 
Equation (4.1), CDS Bid-Ask Spread is the ask price minus the bid price for 5-year sovereign CDSs, CDS-Bond Basis is the 
5-year sovereign CDS spread minus the excess of the 5-year on-the-run sovereign bond yield over the 5-year interest rate 
swap. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and USA, for the period between January 2006 and June 2014. Bond and CDS bid-ask quotes, bond returns, and CDS 
spreads are from the Bloomberg Generic Quote (BGN) and Composite Bloomberg Bond Trade (CBBT) pricing sources. 24-
month Eonia swap rates are from Datastream and US 5-year interest rate swaps are from the Federal Reserve.  
Panel A. Daily Data  
Variable 
              
Obs.           Mean St. Dev. min max 
Bond Return 
Austria 2186 0.0196 42.4511 -1340.7715 527.1245 
Belgium 2186 0.43 51.6758 -1217.0475 1280.611 
Finland  1981 0.8297 45.5086 -1097.912 939.3508 
France 2186 0.2838 34.3012 -791.3228 318.1136 
Germany 2186 0.2359 37.4198 -812.2221 427.7908 
Hellenic Republic (Greece) 1642 -7.7935 162.3787 -1587.8703 3323.4579 
Ireland  1558 1.9395 55.0048 -548.4876 484.9992 
Italy  2186 0.4093 46.7799 -616.4891 622.6819 
Netherlands 2186 -0.1534 44.1949 -1260.819 933.3143 
Portugal  2179 0.8788 90.1987 -1030.0152 1195.4996 
Spain  2186 0.0261 63.34489 -1287.5133 1426.8795 
USA 2186 0.0757 39.67454 -328.1167 416.4979 
CDS Spread Change 
Austria 1774 0.0121 6.4437 -72.5740 47.0750 
Belgium 2015 0.0097 6.1331 -52.1590 45.2930 
Finland  1456 0.0039 1.7204 -9.1870 11.9290 
France 2068 0.0316 3.7930 -26.2990 29.1370 
Germany 2006 0.0226 2.0213 -13.1650 16.7180 
Hellenic Republic (Greece) 1468 4.0731 52.3400 -495.9180 1063.9550 
Ireland  1407 -0.1515 15.9672 -244.3330 119.6670 
Italy  2081 0.0517 10.0223 -74.5830 66.5000 
Netherlands 1468 -0.0054 2.7033 -16.9100 15.9200 
Portugal  2141 0.0826 18.0689 -235.6670 161.8330 
Spain  2150 0.0484 10.2235 -105.6690 58.8960 
USA 1186 -0.0177 1.4179 -11.5000 7.9490 
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Panel B. Daily Data   
Variable 
              
Obs.           Mean St. Dev. min max 
Bond Quoted Bid-Ask Spread 
Austria 2148 9.2717 21.4831 -115.5328 71.7658 
Belgium 2135 -17.7772 48.3806 -339.4892 58.3048 
Finland  1960 24.7063 13.7077 -28.0585 81.6268 
France 2138 13.3571 18.1166 -84.8368 67.8335 
Germany 2141 44.1356 19.0223 11.6286 96.1181 
Hellenic Republic (Greece) 1546 -932.323 2019.2671 -10698.911 24.0269 
Ireland  1548 -223.087 288.18293 -1677.3846 62.2984 
Italy  1957 -114.204 131.0951 -580.8786 33.8645 
Netherlands 2145 22.7886 13.8058 -23.5148 71.2324 
Portugal  2143 -331.581 469.3324 -2571.6088 50.0889 
Spain  2133 -108.149 140.7513 -676.7458 57.4854 
USA 2180 38.7074 24.878 4.5145 137.2676 
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 
Austria 1813 5.7808 4.4251 -32.167 84.399 
Belgium 2067 6.1018 3.9901 -16.315 30.5 
Finland  1471 5.3062 2.4337 1.17 18.045 
France 2106 4.0949 2.417 -4.327 19.333 
Germany 2051 3.6566 2.1472 -4.625 31 
Hellenic Republic (Greece) 1483 18.4613 58.7313 -87.68 1174.52 
Ireland  1419 17.5682 13.5819 1.844 86.667 
Italy  2115 6.2233 10.9774 -55.875 93.665 
Netherlands 1479 5.6611 2.7438 -0.666 21.559 
Portugal  2162 15.9473 19.7057 -3.556 102 
Spain  2189 6.5204 5.3597 -99 106 
USA 1193 5.4224 0.7658 2.03 14.377 
CDS-Bond Basis 
Austria 1749 24.8979 44.296 -93.63 171.334 
Belgium 1776 21.9009 43.1382 -83.16 125.327 
Finland  1476 16.2221 33.0583 -77.725 110.266 
France 1788 33.8573 39.351 -78.81 128.367 
Germany 1760 35.364 36.3159 -60.612 115.132 
Hellenic Republic (Greece) 1161 -25.4151 131.9502 -378.97 2206.243 
Ireland  1420 -6.6311 90.2484 -344.297 190.423 
Italy  1803 12.3859 48.5463 -142.64 164.586 
Netherlands 1485 23.5106 32.6522 -79.78 120.295 
Portugal  1841 -60.7672 121.4171 -574.151 143.287 
Spain  1842 9.7776 59.8049 -146.62 142.4 
USA 1147 26.1394 8.2322 4.79 48.267 
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Table 4.3 
Granger Causality Tests. Daily Data 
Table 4.3 presents country-specific ݔଶ statistics (row 1) and the corresponding p-values (row 2) of pair-wise Granger causality tests between endogenous VAR variables at the daily frequency. 
Null hypothesis is that row variable does not Granger cause column variable. The ordering of the VAR endogenous variables is BONDRET, Bond Liquidity, BONDVOL, CDS, CDSLIQ, 
CDSVOL, BASIS. BONDRET is the daily return on 5-year on-the-run sovereign bonds. BONDLIQ is the daily change in the quoted bid-ask spread (Equation 4.1) for 5-year on-the-run 
sovereign bonds. CDS is the daily change in the spread on 5-year sovereign CDSs. CDSLIQ is the daily change in the absolute bid-ask spread for 5-year sovereign CDSs. BONDVOL. BASIS is 
the daily change in the value derived from the 5-year sovereign CDS spread minus the excess of the 5-year on-the-run sovereign bond yield over the 5-year interest rate swap. The sample 
includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and USA, for the period between January 2006 and June 2014. Bond and CDS 
Bid-ask quotes, bond returns, and CDS spreads are from the Bloomberg Generic Quote (BGN) and Composite Bloomberg Bond Trade (CBBT) pricing sources. European swap rates are from 
Datastream and US swap rates are from the Federal Reserve. 
 
Panel A. Full Sample. Daily. 
 
           
                                                                    AUSTRIA                                                                                             BELGIUM                                                         
                                                                  
Variables BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS 
BONDRET 7.5617 15.705*** 6.9418 14.534***  0.7106 7.7889** 0.3961 20.43*** 
BONDLIQ 11.864**  92.194*** 43.665*** 21.839*** 30.762***  501.85*** 69.54*** 16.148*** 
CDS 3.1519 4.1096 62.622*** 15.721*** 0.3265 3.824  5.5683* 6.6221** 
CDSLIQ 4.0583 19.091*** 170.74*** 56.414*** 0.1227 3.3969 16.879***  9.592*** 
BASIS  3.4781 10.418** 3.328 20.61***  2.7039 4.66* 5.2827* 5.633*  
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                                                                          FINLAND                                                                                                     FRANCE                                                         
                                                                  
Variables BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS 
BONDRET 0.1185 18.73*** 1.6508 8.2994**  13.223*** 31.572*** 0.0494 64.013*** 
BONDLIQ 0.9124  1.8679 5.359 * 27.064*** 2.1279  236.66*** 4.557* 17.041*** 
CDS 1.722 0.5796 6.3552** 2.9449 2.7078 0.7249  6.2089** 24.305*** 
CDSLIQ 0.3352 0.199 2.6511 3.0684 0.1063 1.6783 8.9863**  7.4064** 
BASIS  0.7106 4.0553 1.881 0.4829  4.2262 10.102*** 2.2851 4.7496*  
 
                                                                        GERMANY                                                                                                     GREECE                                                        
          
Variables BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS 
BONDRET 19.894*** 21.389*** 4.1343 68.864***  14.569*** 36.035*** 43.469*** 3.4888 
BONDLIQ 0.8379  24.431*** 4.8242* 18.505*** 3.7248  124.24*** 62.867*** 36.641*** 
CDS 9.7952*** 10.274*** 5.9113* 8.203** 12.673*** 13.092***  61.02*** 29.443*** 
CDSLIQ 3.7511 3.3619 1.0744 2.9387 12.968*** 44.799*** 213.51***  318.41*** 
BASIS  0.7113 0.6065 6.9261** 2.3877  9.8671** 2.5225 30.959*** 149.13***  
                                                        
                                                                   IRELAND                                                                                                ITALY                                                         
                                                                   
Variables BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS 
BONDRET 71.635*** 32.792*** 6.5999* 30.701***  7.8488* 19.559*** 7.6138 25.561*** 
BONDLIQ 17.386***  135.22*** 23.169*** 12.651*** 15.965***  251.97*** 30.641*** 82.97*** 
CDS 38.504*** 44.542*** 13.036*** 8.7052** 12.447** 12.12**  22.183*** 39.189*** 
CDSLIQ 13.133*** 9.4454** 4.6028 2.9152 353.25*** 986.34*** 7069.1***  661.41*** 
BASIS  4.8477 7.2182* 3.8387 5.1205  6.9757 23.197*** 15.123*** 2.9405  
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                                                              NETHERLANDS                                                                                     PORTUGAL                                                         
                                                                  
Variables BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS 
BONDRET 9.9258*** 2.2539 1.2123 32.733***  0.7066 1.298 1.652 6.8676** 
BONDLIQ 2.8805  26.569*** 2.3585 18.373*** 14.089***  204.62*** 77.656*** 24.435*** 
CDS 2.9316 0.0243 7.2752** 11.979*** 6.8869** 7.8045**  3.8877 10.187*** 
CDSLIQ 1.8556 2.4354 11.379*** 13.992*** 2.6773 6.232** 12.959***  4.5395 
BASIS  0.3631 4.9155* 6.9197** 5.7938*  2.5345 1.2706 22.394*** 2.5837  
 
                                                                      SPAIN                                                                                                     USA                                                        
          
Variables BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS BONDRET BONDLIQ CDS CDSLIQ BASIS 
BONDRET 0.1645 7.7108** 4.7344* 13.169***  5.8703* 12.012*** 1.1489 14.524*** 
BONDLIQ 33.815***  569.82*** 197.8*** 4.6565* 0.4418  0.985 2.7885 296.6*** 
CDS 11.888*** 21.541*** 6.4201** 0.8533 19.373*** 0.3943 3.495  4.3518 287.74*** 
CDSLIQ 0.2035 0.6688 8.1158** 0.2534 2.7661 22.154***  333.88*** 
BASIS  4.5123 4.7546* 1.5871 19.126***  1.7309 2.3611 1.8525 2.9231  
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Figure 4.1 
Country-specific Response to Endogenous Variables (Full Sample) 
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                 Graph 9. Netherlands. 
 
 
      
  
                   
 
 
                 Graph 10. Portugal. 
 
              
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200
50
100
150
200
250
Response of CDS to Bond illiquidity.
0 2  4 6  8 10 12 14 16 18 20-15
-10
-5
0  Response of CDS illiquidity to Bond illiquidity.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12  14  16  18 200
50
100
150
200
Response of Bond to CDS illiquidity.
0  2 4 6  8  10 12 14 16 18 20-4
-3
-2
-1
0  Response of Bond illiquidity to CDS illiquidity.
0 2 4 6 8 10  12 14 16 18 20-50
0
50
100
150
Response of CDS to Bond illiquidity.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Response of CDS illiquidity to Bond illiquidity.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12  14  16 18 20-60
-40
-20
0
20
Response of Bond to CDS illiquidity.
0 2 4  6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25  Response of Bond illiquidity to CDS illiquidity.
176 
 
                 Graph 11. Spain.  
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Figure 4.2 
Country-specific Forecasts of Illiquidity (Daily Series) 
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                 Graph 4. France. 
 
                Forecast of Bond illiquidity                                                                       Forecast of CDS illiquidity 
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                 Graph 7. Italy. 
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                 Graph 10. Spain.  
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Figure 4.3 
Country-specific Response of CDS-Bond Basis  
to Bond Illiquidity and CDS Illiquidity (Full Sample) 
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                 Graph 10. Portugal. 
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Figure 4.4 
Country-specific Response to Endogenous Variables in the Periods 
Before and During the Central Bank Interventions 
 
 
1. PRE-ECB INTERVENTIONS PERIOD: 30 SEPTEMBER 2008 - 10 MAY 2010 
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                  Graph 2. Belgium. 
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                  Graph 9. Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
                 Graph 10. Portugal. 
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                 Graph 12. USA.  (Pre-QE2 Period: 31 January 2006 - 3 November 2010). 
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2) SMP PERIOD: 10 MAY 2010 - 21 DECEMBER 2011 
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3) LTROs PERIOD: 21 DECEMBER 2011 - 20 JUNE 2014 
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Figure 4.5 
Country-specific Response to Endogenous Variables in the Period After the Ban 
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5.1. Introduction 
In times of crisis, one might expect a larger than usual number of information-related shocks 
to hit all assets simultaneously, generating volatility and covariation in asset prices, and further 
translating mechanically into an increase in those assets' realized correlations (Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009; 
Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016).114 The increase in the correlation and interconnectedness of financial 
asset-markets during crises is in turn more evident when markets are more volatile: the dependence of 
cross-market correlation coefficients on market volatility causes estimates of correlation coefficients 
to increase and bias upward (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Thus, consistent with a “risk-off” scenario, 
asset correlation improves due to investors decreasing their exposure across all asset classes when the 
environment turns negative (Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016). Such a negative environment has emerged in 
the context of the European sovereign financial markets. The virulent transmission of negative shocks 
during the evolution of the Eurozone crisis coincided with a) the fiscal developments in the debt-laden 
European periphery countries that resulted in those countries' sovereign bond yields remaining at an 
elevated level for the best part of the crisis, and b) the arguments that speculation via the sovereign 
CDS market is additionally responsible for the skyrocketing borrowing costs across the European 
periphery, and that eventually led to the EU regulatory authorities' ban on uncovered positions in 
SCDS contracts. 
This chapter examines the dynamic bilateral volatility spillovers for 11 EMU sovereign bond 
and CDS markets during the 2007-2014 period. The examination is conducted by calculating a 
volatility spillover measure on the basis of Diebold and Yilmaz's (2009, 2012) generalized 
decomposition of the forecast error variance of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. In line with 
Bernanke et al. (2005) and Claeys and Vašíček (2014) the VAR is augmented with two common 
factors reflecting developments at the EMU level that affect concurrently the sovereign bond and 
CDS markets. Considering the theoretically grounded (strong) relationship between volatility and 
correlation (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Andersen et al., 2003 Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009; Aït-Sahalia 
and Xiu, 2016) the analysis is extended in order to examine the conditional correlation between the 
                                                            
114 A discussion of the sources and channels of volatility is provided in Section 2.5. 
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sovereign bond and CDS markets which further constitutes a measure for the level of integration 
between them.115 This is done by means of an asymmetric generalized dynamic conditional 
correlation (AG-DCC) model (see Cappiello et al., 2006) that enables the calculation of the 
conditional correlation between each pair of sovereign bonds and CDSs in a given country. This in 
turn provides information on the extent to which volatility spillover leads to improved conditional 
correlation and whether this improved correlation restores the no-arbitrage relationship between the 
two assets, as reflected in the level of the CDS-bond basis. 
However, the issue of financial market interconnectedness and integration has broader 
implications. A greater degree of market integration results in more welfare gains due to the efficient 
transmission of monetary policy. This is especially important when different countries are involved, 
since integrated markets facilitate monetary policy pass-through, thereby enabling central bank policy 
to exert a homogeneous impact on all countries; that way these countries can reap the gains from the 
coordination of monetary policy (see Oudiz et al., 1984; Oudiz and Sachs, 1985; Rogoff 1985; 
Benigno, 2002). Therefore, central banks have an interest in the level of market integration. This is 
further the case within the confines of a currency union, where according to the optimum currency 
area (OCA) theory (see Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963) as well as previous empirical studies 
(Fratzscher, 2002; Baele, 2005; Kim et al., 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Hardouvelis et al., 2006) the process 
towards monetary convergence is expected to contribute towards a greater degree of market 
integration. To this end the present analysis employs a number of variables from the OCA theory 
along with a set of variables that proxy for the ECB's monetary policy stance in order to assess the 
impact of monetary convergence and of the ECB's monetary policy on the level of European 
sovereign bond-CDS integration.  
Despite its implications for the implementation and transmission of monetary policy the 
importance of the examination lies in the fact that when movements in the European sovereign bond 
and CDS markets deviate from underlying macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals or from 
idiosyncratic risk factors, such as liquidity and credit premia, they are still driven by international 
                                                            
115 For more information on the relationship between volatility and asset correlation see Section 2.5. 
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market risk factors or shocks common to the sovereign credit and derivatives markets. International 
factors and shocks must in turn be the outcome of developments within a country or group of 
countries, thereby impacting on their macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals and inducing 
movements in their sovereign bonds and/or CDSs that consequently spill over to other countries, 
before eventually returning to the initial transmitter(s). These spillovers (primarily within the context 
of intra-asset examination) are found to be time-variant and state-dependent, with potential states 
including either the level of financial market stress (with contrasting volatility behaviour between 
quiet and turbulent periods), or the degree of integration between domestic markets (with improved 
integration enhancing similarity in volatility behaviour); they further exhibit differences in their size 
and direction when moving across domestic markets (see Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) and Engle et al. 
(2012) for international and East Asian equity markets respectively, Skintzi and Refenes (2006), 
Christiansen (2007), and Claeys and Vašíček (2014) for the European sovereign bond markets, and 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) for the equity, bond, foreign exchange and commodities markets).  
No evidence exists so far for the European sovereign debt and credit derivatives markets, 
which have constituted the field of the severest tensions in the history of a currency union. These 
tensions not only intensified, but ultimately extended across all EMU member states and transformed 
into broader economic consequences, thereby resulting in the crowding out of private-sector financing 
and the further decline in the level of economic activity. In addition, bond and credit derivatives 
instruments are the ideal candidates for examining the relation between volatility behaviour and the 
level of integration between different asset-markets, since their integration is - theoretically - 
guaranteed by their no-arbitrage relationship.116 It is therefore imperative that European policy makers 
are provided with all available information on the nature and evolution of linkages between and 
within the respective asset-markets in order to formulate their monetary and macroprudential policies 
accordingly and thus, manage systemic risk and reduce negative spillovers across, or even beyond the 
Eurozone. 
                                                            
116 The no-arbitrage relationship between bonds and CDS contracts is discussed in Section 2.3. 
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Results from the VAR analysis indicate a unidirectional volatility spillover from the 
sovereign bond to the CDS market in all EMU countries within the context of both cross- and intra-
country analysis. Germany emerges as the main transmitter of bond volatility to the CDS markets of 
the Eurozone core, while Ireland and Italy further assume a central role in the European financial 
markets framework, since they appear as significant bond and CDS volatility contributors to the rest 
of the European CDS markets. Thus, despite the surge in the size and importance of the SCDS 
market, the present analysis identifies sovereign bond markets as the most powerful vectors of 
information particularly during the 2010-2102 period. This constitutes government bonds as the most 
efficient indicators of sovereign risk, and further establishes the cash market as the means through 
which information is filtered and transmitted to the derivatives market. 
The examination of the conditional correlation between the sovereign bond and CDS markets 
under the AG-DCC GARCH analysis reveals that the increase in the level of bond-CDS integration in 
each of the countries of the EMU South coincides with an increase in the volatility spillover between 
sovereign bonds and CDSs in the same countries. This provides support to the arguments about 
volatility being a major driver of cross-asset correlation (see Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016). Interestingly 
the analysis points to the existence of two blocs across the Eurozone, depending on the evolution of 
bond-CDS integration in each bloc: while in the EMU South (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
the integration between sovereign bonds and CDS has weakened after the late 2008 and the Lehman 
Brothers collapse, in the rest of the EMU it has followed the reverse track. When the bond-CDS 
volatility interaction is examined against the CDS-bond basis capital flights emerge as the primary 
reason for the persistently positive CDS-bond basis in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands for the duration of the main stage of the sovereign debt crisis, i.e., until late 2011-early 
2012. It further documents an inverse relationship between bond-CDS conditional correlation (and 
therefore integration) and the CDS-bond basis in the EMU South and Belgium: post-2009, an 
improvement of this integration, which further suggests that sovereign bonds and CDSs are driven to 
a large extent by the same fundamentals, causes the basis to become negative. In the same bloc, 
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illiquidity and volatility appear to act as limits to arbitrage, since they coincide with the large and 
persistent negative values of the CDS-bond basis observed during the late 2011-mid 2012 period.  
Lastly, the ECB's monetary policy is found to be a major determinant of the degree of cross-
market integration, since an easing in the ECB' monetary policy stance exerts a strong positive impact 
on the level of bond-CDS conditional correlations. Thus, in times of heightened market activity such 
as those during the Eurozone crisis, an expansion of the central bank's balance sheet might contribute 
towards greater cross-asset integration and therefore facilitate the transmission of monetary policy 
within each country. Along the same lines, the process towards real and monetary integration across 
the Eurozone emerges as an additional factor contributing to improved integration in the European 
sovereign debt and derivatives markets. 
The main contribution of the present chapter pertains to the methodological approach 
adopted. Thus far empirical studies ascribe movements in the European sovereign financial markets to 
the conditions prevailing in international financial markets (Skintzi and Refenes, 2006; Christiansen, 
2007; Claeys and Vašíček, 2014). However, the assignment of asset movements to international 
developments, although highlighting the importance of market correlation and integration, it is 
nonetheless unable to provide additional insight on the roots of these developments (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2000; Claeys and Vašíček, 2014). Still, these developments might be ultimately generated 
by developments in a domestic market and consequently being transmitted to other markets, before 
feeding back to the originator market (Claeys and Vašíček, 2014). When these external risks are 
proxied with an aggregate measure that is assumed to be exogenous to developments in the domestic 
markets, it is further assumed that these risks affect domestic markets symmetrically; this is in turn an 
implausible assumption, especially when considering that volatility linkages are not equally strong 
between all asset-markets and/or countries (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Claeys and Vašíček, 
2014). The effect exerted by large volatility shocks on the domestic markets could be different from 
the effect that is due to smaller volatility shocks (asymmetric response). 
The employment of the generalized VAR addresses specifically the above issues. The 
generalized decomposition extracts all available information on the relative importance of domestic 
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and foreign sources of sovereign bond and CDS market dynamics across the EMU, while it further 
enables the examination of the size and direction of the spillover effects between and within the 
respective asset-markets (Diebold and Yilmaz 2009, 2012). Thus, the decomposition differentiates 
between domestic and foreign drivers of sovereign bond and CDS market dynamics, thereby 
providing an accurate measure of the bilateral spillover between the two markets. In addition, the 
augmentation of the VAR with common factors allows for the inclusion of an additional feedback 
channel from common shocks to the EMU sovereign debt and derivatives markets. Most importantly, 
the inclusion of those shocks in the VAR specification treats those shocks as endogenous to the 
system. The shocks' endogenous nature is a more plausible assumption within the context of volatility 
spillover since - compared to the assumption of exogeneity - allows for the  simultaneous feedback 
between domestic markets.  
Along these lines, and in consistency with  Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012), the adoption of 
the generalized impulse-response framework of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) 
accounts for the correlation of shocks to all domestic markets by means of their historically observed 
distribution. Hence, the factor augmented version of the generalized VAR not only provides a causal 
direction of volatility spillover across and within the sovereign bond and CDS markets, but further 
excludes simultaneity due to the employment of the common factors (Bernanke et al., 2005; Diebold 
and Yilmaz, 2009, 2012; Claeys and Vašíček, 2014). The recursive examination of the factor-
augmented VAR through the employment of rolling windows yields dynamic estimates that further 
allows the analysis to deviate from the static picture that summary measures provide. To this end, the 
time-dependent nature of the new spillover measure provided by the recursive estimations enables the 
monitoring of the cross- and intra-market linkages' evolution throughout the examination period, 
while revealing the existence of potential breaks in those linkages' evolution.  
An additional contribution of the present chapter relates to the examination of the sovereign 
bond-CDS integration per se. Thus far, the (extreme) comovements between the bond and CDS 
markets have been examined in a lead-lag framework, with a focus on the price discovery process 
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between the two markets.117 When asset prices move together this constitutes an indirect evidence on 
the expectations of markets participants and how they respond to changes in the information set (Kim 
et al., 2006b). However, while this type of examination identifies the asset market in which 
information is reflected first and then transmitted to the other asset market (which asset market 
provides more timely information), the issue of integration examines the entire picture, that is, the 
degree of overall correlation between asset markets (Blanco et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2006b). This is an 
important distinction, since one market might lead the other in terms of price discovery, but the 
market lagging the price discovery process might be affected by other exogenous factors that could 
cause overall movements in that market to be disassociated with movements in the former market. 
Existing studies have examined bond and CDS comovements within a lead-lag framework, or treated 
them as time-invariant correlations or covariances, but not from the perspective of bond and CDS 
market integration. To this end, the modelling of these comovements through an AG-DCC GARCH 
model is able to capture the dynamic and time-varying nature of the bond-CDS relationship, while 
allowing for the “asymmetric volatility” phenomenon, according to which financial asset volatility 
increases more following a negative rather than a positive shock of the same magnitude. This is in 
turn necessitated by the negative financial and fiscal shocks that have characterized the ongoing 
European debt crisis. The consideration of these shocks' impact on market integration as well as the 
impact of non-standard measures adopted by the ECB as a response to these shocks is an issue that 
remains unexplored.  
The analysis of this chapter further constitutes the first empirical assessment of the link 
between the integration of any two assets (through their conditional correlation) and those assets' 
equilibrium relationship. When two assets are linked by arbitrage - such as in the case of a derivative 
instrument and the underlying cash contract - any change in their correlation will cause a deviation 
from the prices that guarantee their equilibrium relationship and thus, give rise to arbitrage 
opportunities. The efficient markets approach to arbitrage dictates that these arbitrage opportunities 
should be eliminated by the actions of a large number of investors, each with limited additional 
                                                            
117 These studies are presented in Sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.3. 
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exposure to any of the two assets. However, the assets prices' diversion away from their fundamental 
values, renders arbitrage ineffective, with the consequent mispricing reflecting not some exposure to 
difficult-to-measure macroeconomic risks, but rather, high idiosyncratic volatility risk (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). This in turn leads to a paradox, in that - at least theoretically - high volatility is linked 
to more frequent extreme mispricing, and therefore to continuous opportunities for earning a riskless 
profit. This paradox is explained by the fact that it is the combination of both volatile and illiquid 
assets, that causes arbitrageurs to avoid extremely volatile “arbitrage” positions, since - despite the 
likelihood of excess returns - volatility further exposes professional arbitrageurs to increasing losses 
and the need to liquidate the portfolio under pressure from the investors in the fund (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Since this combination of excess volatility and illiquidity is the case in a number of 
European sovereign bond and CDS markets, especially those in the EMU South, this provides us with 
the opportunity to identify in practice whether these factors are indeed associated with mispricing 
between those asset-markets, and therefore with a status away from equilibrium. 
The remainder of the Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provides the empirical method 
for the calculation of the volatility spillover measure based on the Diebold and Yilmaz's (2009, 2012) 
VAR. Section 5.3 analyzes the empirical findings at the intra- and cross-country level. Section 5.4 
presents the  AG-DCC GARCH model employed for the analysis of sovereign bond-CDS integration. 
Section 5.5 assess the link between bond-CDS integration and the CDS-bond basis, and Section 5.6 
examines the role of monetary policy. Section 5.7 concludes. 
 
5.2. Factor-augmented VAR 
5.2.1. Cross- and Intra-asset Spillovers 
Since the objective of this chapter is to measure the cross- and intra-market spillovers between the 
European sovereign bond and CDS markets, the method employed is the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 
2012) generalized VAR framework for measuring directional spillovers, based on the forecast error 
variance decomposition of the VAR. This method further eliminates the possible dependence of 
210 
 
results on ordering and hence, is the most appropriate for the large number of endogenous variables 
employed in this study. The covariance-stationary ܰ-variable VAR(݌) is: 
 ݔ௧ ൌ ∑ Φ௜ݔ௧ି௜௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                                                          (5.1) 
where 	ߝ~ሺ0, ߑሻ is a vector of independently and identically distributed disturbances, the 
moving-average representation of which is: 
ݔ௧ ൌ ∑ Αఐߝ௧ି௜∞௜ୀ଴                                                                                                                    (5.2) 
with some regulatory conditions being imposed on the ޿௜ matrices.118 These moving average 
coefficients (or transformations such as variance decompositions) are the key to understanding the 
VAR dynamics, since the decomposition of the variance of the H-step ahead forecast error on one of 
the asset prices ݔ௜ represents the percentage of the variance attributed to shocks in the asset price ݔ௝ 
(∀	݆ ് ݅, for each ݅). 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012), define own variance shares to be the fractions of the H-
step-ahead forecast error variances in forecasting ݔ௜ due to shocks to ݔ௜, for  
݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ܰ, and cross variance shares (or spillovers) to be the fractions of the H-step-ahead 
forecast error variances in forecasting ݔ௜ due to shocks to ݔ௝, for  
݅, ݆ ൌ 1,2, . . . , ܰ, where ݅ ് ݆. In order to use the information in the variance decomposition matrix for 
the calculation of the spillover index, the H-step-ahead forecast error variance decompositions ߠ௜௝௚ሺ߅ሻ, 
are normalized by the row sum as:  
ߠ෨௜௝௚ሺ߅ሻ ൌ
ఏ೔ೕ೒ሺ௴ሻ
∑ ఏ೔ೕ೒ೕಿసభ ሺ௴ሻ
                                                                                                               (5.3) 
where by construction ∑ ߠ௜௝௚ே௝ୀଵ ሺ߅ሻ ൌ 1 and ∑ ߠ௜௝௚ே௜,௝ୀଵ ሺ߅ሻ ൌ ܰ. The term ߠ෨௜௝௚ሺ߅ሻ, is 
essentially the own variance shares when ݅ ൌ ݆, or the cross variance shares when ݅ ് ݆. The cross 
variance shares are employed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) to measure the spillover from ݔ௜ to 
ݔ௝, and in our case represent: a) the percentage contribution of a change in a country's bond yield to 
                                                            
118 Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012), set the ܰ ൈ ܰ coefficient matrices ޿௜ to obey the recursion ޿௜ ൌ
Φଵ޿௜ିଵ ൅ ൅	Φଶ޿௜ିଶ൅. . . ൅Φ௣޿௜ି௣ ޿଴, with ޿଴ being a ܰ ൈ ܰ identity matrix and ޿௜ ൌ 0 for ݅ ൏ 0. 
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the variation in the another country's CDS spread, i.e., the intra-asset contribution, and b) the 
percentage contribution of a change in a country's bond yield (CDS spread) to the variation in another 
country's bond yield (CDS spread), i.e., the cross-asset contribution. This can be more comprehensible 
with the help of the matrix ߆ below, where the off-diagonal elements represent all bilateral linkages to 
and from two assets ݔ௜ and ݔ௝, while the main diagonal represents the own linkage of asset ݔ௜.  
߆ ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍߠ෨ଵଵ
௚ ሺ߅ሻ ߠ෨ଵଶ௚ ሺ߅ሻ				⋯ ߠ෨ଵ௺௚ ሺ߅ሻ
ߠ෨ଶଵ௚ ሺ߅ሻ ߠ෨ଶଶ௚ ሺ߅ሻ				⋯ ߠ෨ଶ௺௚ ሺ߅ሻ⋮ 	 										 									⋱	 		⋮					
	ߠ෨௺ଵ௚ ሺ߅ሻ								⋯ 			⋯				ߠ෨௺௺௚ ሺ߅ሻے
ۑۑ
ۑې                                                                                 (5.4) 
In this case, ߠ෨ଶଵ௚ ሺ߅ሻ represents the contribution from a shock in country 1's bond yield or 
CDS spread, to country 2's bond yield or CDS spread (depending on which country-specific asset 
characterizes row 2 and which column 1), otherwise stated, the spillover from country 1's asset to 
country 2's asset. Similarly, ߠ෨ଵଵ௚ ሺ߅ሻ represents the contribution of a shock accounting for the country 
1's own asset price movements. 
This in turn forms the basis for the calculation of a total spillover index, which measures the 
contribution of spillovers of volatility shocks across all country-specific assets in the generalized 
VAR to the total forecast error variance: 
ܵ௚ሺ߅ሻ ൌ
∑ ఏ෩೔ೕ೒೔ಿ,ೕసభ
೔ಯೕ
ሺ௴ሻ
∑ ఏ෩೔ೕ೒೔ಿ,ೕసభ ሺ௴ሻ
∙ 100 ൌ
∑ ఏ෩೔ೕ೒೔ಿ,ೕసభ
೔ಯೕ
ሺ௴ሻ
ே ∙ 100                                                                     (5.5) 
The normalized elements of the generalized variance decomposition matrix are further 
employed to calculate the directional spillovers, which display the direction of the spillover of a 
country's asset being transmitted to the rest	ܰ-1 assets in the system. These are simply defined as the 
sum of the column-elements of the matrix ߆ minus the own asset contribution, or:  
௜ܵ∙
௚ሺ߅ሻ ൌ
∑ ఏ෩೔ೕ೒ೕಿసభ
ೕಯ೔
ሺ௴ሻ
∑ ఏ෩೔ೕ೒ೕಿసభ ሺ௴ሻ
∙ 100                                                                                                      (5.6) 
In a similar respect, the directional spillovers received by a country's asset from the rest	ܰ-1 
assets in the system, is defined as the sum of the row-elements of the matrix ߆ minus the own asset 
contribution, namely:  
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∙ܵ௜
௚ሺ߅ሻ ൌ
∑ ఏ෩ೕ೔೒ೕಿసభ
ೕಯ೔
ሺ௴ሻ
∑ ఏ෩ೕ೔೒ೕಿసభ ሺ௴ሻ
∙ 100                                                                                                      (5.7) 
This set of directional spillovers is essentially the decomposition of total spillovers into two 
categories: those being transmitted to- and those received from a particular asset. The net directional 
volatility from asset to all other ܰ-1 assets in the VAR, which indicates whether an asset is a 
transmitter or receiver of volatility, is consequently defined as the difference between equations (5.6) 
and 5.(7), or:    
 ܵ௚ሺ߅ሻ ൌ ௜ܵ∙௚ሺ߅ሻ െ ∙ܵ௜௚ሺ߅ሻ	                                                                                                  (5.8) 
Finally, the calculation of the net pairwise volatility spillovers reveals the extent to which 
each asset ݅ contributes to the volatility of asset ݆ in net terms. This is simply the difference between 
the gross volatility shocks transmitted from asset ݅ to asset ݆ and those transmitted from asset ݆ to 
asset ݅: 
௜ܵ௝
௚ሺ߅ሻ ൌ ቈ ఏ෩೔ೕ
೒ሺ௴ሻ
∑ ఏ෩೔ೖ೒ೖಿసభ ሺ௴ሻ
െ ఏ෩ೕ೔
೒ሺ௴ሻ
∑ ఏ෩ೕೖ೒ೖಿసభ ሺ௴ሻ
቉ ∙ 100                                                                             (5.9) 
Since directional spillovers and pairwise spillovers are derived from the forecast error 
variance decomposition of the generalized VAR some additional economic information might not be 
captured by the system. This is due to the fact that, by construction, these variance decompositions 
can be observed only for the included variables, which in turn might constitute only a subset of the 
variables researchers and policy-makers care about, especially with regards to the examination of 
sovereign bonds and CDS comovements, which pertains to both monetary policy, as well as to 
financial markets analysis (Bernanke et al., 2005). To additionally control for the possibility of shocks 
that are exogenous to the VAR system, we follow Bernanke et al. (2005) and Claeys and Vašíček 
(2014) and augment the system with two variables that represent the common response of bond yields 
and CDS spreads respectively to those exogenous shocks. The Bernanke et al. (2005) factor-
augmented VAR (FAVAR) assumes that the informational time series ܺ௧ are related to the 
unobservable factors ܨ and the observed variables ௧ܻ by the following equation: 
ܺ௧ ൌ ߉௙ܨ௧ ൅ ߉௬ ௧ܻ ൅ ߝ௧ ,                                                                                                     (5.10) 
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where ߉௙ is a ܰ ൈ ܭ matrix of factor loadings, ߉௬ is a ܰ ൈܯ, and  ߝ௧ is a ܰ ൈ 1 vector of 
zero mean innovations.119 To construct these additional variables factor analysis is employed in order 
to extract the common factors that account for the greatest amount of variance among the observed 
variables. The Kaiser criterion is used to determine the number of factors to be retained and that 
consequently enter the principal factor analysis for the estimation of the factor loadings. Then the 
scores from the factor analysis conducted for the bond yields and the CDS spreads are included 
separately as endogenous variables in the FAVAR in addition to the initial set of observable variables. 
This allows for the identification of direct linkages between any two assets ݅ and ݆, as well as of 
indirect linkages via the common bond and/or CDS factors. 
An advantage of the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) VAR framework over partial 
equilibrium regression approaches is the address of the contemporaneous nature characterizing the 
movements between different financial asset prices. By construction, any change in the value of an 
endogenous variable in the VAR feeds into the other endogenous variables and through them to the 
overall co-movement of endogenous variables in the system. Furthermore, since the contemporaneous 
correlation between financial assets forms the basis for the analysis of the linkages between them, it 
would be preferable to calculate a spillover measure invariant to variable ordering.  
However, the resulting forecast error variance decompositions - that rely on the Cholesky 
factor identification - are dependent on VAR ordering, therefore imposing diagonal block restrictions 
on this contemporaneous feedback between the variables in the system (Claeys and Vašíček, 2014). 
The Diebold and Yilmaz's (2009, 2012) exploitation of the generalized VAR framework of Koop et 
al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), accounts for correlated shocks through the employment of the 
historically observed distribution of the errors, thus producing variance decompositions invariant to 
                                                            
119 Bernanke et al. (2005), assume that the innovations are either normal and uncorrelated or display a small 
amount of cross-correlation, depending on whether estimation is by likelihood methods or principal 
components. 
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variable ordering.120 Hence, the employment of the generalized VAR framework along with the 
augmentation of the VAR with common factors guarantees the identification of the actual causal 
direction of the linkages between different assets, while also addresses simultaneity issues that might 
influence the direction and size of those linkages. 
 
5.2.2. Sovereign bond and CDS data 
The dataset consists of bond yields and CDS spreads for sovereign bonds and sovereign CDSs 
(SCDSs) with 5 years to maturity from August 8 2007, to June 20 2014. The starting date marks the 
onset of the US financial crisis which further led to an era characterized by increasing volatility in all 
European sovereign bond and CDS markets, and that lasts until the time of the writing.121 The sample 
includes all EMU member-states at the time of the introduction of the euro, i.e., Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.122 The 
consideration of the 5-year time to maturity is due to the fact that constitutes the most liquid and 
traded maturity for CDS contracts, while it is further employed as a reference for the level of spreads 
in the sovereign CDS market. Daily bond yields are from Thomson Reuters Datastream and daily 
CDS spreads are from Markit. Since the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reveal the non-stationarity 
nature of the time series, first differences are employed. The change in bond yields is further 
converted into basis points (bps), due to the CDS spread changes (calculated as ߂ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ܵ௧ െ ܵ௧ିଵ) 
                                                            
120 Due to the shocks to each variable not being orthogonalized, the sum of contributions to the variance of 
forecast error, i.e., the sum of the row-elements of the variance decomposition matrix, is not necessarily equal to 
one (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009).  
121 Only bond yields are employed and not bond spreads, i.e., the difference between a country's government 
bond yield and the yield on the government bond of Germany (equal maturities are assumed), since Germany 
(as evidenced by the results in sections 5.3 and 5.5) performs a pivotal role in the analysis of the cross- and 
intra-asset spillovers between the EMU periphery and the EMU core. 
122 Data for Luxemburg is available from February 2009 onwards , except for the period from January 2010 to 
February 2011, and therefore not included in the sample.  
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being already in basis points. The motivation for the chosen data frequency (daily) is motivated by the 
fact that comovements in the bond and CDS markets often change on a rapid basis as investors shift 
their domestic asset. In addition arbitrage opportunities, which are a significant driver, as well as 
consequence, of these comovements are likely to be diminished at lower frequencies. 
Figure 5.1 presents the evolution of the daily time series of the bond yields and the CDS 
spreads for two different blocs of countries, i.e., the EMU periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain) and the EMU core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). 
Bond yields in the former bloc follow a skyward trend since late-2009 and in any case after mid-2010 
when Greece reached an agreement with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for a €110 billion financing package in order to recover from its debt crisis and modernize the 
economy. This has been the case until approximately mid-2012 when bond yields appear to return 
close to their pre-2010 levels. Among these debt-laden countries, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have 
seen their government bonds to be (negatively) affected the most by the Eurozone crisis. Bond yields 
in the EMU core follow the exact opposite course, since they fall during the best part of the post-2008 
period (with only a slight rise occurring in the first half of 2011), thus appearing to have benefited 
from the skyrocketing borrowing costs of the periphery countries. CDS spreads in the EMU periphery 
match closely the upward trend exhibited by the periphery bond yields pointing to a close association 
between the two asset-markets. However, CDS spreads also increase in the EMU core, indicating an 
overall rise in the sovereign default probabilities across the entire Eurozone. 
Considering the evidence that since the onset of the Eurozone crisis, bond yields are 
dependent not only on the underlying macro-fundamentals but also on international risk factors 
(Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2013), and that the EMU periphery CDS spreads overpriced the 
prevailing values of fiscal space and other macro variables (Aizenman et al., 2013), factor analysis is 
applied in order to extract common factors from the 11 EMU countries' sovereign bond yields and 
CDS spreads respectively. The Kaiser criterion selects three factors as common drivers, hence the first 
three principal factors are used to compute the scores that form the two additional variables, each of 
them representing the sovereign bond (CDS) market's response to common shocks.  
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 [Insert Figures 5.1 and 5.2 about here] 
The evolution of the two factors at the daily level is presented in Figure 5.2. Although exhibiting a 
relatively contrasting course until about the mid-2008 period which coincides with the intensification 
of the US-credit crunch, thereafter, movements in both factors parallel each other. Bond and CDS 
factors rise following the onset of the Eurozone crisis and remain at elevated levels before beginning 
to revert back to their pre-crisis levels from mid-2012 onwards. Interestingly, the respective 
breakpoint, i.e., mid-2012, signifies a period of recession with regards to the level not only of the two 
factors, but also of the bond yields and CDS spreads across both EMU blocs, thereby designating a 
potential de-escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis, at least from the perspective of financial 
market participants. 
The following sections include the estimation of the intra- and cross-asset linkages across the 
EMU sovereign bond and CDS markets. Following Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), a FAVAR of order 2 
is estimated and generalized variance decompositions of 10-day-ahead volatility forecast errors, a 
period long enough to encompass all available information on the occurrence of these spillovers. 
 
5.3. Empirical Results from the FAVAR 
5.3.1. Cross- and intra-asset linkages 
This section presents the results for all bilateral cross- and intra-asset linkages across the EMU 
sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads (as well as the two common factors) from the estimation of 
the generalized FAVAR specified in equation (5.10). Table 5.2 includes a 28 ൈ 25 matrix, where the 
off-diagonal elements represent all bilateral volatility linkages between any two assets ݅ and ݆ 
(for	݅ ് ݆), i.e., the cross variance shares, and where the main diagonal elements represent the 
contribution of an asset's volatility to its own volatility, i.e., the own variance shares. The first two 
rows following the cross and intra-bilateral linkages sum the contribution of shocks to asset ݅ on all 
other assets excluding (i.e., ݅ ് ݆), and including its own contribution respectively. The penultimate 
row (and the first right-hand column) sums the contribution that an asset ݅ receives from all other 
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assets, while the last row represents the net spillover, i.e., the difference in the size of shocks that an 
asset contributes to and receives from all other assets (excluding its own contribution). 
[Insert Table 5.2 about here] 
According to Table 5.2, the total spillover between all assets (including the two common 
factors) is 53%, revealing that half of the variation in the European sovereign bond and CDS markets 
is attributed to volatility shocks in other countries' bonds and CDSs, while the other half is caused by 
domestic factors, among them the lagged level of own volatility. These domestic factors present 
considerable differences when moving between the same, as well as across different asset-markets. 
The values for the own variance shares (i.e., the main diagonal elements in the total spillover matrix) 
reveal that the relation between current and past volatility shocks is stronger in the bond rather than 
the CDS market. They therefore suggest that European sovereign bond markets appear considerably 
less integrated, with shocks to bond yields being mainly idiosyncratic, a result in line with the non-
uniform evolution of bond yields outlined in Figure 5.1. In particular, the percentage of bonds' 
variation attributed to domestic developments is in the 45.00-60.00 range in most cases, while it 
reaches the 77.00-86.00 range for countries such as, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Germany. This result 
is not surprising, since it verifies the earlier studies' findings about the level of the respective market's 
dependence on country-specific factors (see Codogno et al., 2003; Longstaff et al., 2011; Favero and 
Missale, 2012, Claeys and Vašíček, 2014).  
On the other hand, the dependence of the CDS market on idiosyncratic shocks is generally 
smaller than the same dependence of the bond market, thereby pointing to a close relationship 
between movements across the European sovereign CDS markets. This offers an explanation for the 
almost identical evolution of all EMU CDS spreads depicted in Figure 5.1, where spreads follow an 
upward trend throughout the Eurozone crisis. However, in countries such as Greece, Ireland and 
Germany CDS spreads exhibiting strong dependence on own volatility shocks (which is 2 to 4 times 
the dependence exhibited by the rest sovereign CDSs). This is in turn new evidence with regards to 
the sovereign CDS market, and stands in contrast to the previous studies' conclusions that 
idiosyncratic country-specific volatility represents only a secondary fraction of the total volatility in 
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SCDS spreads, the volatility of which is mainly related to global and regional risk premia. This 
conclusion is derived for a large sample of developed and emerging economies for the pre-2007 
period (see Longstaff et al., 2007), and for emerging economies during the 2007-2011 period (see 
Fender et al., 2012). 
Moving from the idiosyncratic shocks to bilateral spillovers (i.e., the off diagonal elements in 
the total spillover matrix), we observe that the cross-country linkages between sovereign bond yields 
and CDS spreads exhibit differences depending on whether the source of transmission lies in the bond 
or the CDS market. Bond volatility shocks are transmitted to a considerably greater extent to CDS 
volatility, than when the reverse path is considered. Among the domestic bond markets with the 
strongest contribution to the rest of the European CDS markets are those of Germany, Italy, Ireland, 
Spain and France (ordered by the size of the contribution). In Germany, which is by far the greatest 
transmitter of bond volatility shocks, around a third of these shocks is (evenly) transmitted to the CDS 
spreads of the rest EMU countries. The same is further observed for Italy (the second largest bond 
volatility contributor) and Ireland, where a fourth and a third of their bond volatility shocks 
respectively are directed to the other countries' CDS spreads (Italy affects evenly all European CDSs, 
while Ireland's effect is mainly concentrated in the periphery). These latter two periphery countries 
also appear to be the main transmitters of CDS volatility shocks, however only a limited fraction of 
these shocks is directed to the domestic bond markets across the Eurozone. Interestingly, although 
Spain appears as the fourth largest contributor of bond volatility shocks, its contribution mainly 
pertains to the bond factor, thus elevating the respective country into a barometer for the overall level 
of volatility in the European sovereign bond markets. 
We can therefore deduce that in terms of cross-asset linkages, Germany appears as the main 
transmitter of volatility to the domestic markets of the Eurozone core, when the direction of 
transmission is from the bond market to that of CDSs. German government bonds act as benchmarks, 
thereby affecting prices across European financial markets, while they also constitute the highest-
quality collateral within the European sovereign bond market context. It is not surprisingly therefore, 
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that any movements in their yields have wide repercussions across the Eurozone sovereign debt and 
derivatives markets 
However, the role of the key country within the context of the European sovereign bond and 
CDS markets, is jointly assumed by Ireland and Italy, since the two countries emerge not only as bond 
volatility contributors to the other domestic CDS markets, but also as the main contributors of CDS 
volatility shocks to the volatility of the rest European CDSs. The bi-fold contribution of Ireland and 
Italy to the sovereign CDS volatility across Eurozone is in turn directed to both the EMU periphery 
and the core. This systemic importance of the two periphery countries is due to Italy being the EMU's 
3rd largest economy with its post-2008 public debt to GDP ratios being constantly above 115%, while 
Ireland experienced an increase in its public debt to GDP ratio by 62.9 percentage points during the 
2007-2010 period (by 96.3 during the 2007-2012 period), and by 25 percentage points alone between 
2009 and 2010 as a consequence of the recapitalization and nationalization of its large banks; it has 
further been the first Eurozone country to enter a recession (Acharya and Sascha, 2012; Acharya et 
al., 2014).  
Furthermore, the Italian along with the Belgian and Spanish banks' mutual accumulation of 
large government debt holdings, not only adds to the systemic risk importance of Italy, but in 
combination with the Spanish banks' exposure to problems in the domestic financial sector which 
could be transmitted to their foreign branches, further explains the emergence of the Spanish 
government bond market as a determinant of the overall European bond market volatility (Claeys and 
Vašíček, 2014). 
It should also be noted that a considerable fraction of sovereign bond volatility in the core is 
attributed to volatility shocks originating in the sovereign bond markets of France and Belgium. The 
former, as the euro area's second largest economy, presents several similarities with Germany, since 
they both display relatively high exposure to the Eurozone periphery, while French government bonds 
further act as benchmarks in the fixed-income market. In addition, during the 2010-2011 period 
French and Belgian banks (in particular Dexia S.A., Crédit Agricole S.A. and Société Générale) have 
risen to the top of Europe’s systemic financial institutions, a fact also reflecting the Belgian 
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internationally developed banking system's strong exposure to the  periphery sovereigns (Acharya and 
Sascha, 2012; Claeys and Vašíček, 2014). 
Focusing on the intra-country volatility spillovers between sovereign bond yields and CDS 
spreads there is a moderate interaction when the shocks are transmitted from the former to the latter, 
since only in half of the EMU countries bond-originated volatility shocks spill over to CDSs. These 
countries include the periphery countries of Ireland, Italy, and Spain, and the core countries of 
Belgium and Germany. However, when the reverse order of this transmission is considered, the 
interaction is even more narrow and observed only for some of the periphery countries, i.e., for 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. To get a clearer picture of these cross-asset linkages in each EMU 
member state, the next section examines their dynamic evolution. 
Shocks to common factors exert only a marginal impact on sovereign bonds and CDS 
volatility indicating that EMU-wide (and international non-EMU-wide) developments have been 
limited in number and/or size during the Eurozone crisis. It appears that all shocks originate within the 
domestic markets and transmitted from their source of origin directly - rather than indirectly - not only 
to the rest of the countries, but also to the common factors. In this respect, domestic developments in 
Spain (primarily) and Italy (secondarily) emerge as the main determinants of common bond market 
developments, since they jointly account for approximately three fourths of bond factor volatility 
(45.91 and 22.86 respectively). Most importantly, half of the effect of the Spanish and Italian bond 
market developments is also transmitted indirectly to the EMU-wide CDS market through the 
significantly strong contribution of bond factor to CDS factor (i.e., 37.50). Hence, although overall 
movements in the EMU-average CDS spreads appear to be disassociated with developments in the 
domestic CDS markets, they are nevertheless strongly related to the average level of European 
sovereign bond yields. 
Results so far reveal a unidirectional volatility spillover from the sovereign bond to the SCDS 
market, suggesting that new information is mainly transmitted from the former to the latter, while 
further pointing to the two markets having a different degree of dependence on underlying 
fundamentals. Thus, a repetition of a wake-up call similar to the homonym hypothesis of Goldstein 
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(1998) may have been the case across the Eurozone, where the debt crisis provided new information, 
thereby prompting investors to reassess the vulnerability of other market segments or countries, and 
thus leading to a rediscovering and/or repricing of macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals in 
sovereign bond pricing (Goldstein, 1998; Goldstein et al., 2000; Bekaert, 2014, Claeys and Vašíček, 
2014). This, in combination with the potential launch of speculative attacks via the European SCDS 
market - that could have raised SCDs' spreads and volatility and consequently weakened their link 
with the underlying fundamentals - might have resulted in a prominent volatility effect being 
transmitted from the sovereign bond market to that of SCDSs.  
 
5.3.2. Dynamic bond-CDS linkages 
Section 5.3.1 estimated the total cross- and intra-asset spillovers between the European sovereign 
bond and CDSs. Clearly, many changes occurred during the 2007-2014 period, the European 
sovereign debt crisis probably being the most notable among them, thereby altering the strength and 
direction of these spillovers. As seen in Figure 5.1 above, the onset of the Eurozone crisis resulted in 
the European sovereign bond yields following divergent paths depending on whether these bonds 
belong to the EMU periphery or the EMU core. It further resulted in the periphery CDSs' rise being 
significantly greater in size than the corresponding rise in the CDSs of the core. Given this period of 
extreme stress and heightened market activity within the European financial market context, it is 
unlikely that any single fixed-parameter model would pertain to the entire examination period. Hence, 
in order to assess the unidimensional and/or cyclical movements in cross- and intra-market spillovers 
that cannot be captured by the total spillover index, the analysis follows Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 
2012) and examines the dynamic evolution of these spillovers by estimating the FAVAR over a 200-
day rolling window. 
[Insert Figure 5.3 about here] 
The daily time-series for the net spillover between sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads in 
each EMU country are presented in Figure 5.3. The graphs confirm the existence of two periods of 
moderate and significant volatility spillover respectively. The common conclusion is that, in both 
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periods and in all countries, volatility is transmitted from the sovereign bond to the CDS market (the 
only exception being Portugal during the second period). The respective periods consist of the late 
2008-early 2009 period , where spillover is of a moderate size and duration and pertains to only half 
of the Eurozone countries, and of the main stage of the European sovereign debt crisis, i.e., from 2010 
to 2012, where spillover is considerably stronger and occurs in almost each country. The former 
period corresponds to the post-Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy period, which was associated with a 
repricing of European sovereign credit risk due to the an increase in global uncertainty, that further 
led to a rise in the demand for low-risk German government bonds.  
The reassessment of country-specific fundamentals and the consequent correction in 
sovereign credit risk was probably more immense - as implied by the volatility transmission from 
sovereign bonds to CDSs - in the sovereign bond markets of the weakest periphery economies, i.e., 
Ireland and Greece (partly evident in the movements of their bond yields in Figure 5.1), as well as 
Portugal. This repricing in the EMU periphery triggered diametrically opposite movements in the 
bond yields of the safer EMU economies, a fact primarily evident from the bond-CDS volatility 
spillover occurring in Germany (the main recipient of flights-to-safety) and secondarily in the 
Netherlands. However, the period where is evidence of excessive cross-asset volatility spillover 
within each EMU country is the one starting from mid 2010, and in any case from early 2011, until 
mid 2012. The only exception appears to be Finland, where the spillover is rather limited and close to 
the pre-crisis level, while in Austria the spillover, although greater than pre-2010, is relatively weak 
compared to the other EMU countries.  
Hence, it appears that the European sovereign debt crisis have resulted in an increase in the 
transmission of volatility from sovereign bonds to SCDS contracts in each EMU country. At first 
glance, this appears contradictory to the remarkable increase in the size and trading activity, and 
consequently in volatility,  of - particularly - the periphery countries' sovereign CDS markets as 
entering the Eurozone crisis. However, according to Figure 5.4, this surge in the periphery SCDS 
market's size and volatility is mainly transmitted at the intra-asset level, i.e., to the SCDS markets in 
the core, rather than to the sovereign bond markets in any of the periphery or the core.  
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[Insert Figure 5.4 about here] 
As the next section (i.e., Section 5.6) reveals, the Eurozone crisis marked a significant 
increase in the integration (reflected in the bond-CDS conditional correlations) between the sovereign 
bonds and SCDS contracts in each EMU periphery country and Belgium. This improved integration 
however appears to be driven by information provided by the sovereign bond market. It therefore 
seems that even though the escalation of the Eurozone crisis prompted investors to heightened 
perceptions of the sovereign credit risk of most EMU member-states, these corrections in sovereign 
risk pricing was fuelled from the reassessment of fundamentals in the sovereign bond market. In each 
of the economies of the EMU core, the evolution of their (declining) sovereign bond yields in each 
country is diametrically opposite to the evolution of their (rising) CDS spreads, which (according to 
Section 5.6) further leads to a limited level of integration between them. Nevertheless, similar to the 
periphery countries' case, this moderate rise in the core countries' CDS spreads is largely affected by 
information transmitted from their sovereign bonds, as the direction of volatility is from the latter to 
the former. 
This is further verified by the evolution of the net bond-CDS spillover between the two EMU 
blocs in Figure 5.4. The sovereign bond market in one bloc, remains the principal transmitter of 
volatility to the SCDS market of the other bloc regardless of whether the sovereign bond market is 
located in the periphery or the core. The only period where this transmission appears to be weak is 
from 2013 onwards, when the rising sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads in the European core 
begin to recede, thus signifying a potential containment of the Eurozone crisis. 
Thus, despite the surge in the size and importance of the SCDS market, the results identify 
sovereign bond markets as the most powerful vectors of information - through - volatility during the 
2010-2102 period. Therefore, the results of Section 5.3.1 according to which volatility was found to 
be transmitted from the sovereign bond to the CDS market at both the cross-country and the EMU-
wide level, are further verified in the context of the intra-country analysis.  
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5.3.3. Robustness checks 
To ensure the robustness of these results a VAR is estimated consisted solely of the country-specific 
bond yield and CDS spread series and excluding the bond and CDS factors. Results in Table 5.3 
suggest that the total spillover is approximately 9% lower, thus verifying Section's 5.3.1 assumption 
about the interaction of the common factors with each of the bond and CDS markets respectively. The 
differences between the two total spillover indices are mainly concentrated in the bond market, 
pointing to the fact that the latter market constitutes the laboratory for the amplification of volatility 
shocks to an EMU-scale, as well as the channel for these shocks' transmission across the Eurozone . 
Contribution to- as well as from other assets is significantly weaker in the case of the European 
periphery bond yields, further suggesting that common EMU developments have different 
explanatory power when moving between the two EMU blocs. Also evident from the comparison of 
the diagonal elements in the two total spillover matrices is the greater size of own country linkages in 
the omitted factor-VAR; this owes to the effect of common shocks being incorporated in the country-
specific bond yields and CDS spreads.  
[Insert Table 5.3 about here] 
Hence, the inclusion of the common bond and CDS factors in the VAR reverses the 
underestimation of the cross- and intra-asset spillovers stemming from and being directed to the bond 
markets of the European periphery. It further corrects for the upward trend in the own variance share, 
which is otherwise the case when the simple VAR is considered. To further confirm the 
appropriateness of the initial VAR's chosen specification the spillover index is calculated for orders 2 
to 4, and with forecast horizons varying from 8 to 10 days. Overall, the results appear to be insensitive 
to the choice of the order of the FAVAR or the choice of the forecast horizon, a fact also evident in 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). 
 
5.3.4. Implications 
A quite important conclusion derived from this chapter's analysis is the increased capacity of the 
sovereign bond market to transmit information to that of CDSs, a fact observed at both the country- 
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and the EMU-level. This points to the need that the management of sovereign credit risk within the 
macroprudential framework is conducted with reference to the sovereign bonds rather than the CDS 
contracts. It further highlights the importance and verifies the selection of the European sovereign 
bond market for the targeted central bank interventions carried out at the European level with the 
scope of minimizing the spillover to the CDS market and restoring investor trust in the periphery 
countries’ financial soundness as reflected by the level of their CDS spreads. On the other hand, the 
capacity of the CDS market to transmit information to the bond market is rather limited; CDS 
volatility is only transmitted at the intra-asset level, with majors transmitters the CDS markets of 
Ireland, Italy and Spain, suggesting that during the Eurozone crisis information is generated by 
countries with deteriorating fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. The emergence of the Spanish 
and Italian CDS spreads as predominant volatility contributors to the “common bond factors” variable 
emphasizes the importance of the two countries for the overall level of Eurozone bond yields.  
Thus, policies - such as fiscal-consolidation measures and/or structural reforms - aiming at 
ensuring the solvency of the respective countries and thereby reducing their default probabilities 
might be a contributing factor for the containment of yields across the European sovereign bond 
markets. This  pivotal position of Italy and Spain further draws attention to the issue of the sovereign-
bank nexus. This issue concerns the increased holdings of domestic government bonds by those 
countries' banks and the dangers that the banks' exposure to problems in the domestic financial sector 
can be transmitted to their branches across the Eurozone. The revision of the current regulatory 
framework should aim at exactly limiting even further the exposure of banks to a single counterparty 
and placing an even lower cap on the ratio of domestic bond holdings to the banks' total assets. This in 
turn should minimize the possibilities that insolvent or imprudent banks downgrade the solvency of 
their sovereigns and vice versa and therefore increasing the systemic risk across the Eurozone. 
 
5.4. AG-DCC GARCH 
Following the examination of volatility spillovers between the European sovereign bond and CDS 
markets and considering the theoretical propositions that volatility is a major driver of asset-
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correlation, the second part of this chapter assesses whether bond-CDS volatility spillovers are 
associated with stronger integration between sovereign bonds and CDSs in each EMU country.123 It 
additionally evaluates whether the shift in the ECB's monetary policy stance and the process towards 
monetary and economic integration has impacted on the degree of this integration. Since theoretical 
and empirical studies attribute cross-market integration and comovement to informational linkages, 
and following Ross's (1989) arguments that in a no-arbitrage economy changes in conditional 
variances are directly related to the rate at which information flows to the market, the examination of 
the information flow between the sovereign bond and CDS markets is plausible through the modelling 
of their conditional volatility interdependence and correlation. To this method, contributes the 
argument that market integration should affect the conditional return-generating process (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 2003).  
Due to the time-variance and clustering exhibited by the conditional volatilities and the 
conditional correlation of multivariate financial time-series, the multivariate generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model developed by Bollerslev et al. 
(1988) emerges as a natural candidate for the modeling of these stylized facts. This is especially the 
case in the context of the analysis of financial return comovement, an essential component of which is 
the construction, estimation, and forecasting  of the joint volatility dynamics of financial asset returns 
in a given portfolio; it further pertains to the derivative pricing of correlation sensitive products. The 
dependence of conditional volatilities and conditional correlation on their past values is also addressed 
by the MGARCH (also called VEC model). This dynamic nature of conditional volatilities, further led 
to the development of more sophisticated MGARCH models, such as the principal component 
GARCH model by Ding (1994), the BEKK model of Baba et al. (1995), the asymmetric dynamic 
covariance (ADC) model of Kroner and Ng (1998), and the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) 
model of Engle (2002).  
                                                            
123 The theoretical arguments about the relationship between volatility and correlation are discussed in detail in 
Section 2.5. 
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Each of the above models imposes different restrictions on the conditional covariance matrix, 
therefore providing different variance and covariance estimates; among them, BEKK and DCC are the 
two most widely used models, and are employed as forecasting tools, especially during periods of 
“heightened” market activity, where significant changes in the correlation dynamics are likely to 
occur. For the purposes of the analysis conducted in the present chapter a DCC model is selected. This 
selection is not arbitrary and is based on the DCC model's clear computational advantages over 
BEKK. In specific, the non-linear optimization required under the maximum likelihood fit of the 
BEKK model's parameters involves heavy computations due to several matrix transpositions, while 
the model is further difficult to converge in high-dimensions. On the other hand the number of DCC 
parameters to be estimated in the correlation process is independent of the number of series to be 
correlated, making feasible the estimation of potentially very large correlation matrices (Engle, 2002). 
Most importantly, the estimation of the DCC model involves dynamic parameters, in contrast to 
BEKK,  where the values of the model's parameters are assumed to be constant; thus, the DCC is 
better able to capture the dynamic and time-varying nature of the financial conditions, especially 
when the frequency of the observations increases (Engle, 2002; Cappielo et al., 2006). 
The choice of the DCC is further necessitated by the “asymmetric volatility” phenomenon, 
where financial asset volatility increases more following a negative rather than a positive shock of the 
same magnitude (Cappielo et al., 2006). This is important when considering the existence of 
numerous negative shocks in the European sovereign credit markets during the recent Eurozone crisis, 
e.g., the post-2008 banking crisis in Ireland, Greece's upward revision of government deficit in late 
2009, or the numerous credit rating announcements during the 2009-2012 period.124 The possibility 
that these negative shocks exerted an asymmetric impact on the current and - due to the dynamic 
nature of conditional correlation - in the future asset conditional correlation, serves as a motivation to 
follow Cappiello et al. (2006) and model the joint return generating process of sovereign bond and 
CDS markets with a bivariate DCC-GARCH model. 
                                                            
124 During the 2009-2012 period the number of published downgrades for the Eurozone countries by Standard 
and Poor's, Moody's Ratings and Fitch Ratings were 35, 32 and 29 respectively. 
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 The estimation of the DCC-GARCH consists of two stages. The first stage accounts for the 
conditional heteroskedasticity and involves the derivation of the standardized residuals, which are 
further used as inputs in the DCC-GARCH model. This derivation is feasible through the estimation 
of the GJR-GARCH model of Glosten et al. (1993), a procedure also known as “de-GARCHing” 
(Engle, 2002).125 The conditional variance	ߪ௧ଶ at time ݐ, under the uni-variate GJR-GARCHሺ݌, ݍሻ is 
modeled according to the following specification: 
	ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ∑ ߙ௜௣௜ୀଵ ߝ௧ି௜ଶ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜௣௜ୀଵ ߝ௧ି௜ଶ ܫሾε௧ି௜ ൏ 0ሿ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝௤௝ୀଵ ߪ௧ି௝ଶ 	                                   (5.11) 
and is a function of the lagged positive and negative squared residuals ߝ௧ଶ (the ARCH, and 
GARCH terms respectively), and the lagged conditional variance ߪ௧ଶ. ܫሺ∙ሻ denotes the indicator 
function which equals 1 if ε௧ି௜ ൏ 0 and 0 otherwise. The GARCH parameters are estimated through 
maximum likelihood estimation.  
In the second stage, the standardized residuals of the bond returns and CDS spreads changes 
in each EMU country and the EMU-average are used as inputs in the DCC-GARCH model for the 
calculation of the conditional correlations. Under the DCC, the conditional covariance matrix ܪ௧ of 
the standardized residuals is decomposed as:  
ܪ௧ ൌ ܦ௧ܴ௧ܦ௧                                                                                                                       (5.12) 
where ܦ௧ is a  ݊ ൈ ݊ matrix of time-varying standard deviations from the uni-variate GJR-
GARCH model of equation (5.11), and ܴ௧ is the time-varying correlation matrix. 
The log likelihood of the DCC estimator is expressed as:  
ܮ ൌ െ ଵଶ∑ ሺ݊ logሺ2ߨሻ ൅ logሺ |ܦ௧|ଶሻ ൅ logሺ|ܴ௧|ሻ௡௧ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧′ܴ௧ି ଵߝ௧ሻ                                        (5.13)    
where ߝ௧~ܰሺ0, ܴ௧ሻ are the standardized residuals from the first-stage estimation of the GJR-
GARCH. The log likelihood can further be written as the sum of a volatility part and a correlation 
part, namely: 
 ܮሺߠ, ߮ሻ ൌ ܮ௩ሺߠሻ ൅ ܮ௖ሺߠ, ߮ሻ                                                                                              (5.14) 
                                                            
125 A Threshold ARCH (TARCH), and an Absolute Value GARCH (AVGARCH) are employed as alternatives 
to the GJR-GARCH for robustness purposes. 
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the volatility component is 
ܮ௩ሺߠሻ ൌ െ ଵଶ∑ ൫݊ logሺ2ߨሻ ൅ logሺ |ܦ௧|ଶሻ ൅ ݎఛ′ܦ௧ି ଶݎ௧൯௡௧ୀଵ                                                     (5.15) 
and the correlation component is 
ܮ௖ሺߠ, ߮ሻ ൌ െ ଵଶ∑ ൫log|ܴ௧| ൅ ߝ௧′ܴ௧ି ଵߝ௧ െ ߝ௧′ ߝ௧൯௡௧ୀଵ                                                                (5.16) 
The DCC model as formulated in Engle (2002) has the following non-linear GARCH 
specification:  
ܳ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙ െ ߚሻ തܳ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵߝ௧ିଵ′ ൅ ߚܳ௧ିଵ                                                                        (5.17) 
where ܳ௧ ൌ ሺݍ௜,௝,௧ሻ is α ݊ ൈ ݊ conditional variance-covariance matrix of standardized 
residuals, ߙ and ߚ are non-constant negative scalars causing the model to be mean-reverting as long 
as ߙ ൅ ߚ ൏ 1 (or integrated if	ߙ ൅ ߚ ൌ 1), and തܳ ൌ ܧሾߝ௧ߝ௧′ ሿ is the unconditional time-invariant 
variance-covariance matrix of the standardized residuals. According to Engle (2002), the modelling of 
the conditional covariance of the standardized returns is equivalent to the modelling of the returns' 
conditional correlation; hence the time-varying conditional correlations ݍ௜,௝,௧ are normalized and then 
used in the estimation of the conditional correlation ߩ௜,௝,௧ between any two assets at any instant of 
time ݐ, according to  the equation:  
ߩ௜,௝,௧ ൌ ௤೔,ೕ,೟ඥ௤೔,೔,೟	௤ೕ,ೕ,೟                                                                                                                 (5.18) 
The mechanics of the DCC are such, that when new information causes the assets to move in 
the same (opposite) direction, the coefficient ߙ will cause the conditional correlations ݍ௜,௝,௧ to increase 
(decrease) above (below) their average level and remain at this level for a short period of time, before 
the coefficient ߚ forces them to revert back to their long-run average direction.  
Since a fundamental assumption of Engle's (2002) DCC is that the conditional correlations 
follow the same dynamic structure, in the presence of structural breaks, such as those during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, the conditional correlations may lead to 
an over- or under-estimation of asset risk. For that reason, the asymmetric generalized DCC (AG-
DCC) specification of Cappiello et al. (2006) is employed. Compared to the conventional DCC, the 
asymmetric generalized extension on the one hand allows for asset-specific news and smoothing 
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parameters and on the other hand permits conditional asymmetries in correlations (Cappielo et al., 
2006). Furthermore, the AG-DCC models' modification of the univariate volatility parameterizations 
of standard models allows for the accommodation of conditional asymmetries. The combination of 
these two approaches results in a specification that is flexible and also feasible when more than one 
assets are considered, as is the case in the present analysis of sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads. 
Lastly, the evolution of the original DCC estimator is modelled according to a process that assumes 
identical news impact and smoothing parameters for all pairs of variables; since this is a rather strong 
assumption to hold for high-dimensional models, the employment of the AG-DCC estimator is more 
efficient in capturing the heterogeneity present in the financial data (Cappielo et al., 2006). 
Under the AG-DCC, the correlation evolution of equation (5.17) is modified as:  
ܳ௧ ൌ ൫ തܳ െ ޿′ തܳ޿ െ ߁ ′ ഥܰ߁ െ ߀′ തܳ߀൯ ൅ ޿′ߝ௧ିଵߝ௧ିଵ′ ޿ ൅ ߁ ′ߥ௧ିଵߥ௧ିଵ′ ߁ ൅ ߀′ܳ௧ିଵܤ               (5.19) 
where ޿, ܤ,	and ߁ are ݇ ൈ ݇ parameter matrices, ߥ௧ ൌ ܫሾε௧ ൏ 0ሿ°ε௧ ሺܫሾ∙ሿ is a ݇ ൈ 1 indicator 
function which equals 1 if ε௧ ൏ 0 and 0 otherwise, and ° is the Hadamard product), and ߋഥ ൌ ܧሾߥ௧ߥ௧′ ሿ. 
Re-arranging the terms in the parenthesis, and denoting the unconditional correlation തܳ as തܴ, 
the conditional correlations of the DCC-GARCH(݌, ݎ, ݏ) for two assets (i.e., bond returns and CDS 
spread changes) is estimated as: 
ݍ௜,௜,௧ ൌ തܴ௜,௜൫1 െ ∑ ߙ௞ଵଵ௣௞ୀଵ െ ∑ ߛ௠ଵଵ௥௠ୀଵ െ ∑ ߚ௡ଵଵ௦௡ୀଵ ൯ ൅ ∑ ߙ௞ଵଵ൫݁௜,௧ି௞൯ଶ௣௞ୀଵ ൅
																													൅∑ ߛ௠ଵଵሺߥ௜,௧ି௠ሻଶ௥௠ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௡ଵଵݍ௜,௜ି௡௦௡ୀଵ                                                             (5.20) 
 
ݍ௜,௝,௧ ൌ തܴ௜,௝൫1 െ ∑ ߙ௞ଵଶ௣௞ୀଵ െ ∑ ߛ௠ଵଶ௥௠ୀଵ െ ∑ ߚ௡ଵଶ௦௡ୀଵ ൯ ൅ ∑ ߙ௞ଵଶ݁௜,௧ି௞ ௝݁,௧ି௞௣௞ୀଵ ൅
																													൅∑ ߛ௠ଵଶߥ௜,௧ି௠ߥ௝,௧ି௠௥௠ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௡ଵଶݍ௜,௧ି௡ݍ௝,௧ି௡௦௡ୀଵ                                               (5.21) 
 
ݍ௝,௝,௧ ൌ തܴ௝,௝൫1 െ ∑ ߙ௞ଶଶ௣௞ୀଵ െ ∑ ߛ௠ଶଶ௥௠ୀଵ െ ∑ ߚ௡ଶଶ௦௡ୀଵ ൯ ൅ ∑ ߙ௞ଶଶ൫ ௝݁,௧ି௞൯ଶ௣௞ୀଵ ൅
																														൅∑ ߛ௠ଶଶሺߥ௝,௧ି௠ሻଶ௥௠ୀଵ ൅ ൅∑ ߚ௡ଶଶݍ௝,௝ି௡௦௡ୀଵ                                                        (5.22)                           
in which the conditional correlation or “quasi-correlation” ݍ௜,௝,௧ (where ݅ ሺ݆) is the sovereign 
bond (CDS) market of each of the 11 EMU countries and the EMU-average at time ݐ), is a function of 
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the past symmetric and asymmetric innovations, ݁௧ and ݊௧ respectively, and its own past conditional 
correlations ݍ௜,௝,௧.126 
Under the AG-DCC, the time-varying conditional correlation ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ,௧ between the bond and 
CDS markets at time ݐ, is simply the ratio of their conditional covariance ݍ஻,஼஽ௌ,௧ at time	ݐ, and the 
individual conditional variances of the bond and CDS markets at time	ݐ, i.e., ߪ஻,௧ଶ  and ߪ஼஽ௌ,௧ଶ  
respectively, or:         
 ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ,௧ ൌ ఙಳ,಴ವೄ,೟
మ
ටఙಳ,೟మ 	ఙ಴ವೄ,೟మ
                                                                                                         (5.26) 
The value of ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ,௧ is an indication of the level of the sovereign bond-CDS comovement at 
any instant of time ݐ, and it is interpreted as reflecting the evolution of the integration process between 
the sovereign bond and CDS markets, since it considers the effects of common  information and 
volatility shocks between and from the two markets. We would expect this measure to assume a 
positive value, since no-arbitrage conditions force the spread of the CDS to rise in response to a rise in 
the yield of the underlying bond, and/or vice versa. Conditional correlation is bounded between 
െ1 ൑ ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ,௧ ൑ 1, with a high positive value indicating a greater degree of sovereign bond-CDS 
integration. 
 
5.5. Sovereign bond-CDS conditional correlation and CDS-bond basis 
This section analyzes the  relationship between the level of conditional correlation between sovereign 
bonds and CDSs in each EMU country (estimated from the AG-DCC model of equation (5.19)) and 
                                                            
126 According to equations (5.20)-(5.22), the specification of a AG-DCC(1,1,1) is: 
ݍ௜,௜,௧ ൌ തܴ௜,௜ሺ1 െ ߙ1ଵଵ െ ߛ1ଵଵ െ ߚ1ଵଵሻ ൅ ߙ1ଵଵሺ݁௜,௧ିଵሻଶ ൅ ߛ1ଵଵሺݒ௜,௧ିଵሻଶ ൅ ߚ1ଵଵݍ௜,௜,௧ିଵ                   (5.23)     
 ݍ௜,௝,௧ ൌ തܴ௜,௝ሺ1 െ ߙ1ଵଶ െ ߛ1ଵଶ െ ߚ1ଵଶሻ ൅ ߙଵଵଶ݁௜,௧ିଵ ௝݁,௧ିଵ ൅ 
            	൅ߛ1ଵଶݒ௜,௧ିଵݒ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ1ଵଶݍ௜,௝,௧ିଵ                                                                                           (5.24) 
  ݍ௝,௝,௧ ൌ തܴ௝,௝ሺ1 െ ߙ1ଶଶ െ ߛ1ଶଶ െ ߚ1ଶଶሻ ൅ ߙ1ଶଶሺ݁௜,௧ିଵሻଶ ൅ ߛ1ଶଶሺݒ௜,௧ିଵሻଶ ൅									 
															൅ߚ1ଶଶݍ௝,௝,௧ିଵ                                                                                                                         (5.25) 
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the level of the CDS-bond basis in the same country (calculated from equation (5.27)).127 Figure 5.5 
plots for each of the 11 EMU countries the daily time-series of the bond-CDS conditional correlation 
against the daily time-series of the CDS-bond basis.128 
 [Insert Figure 5.5 about here] 
As a general conclusion, it appears that the evolution in each of the bond-CDS market 
integration (proxied by the bond-CDS conditional correlation) and the CDS-bond basis is 
characterized by two key breakpoints: the first is common for movements in both market integration 
and the CDS-bond basis across all 11 EMU countries and pertains to late 2008-early 2009, while the 
second refers to late 2011-early 2012, however  is only common for the countries of the EMU core 
excluding Belgium. In the latter country, as well as in each of the EMU periphery countries emerge 
considerable time differences between market integration and the CDS-bond basis with regards to the 
direction of their evolution during the post-2009 period. 
The former breakpoint coincides with the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers which marked 
an upward trend in long-term European government bond yields and a disruptive re-pricing of 
European sovereign credit risk. This reassessment of underlying economic and financial fundamentals 
(a direct consequence of the associated global uncertainty and flight-to-quality tendencies) increased 
investor demand for low-risk German government bonds. The following recession and the 
government announcements of large-scale bail-out programs for banks further prompted investors to 
heightened perceptions of sovereign credit risk in most Eurozone countries (Fontana and Scheicher, 
2016). In particular, during the pre-2009 period, a rather limited degree of cross-market integration is 
observed, with bond-CDS conditional correlations assuming values within the (-20, 20) range in all 
                                                            
127 To account for the fact that the European sovereign bonds are denominated in Euros, while the CDS 
contracts written on them are denominated in US Dollars, and therefore remove the strong impact exerted by the 
Euro/US Dollar exchange rate on the level of the CDS-bond basis, the SCDS contracts employed are 
denominated in Euros. 
128 The value of the conditional coefficient ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ,௧ is multiplied by 100 for expositional convenience, therefore 
it is bounded by െ100 ൑ ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ,௧ ൑ 100. 
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Eurozone countries. This disintegration between sovereign bonds and CDSs, further coincides with a 
negative CDS-bond basis in all EMU member states, except the Netherlands. 
However, when progressing into the European sovereign debt crisis from early 2009 onwards, 
we observe the formation of two different blocs within the EMU, according to the degree of bond-
CDS integration in each country. The first bloc includes the distressed countries of the EMU 
periphery, which were characterized by persistent and positive conditional correlations. Belgium is 
further included in this bloc, since its behaviour with regards to both the bond-CDS conditional 
correlation and the CDS-bond basis resembles that of the periphery countries. The other bloc consists 
of the EMU core countries (excluding Belgium), where these correlations recede even further from 
their (negative) pre-2009 values and remain at a moderately negative level for the best part of the 
Eurozone crisis. During that period we observe a positive basis across the Eurozone, which 
particularly during the mid 2009-early 2010 period exceeds the 100 basis points level in all countries, 
while in cases such as of Greece (primarily), Austria, Ireland, and Spain the basis peaks even higher. 
 
5.5.1. Sovereign bond-CDS integration 
Therefore, the transition to the Eurozone crisis is associated with an increase in the bond-CDS 
conditional correlations in each country of the EMU South and also in Belgium. As Section 5.3 
reveals this period of rising bond-CDS correlations coincides with an increase in volatility directed 
from the sovereign bond towards the SCDS market. This consequently points not only to the overall 
(strong) relationship between volatility and cross-asset correlation (see Andersen et al., 1999, 2003) 
but further to the importance of volatility for the evolution of cross-asset correlation (Aït-Sahalia and 
Xiu, 2016). According to the findings of Section 5.3 during - and shortly after - the onset of the 
Eurozone crisis, information appears to be mainly transmitted from the sovereign bond to the SCDS 
market, a fact evident in all EMU countries and not just those of the EMU South. However, this 
period of increased information transmission towards the CDS market results in a stronger bond-CDS 
correlation only across the EMU South and Belgium. Hence, it appears that up until the Eurozone 
crisis period, the domestic CDS markets across the latter bloc were not responding to the same 
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information as that bloc's domestic bond markets. Once the CDS markets started to act as the recipient 
of bond-stemming volatility and information, the conditional correlations between the sovereign bond 
and CDS markets experienced a significant increase climbing above the +70 level in most countries 
(i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain).   
As the main stage of the Eurozone crisis evolves we observe a moderate downward shift in 
the cross-market conditional correlations of the EMU periphery countries and Belgium, which is 
matched by an also moderate but upward shift in the conditional correlations of the EMU core 
countries, signifying a return of these correlations close to their pre-crisis levels. A similar 
(downward) shift is also evident with regards to the CDS-bond basis, the only difference being that 
this shift is common for the two EMU blocs and results in an almost entirely negative basis in each of 
the Eurozone countries thereafter.  
This change in the strength of  market integration occurs between late 2010 and early 2011 in 
all periphery countries and Belgium, while in the European core the same change takes place with a 
lag ranging from two to four quarters, i.e., between late 2011 and mid 2012. What is interesting is that 
the change in each of the core countries' conditional correlations towards less negative values concurs 
with the large downward shift in their CDS-bond basis. In the periphery however, the transition to a 
period of weaker cross-asset integration precedes by far the changes in the level of the basis. In 
particular the time distance between them ranges from two quarters in Italy, to four and six quarters in 
Spain and Greece respectively. In Portugal, while the basis turns negative in early 2011, the country's 
bond yields and CDS spreads continue to be moderately integrated until the end of 2013. In Ireland, 
despite the switch towards a negative basis, the degree of bond-CDS integration, although relatively 
weaker, is still close to its post-2009 average.  
Due to this contradicting behaviour of conditional correlations between the Eurozone 
countries we can conclude that the European sovereign debt crisis constitutes the breaking point for 
the considerable improvement in the integration between the sovereign bond and CDS markets in the 
EMU periphery and Belgium, i.e., the countries - at least those in the periphery bloc - affected the 
most by this crisis. Even though during the pre-2009 period movements in the respective countries' 
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bond yields and CDS spreads were relatively uncorrelated, during the initiation and the main stage of 
the Eurozone crisis this correlation assumes large positive values, thus pointing to a strong association 
between them. 
The diametrically antithetical movements between sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads in 
the European core during most of the Eurozone crisis depicted in Figure 5.1, are further reflected in 
the level of bond-CDS conditional correlations in each of the core countries, with the exception of 
Belgium. Although translating into higher default probabilities, a rise in those countries' CDS spreads 
is associated with a fall in their underlying government bond yields. Thus, it appears that the 
aforementioned countries have been the recipients of the so called “safe haven flows”, especially from 
the first half of 2010 until the second half of 2011, i.e., during the main stage of the Eurozone crisis 
(Fontana, 2012). The sky-rocketing SCDS spreads and rising sovereign bond yields, as well as the 
positive correlation between them in the EMU periphery during the same period, verify the argument 
about the flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity phenomena, according to which in times of 
heightened market uncertainty, investors rebalance their portfolios toward less risky and more liquid 
securities, especially in fixed-income markets (Beber et al., 2009). This phenomenon is in turn more 
evident in the case of Finland, France and Germany, as well as in Austria and the Netherlands. In 
addition, the significantly greater credit quality (reflected in the higher credit ratings) and liquidity 
(reflected in the tighter bid-ask spreads) of the core countries' government bonds relative to those in 
the periphery, further points to the fact that these flights into the core countries' sovereign debt 
markets are due to both safety and liquidity considerations (a fact also documented in Monfort and 
Renne, 2014 and in Fontana and Scheicher, 2016). 
 
5.5.2. Sovereign bond-CDS integration and the CDS-bond basis 
The degree of market integration is in turn essential in explaining the level of the CDS-bond basis in 
each EMU country. As suggested by the graphs, the onset of the Eurozone crisis resulted in the 
classification of EMU member states into two blocs: the EMU periphery countries and Belgium, and 
the EMU core countries excluding Belgium. Each of these blocs exhibit strong and weak sovereign 
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bond-CDS integration respectively. The same blocs however, are observed with regards to the 
evolution of the CDS-bond basis, since in the former bloc the transition of the basis towards negative 
values occurs between two to four quarters earlier than the same transition in the latter bloc (i.e., late 
2010-early 2011 versus  late 2011-mid 2012). In addition, while in the EMU core this shift to negative 
basis coincides with a rise in conditional correlations, in the periphery countries and Belgium 
conditional correlations begin to decrease significantly later than the negative shift in the basis' level. 
The negative correlation in the core countries during the main stage of the Eurozone crisis 
offers the most plausible explanation for the positive basis during the same period. The “safe haven 
flows” targeting that bloc's constituent countries result in the rise of their SCDS spreads to be matched 
by a concurrent fall - rather than a rise - in their sovereign bond yields, thereby causing a widening of 
their basis towards positive values. Along these lines, from late-2011 onwards when the flight-to-
quality and flight-to-liquidity phenomena appear to weaken, the basis starts to converge towards zero 
before eventually turning negative for the remainder of the crisis. This is primarily evident in the 
EMU's two largest economies and principal recipients of the capital flights from the EMU periphery, 
i.e., Germany and France, while it is further the case in Austria, Finland and the Netherlands. In these 
two latter countries, although the basis turns again slightly positive in 2014, its level is considerably 
lower than the level at which the basis peaked during 2009 and 2010. Even though the 
contemporaneous rise and fall in the core countries' CDS spreads and bond yields respectively 
justifies the notably large positive sign of the basis in each of these countries during the 2009-2012 
period, in the periphery such a diametrically opposite relationship between the two assets is not 
observed. Therefore, the positive basis in the periphery and Belgium should be attributed to other 
factors than the flight-to-safety phenomenon.  
A partial explanation is provided by the inherent differences in the exposure of sovereign 
bonds and CDSs to various risk factors; being cash instruments, bonds are affected by interest rate 
risk, default risk, and funding risk, while CDSs are mainly affected by default risk and counterparty 
risk. Since, default probabilities were considerably high for the debt-laden European periphery - as 
well as for Belgium according to Figure 5.1 - sovereign CDSs in the respective bloc's countries have 
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been affected asymmetrically relative to the underlying sovereign bonds. This is evident in the pre-
2011 period where the basis assumes significantly positive values, pointing to the increase in the CDS 
spreads being greater than the corresponding increase in the underlying government bond yields. At 
the same period, the integration between the two assets remains at a moderate level suggesting their 
sensitivity to different  underlying fundamentals. However, from early-2010 onwards, sovereign 
bonds in the periphery and Belgium appear to integrate with SCDSs, signifying that movements in 
both asset-markets are driven to a large extent from the same factors. This process towards stronger 
integration is in turn matched by the process towards a negative basis for the remainder of the period.  
Entering the late 2011-early 2012 period we observe the largest negative values of the basis 
across the EMU South and Belgium. These persistent and negative values coincide with the peak in 
the level of the CDS spreads during the same period, as well as with signs of extreme illiquidity (as 
measured by the wide bid-ask spreads) and volatility (as measured by the large standard deviation) in 
the periphery's CDS contracts. The combination of illiquid and volatile CDS contracts is in turn 
responsible for the persistence of the negative basis, since it causes professional arbitrageurs to avoid 
extremely volatile “arbitrage” positions; the exposure to increasing losses due to excessive volatility, 
as well as the potential need to liquidate the portfolio outweigh the likelihood of earning excess 
returns from trading the basis (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This can further be seen from a different 
perspective: within Merton's (1974) framework, the CDS is essentially a put option on the underlying 
bond.129 During the mid 2011-mid 2012, bond yields across the periphery elevated to their highest 
levels in the short history of the EMU, with CDS spreads also matching this upward trend. The non-
negligible likelihood of a sovereign defaulting at the time rendered the put options on these bonds 
(i.e., the CDS) in the money. Hence, the volatility smile arising or in other words the volatility smirk 
(since sovereign bonds generally attract passive and/or long-term investors and thus resemble long-
term equity options and index options), advocates excessive volatility for SCDS contracts relative to 
the pre-2012 period when sovereign bond yields were fluctuating within more moderate levels.  
 
                                                            
129 More information on Merton's (1974) model is provided in Section 2.2.  
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5.5.3. Implications 
Overall, several conclusions are derived from the intra-country analysis of the sovereign bond-CDS 
integration as well as the analysis of the relationship between bond-CDS integration and the level of 
the CDS-bond basis. First, the increase in the level of bond-CDS integration in each of the countries 
of the EMU South coincides with an increase in the volatility spillover between sovereign bonds and 
CDSs in the same countries, thereby verifying - to an extent - the arguments about volatility being a 
major driver of cross-asset correlation (see Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016). Second, capital flights emerge 
as the primary reason for the persistently positive basis in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands for the duration of the main stage of the European sovereign debt crisis, i.e., until late 
2011-early 2012. Lastly, post-2009, when bond-CDS integration in the European periphery and 
Belgium strengthens, suggesting that sovereign bonds and CDSs are driven to a large extent by the 
same fundamentals, the basis becomes negative; this in turn renders sovereign bond yields as the most 
efficient indicators of sovereign credit risk in those countries. In the same countries, illiquidity and 
volatility appear to act as limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Roll et al., 2007; Gârleanu 
and Pedersen, 2011; Nashikkar et al., 2011), since they coincide with the large and persistent negative 
values of the basis observed during the late 2011-mid 2012 period. 
 
5.6. Monetary conditions and sovereign bond-CDS integration 
This section examines the effect of monetary and macroeconomic conditions as reflected in the 
process of monetary and real economic convergence and in the ECB's monetary policy stance.130 The 
examination is motivated by previous studies arguments that the EMU has achieved considerable 
convergence on the macroeconomic and monetary front, and that financial market integration is 
dependent, not only on country-specific fundamentals, but on the level of real and monetary 
convergence between international economies (see Fratzscher, 2002; Baele, 2005). Since the 
examination is conducted within a monetary union, the theory on optimum currency area suggests that 
these forms of convergence will have increasing effects on cross-market integration (Mundell, 1961; 
                                                            
130 The analysis in this section follows that of Kim et al. (2005, 2006b) for the stock and bond markets. 
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McKinnon, 1963). In order to determine the appropriate model for the examination we must first 
identify the direction of causality between the sample of monetary and macroeconomic variables and 
the bond-CDS conditional correlations that are employed to proxy for the degree of bond-CDS 
integration.  
To this end, a Granger causality test is performed for each EMU country individually in order 
to test whether monetary and macroeconomic variables contain information for forecasting the 
country-specific bond-CDS conditional correlations and vice versa. For the null hypothesis that 
variable ߯ does not Granger cause (the dependent) variable ݕ, the variable ݕ is regressed on its own 
lagged values and on lagged values of ߯ in order to test whether the lagged coefficients of ߯ are 
jointly zero. The cell associated with the ݅௧௛		row variable and the ݆௧௛ column variable shows the ߯ଶ 
statistics and corresponding p-values in parentheses. 
[Insert Table 5.4 about here] 
Starting from Austria, Table 5.4 reveals that the variable proxying for real economic 
convergence at the EMU-level Granger causes that country's bond-CDS conditional correlation, since 
the value of cell (1,1) is 15.545 and significant at the 5% level. However, the reverse does not appear 
to be the case since the value of cell (5,5) is 7.251 and insignificant at all levels, thereby indicating 
that the level of bond-CDS integration in Austria is not informative for movements in the real 
economic convergence variable. The coefficients from the Granger causality tests for the remaining 
countries in Table 5.4 are interpreted in a similar way. Overall, the results point to a unidirectional 
transmission of causality stemming from the monetary and macroeconomic variables to the bond-
CDS conditional correlations. This implies that by modifying its monetary policy stance, the central 
banks can affect the bond-CDS integration and thus (in the case of increased integration), enhance the 
diversification and hedging benefits of investment strategies. 
Due to this unidirectional relationship, it is reasonable to treat the monetary and 
macroeconomic variables as exogenous in relation to the cross-market conditional correlations; 
however the probability of correlation between those variables - possibly through their innovations - 
is also allowed. These innovations capture regulatory and institutional features, political factors, and 
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any other information that could be omitted in ordinary least squares regressions (Kim et al., 2006b). 
For these reasons a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is employed, that is, a system of linear 
equations that has contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation. Because of the nature of the 
variables employed to proxy for real economic convergence and monetary convergence, multi-
collinearity problems arise during the analysis. To address these problems, along the lines of 
Fratzscher (2002) and Kim et al. (2005, 2006b) principal component analysis is employed in order to 
form two new variables that proxy for each of these forms of convergence. The model is comprised of 
11 separate equations, one for each EMU member-state, and has the following form:  
ߩ஻஼஽ௌ௜,௧ ൌ ߙଵ௜ ൅ ߚଵ௜ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵ௜ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߜଵ௜௝ܧܥܤ௧ି௝௣௝ୀ଴ ൅  
                  ൅∑ ߞଵ௜௝ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ௜,௧ି௝ଶ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߠଵ௜௝௞ሺ௙௢௥	௞ୀଵ:ଷሻܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௧ି௝௥௝ୀ଴ ൅ ߝ௜௧                  (5.26) 
where ߩ஻஼஽ௌ௜,௧ is the bond-CDS conditional correlation of country ݅ at time ݐ. ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௜,௧ିଵ 
and ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ are the variables resulted from the principal component analysis and that 
employed as proxies for real economic convergence and monetary policy convergence respectively. 
These variables enter the analysis in their lagged values. The vector ∑ ߜଵ௜௝ܧܥܤ௧ି௝௣௝ୀ଴  is the monetary 
policy variable. This variables is consisted of a vector containing the present and past values of the 
interest rate variables (i.e., the EONIA and EURORATE) and the measures of “orthogonalized” 
reserves held with the ECB (i.e., ERX, RRX, ER/TR, RR/TR). This variable is employed as a proxy 
for the stance of the ECB's monetary policy. The equations also include the lagged bond-CDS 
conditional correlation of country ݅ at time ݐ, which is represented by the vector ∑ ߞଵ௜௝ߩ஻,஼஽ௌ௜,௧ି௝ଶ௝ୀଵ . 
The vector ∑ ߠଵ௜௝௞ሺ௙௢௥	௞ୀଵ:ଷሻܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௧ି௝௥௝ୀ଴  is a vector of control variables and includes the implied 
volatility of the CBOE index (VIX) and the economic uncertainty index (UNCERTAINTY).131 The 
vector of control variables further includes a dummy variable equal to one (otherwise zero) for all 
observations after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers (i.e., September 15 2008), and a dummy 
                                                            
131 Table 5.1 provides detailed  information on the definition of the variables employed in the analysis of Section 
5.6, the sources of these variables and the methods for their construction. 
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variable equal to one (otherwise zero) for all observations after the onset of the implementation of the 
short-sales ban (i.e., November 1 2012). 132 Lastly, ߝ௜௧ is the error term.  
To confirm the appropriateness of dummy variables and verify the results from Section's 5.5 
graphs regarding the points where structural changes in the evolution of bond-CDS conditional 
correlations occurred, the Bai and Perron testis also employed. Only the September 2008 date is 
chosen as the cut-off point for the dummy variable, since the other changes occurred in a wider time-
band (second half of 2010 - first half of 2011); these latest changes are represented by the measures of 
bank reserves with the ECB, which also experience a significant increase after May 2010, and thus, 
capture this transition to a period of unconventional monetary policy across EMU. Results in Table 
5.5 reveal that independent variables are not uniformly significant as we observe relative differences 
across EMU member-states, suggesting that the use of  measures of “orthogonalized” reserves and the 
employment of principal components has addressed the issue of multi-collinearity raised previously.   
[Insert Table 5.5 about here] 
Along the lines of OCA theory, advances in real economic as well as in monetary policy 
convergence appear to have been successful in driving the European sovereign bond and CDS 
markets towards greater integration. This is primarily the case with regards to the real economy, 
where the significant coefficients are greater in number and value, and are observed in the majority of 
the EMU member-states. The proxy for monetary policy convergence also appears effective in 
improving cross-market integration, however its importance is mostly concentrated in the less strong 
and/or the debt-laden economies; this is unsurprising, since predominant economies such as Germany 
and France are the main determinants of the monetary conditions prevailing in the EMU, and further 
constitute the benchmarks against which the monetary convergence of individual states is evaluated. 
The implication of these results is that a greater degree of conformance with the EMU-average in 
                                                            
132 This is motivated by the analysis of Section 5.5, which revealed that the changes in the time-varying bond-
CDS conditional correlations occurred since late 2008. The analysis further shows that the other period where a 
significant change in the pattern of these correlations occurred, is from the second half of 2010 until the first 
half of 2011.  
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terms of trade openness, productivity growth, and price level adjustments, leads to a tighter 
association and a more efficient interaction between the debt and credit derivatives markets of an 
EMU member-state.  
Focusing on the variables reflecting the ECB's monetary policy stance, we observe that 
“orthogonalized” reserves are effective in inducing movements in sovereign bond-CDS integration. 
Monetary expansion represented by a rise in excess reserves and/or required reserves is generally 
associated with an improvement in the bond-CDS conditional correlations. Interest rates further 
constitute a determinant of cross-market integration (although their contribution is relatively weaker 
than that of bank reserves), with a fall in interest rates generally leading to a rise in the degree of 
integration between sovereign bonds and CDSs in most of the Eurozone countries. This strong impact 
of the monetary policy variables provides a strong argument for the expanded asset purchase 
programme (APP), i.e., the massive purchase programme for marketable debt instruments announced 
by the ECB in January 2015 in order to intervene more heavily in the European sovereign debt 
markets . Hence, the further expansion of the ECB's balance sheet through additional purchases of 
government bonds can contribute to the restoration of equilibrium between the sovereign bond and 
CDS markets. The impact of measures of bank reserves is mainly concentrated in the countries of the 
EMU South (along with the smallest EMU North economies, such as Austria and Belgium), that is the 
countries that the ECB purported to affect, and whose sovereign markets comprise the primary target 
of the asset purchase programmes. Among those measures, the excess reserves to total reserves ratio 
appears to exert the greatest impact on cross-market conditional correlations, suggesting that it can be 
an efficient tool - and signal - for determining the future level of bond-CDS integration. 
We would expect economic uncertainty to affect cross-market integration in different ways, 
with growing uncertainty (represented by a rise in the uncertainty index and/or the volatility index) 
improving integration in the strongest EMU economies and favouring segmentation in the less strong 
and debt-laden ones, due to the flight-to-safety phenomenon. The coefficients on both the uncertainty 
index and the volatility index are significant, however their sign across countries does not support the 
above argument. Thus, either the period of market uncertainty in the Eurozone cannot be fully 
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captured by these measures, or the European sovereign bond and CDS markets are away of their 
equilibrium values and cannot perform their diversification role. Results are not clear with regards to 
the influence of the dummy variables, as the coefficients of both variables vary in sign and 
significance. This is expected when considering the effect of the post-September 2008 period, since 
following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the re-pricing in the European sovereign debt 
markets, bond-CDS integration has followed different paths depending on the country of question, a 
pattern also evident in the AG-DCC GARCH analysis of Section 5.5. However, it cannot be argued 
with certainty that the short-selling ban has been a contributing factor towards greater integration 
between the two markets; the coefficients are significant in only half of the EMU member states. A 
rather expected finding is that the level of bond-CDS conditional correlation is dependent on the past 
values of this correlation in most countries; this in turn verifies the persistent and dynamic nature of 
the bond-CDS integration process. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter measures the bilateral volatility spillovers between the sovereign bond and CDS markets 
across the EMU during the 2007-2014 period by augmenting the Diebold and Yilmaz's (2009, 2012) 
generalized VAR model with two common factors to account for the possibility of EMU-wide shocks. 
Results from the intra-country analysis reveal a unidirectional volatility spillover from the sovereign 
bond to the SCDS market in all EMU countries, which is further verified within the context of cross-
country analysis. Germany emerges as the main transmitter of bond volatility to the CDS markets of 
the Eurozone core, while Ireland and Italy also assume a central role in the European financial 
markets framework, since they appear as significant bond and CDS volatility contributors to the rest 
of the European CDS markets. Thus, despite the surge in the size and importance of the SCDS 
market, the results identify sovereign bond markets as the most powerful vectors of information 
particularly during the 2010-2012 period.  
The chapter further assess the extent to volatility interaction between sovereign bonds and 
CDSs within the same EMU country drives the level of integration between them (as reflected in their 
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level of conditional correlation), and whether this integration is consequently linked to the evolution 
of the no-arbitrage relationship between the two assets (the CDS-bond basis). This is done by means 
of the asymmetric generalized DCC of Cappiello et al. (2006). In this regard, the increase in volatility 
directed from the sovereign bond towards the SCDS market from the onset of the Eurozone crisis 
onwards coincides with the an increase in the bond-CDS conditional correlations in each country of 
the EMU South and Belgium. This verifies the theoretical arguments about the strong association 
between volatility and cross-asset correlation (Andersen et al., 1999, 2003) and most importantly the 
importance of volatility for the evolution of cross-asset correlation (Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016). The 
consideration of the role of the CDS-bond basis, reveals the existence of a two-tier Eurozone. In the 
countries of the North (i.e., Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) capital flights 
emerge as the primary reason for the persistently positive CDS-bond basis for the duration of the main 
stage of the Euro debt crisis, i.e., until late 2011-early 2012. In the EMU South and Belgium however, 
there is evidence of an inverse relationship between bond-CDS conditional correlation (and therefore 
integration) and the CDS-bond basis: post-2009, an improvement of this integration, which further 
suggests that sovereign bonds and CDSs are driven to a large extent by the same fundamentals, causes 
the basis to become negative. In the same bloc, illiquidity and volatility appear to act as limits to 
arbitrage, since they coincide with the large and persistent negative values of the CDS-bond basis 
during the late 2011-mid 2012 period.  
The present chapter's results carry significant implications for the measurement and 
transmission of sovereign credit risk. Within this framework the analysis of this chapter identifies 
sovereign bond yields as the most efficient indicators of sovereign credit risk in the countries of the 
EMU South. Therefore, macroprudential policies should take into consideration the optimum mix of 
sovereign bonds and CDSs in the portfolio of financial institutions when calculating the risk in those 
institutions' portfolio. This is not only due to the capacity of bonds to transmit information to CDSs, 
but also to the former being the driver of the integration between the two assets. This in turn 
determines the exposure of a financial institution in a given country since it dictates the amount of 
domestic debt to be hedged at any instant by assuming offsetting positions in the underlying domestic 
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sovereign CDS market. In addition, early warning indicators of financial stress should assign more 
weight to developments in the sovereign bond market in order to forecast developments in that of 
sovereign CDSs.  
Future research could be devoted to measuring the extent to which this increased intra- and 
particularly cross-country spillover between sovereign bond and CDSs eventually leads to the 
emergence of contagion phenomena between the two asset-markets. As the analysis in the present 
chapter reveals, in periods of extreme markets stress there are increased volatility linkages across the 
Eurozone. Since contagion is defined as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock 
to one country, or group of countries (see Frobes and Rigobon, 2002), future examination could focus 
on whether the strength of the linkages documented in this chapter is strong enough to result in 
contagion. 
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Table 5.1 
List of Variables and Definitions 
Variable 
BOND 
CDS 
BOND FACTOR 
 
 
CDS FACTOR 
 
PCREAL 
 
 
 
 
 
PCMONETARY 
 
Frequency 
Daily 
Daily 
Daily 
 
 
Daily 
 
Monthly 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
Source 
Datastream 
Markit 
Bloomberg 
 
 
Eurostat 
 
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurostat 
Datastream 
Definition 
The yield on the 5-year on-the-run sovereign bond.  
Τhe change in the spread on the 5-year CDS contract.  
The common factor from the principal factor analysis of the 11 countries' yields on the 5-year on-
the-run sovereign bonds. 
The common factor from the principal factor analysis of the 11 countries' spreads on the 5-year 
on-the-run sovereign CDS contracts. 
The principal component that proxies for real economic convergence and is formed of the 
following variables: 
Output: The rolling correlations in annual growth rates of seasonally adjusted industrial 
production (IP) with the average of the Euro Area. 
Trade Openness: The ratio of the country's total exports plus imports to the country's annual GDP. 
Intra-Trade: The ratio of the country' s exports to EMU plus imports from EMU to the country's 
total trade. 
The principal component that proxies for monetary policy convergence and is formed of the 
following variables: 
Nominal short-term rates: The rolling correlations in nominal short-term interest rates (1 month 
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ERX 
 
 
 
 
RRX 
 
ER/TR 
RR/TR 
EONIA 
EURORATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
Monthly 
Weekly/Monthly 
Weekly/Monthly 
Daily/Weekly/Monthly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECB 
 
 
 
 
ECB 
 
ECB 
ECB 
ECB 
Datastream  
 
 
LIBOR rates) with Euribor.  
Real short-term rates: The rolling correlations in real short-term interest rates (1 month LIBOR 
rates) with Euribor.  
Inflation: The rolling correlations between the country's seasonally adjusted harmonized index of 
consumer prices (HICP) with the average of the Euro Area. 
The change in the orthogonalized excess reserves of Euro Area credit institutions with the ECB. 
The variable is constructed as follows: Excess reserves and total reserves are normalized by a 36-
month moving average of total reserves. Then, normalized excess reserves are regressed on 
normalized total reserves. The residuals from this regression are collected to form the 
orthogonalized excess reserves.  
The change in the orthogonalized required reserves of Euro Area credit institutions with the ECB. 
The method for the calculation of this variable is the same as in the ERX variable with required 
reserves replacing excess reserves. 
The change in the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves. 
The change in the ratio of required reserves to total reserves. 
The change in the EONIA. 
The change in a set of interest rates. The method for the calculation of this variable is the one 
described in Appendix A of Chapter I (Section 3) 
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VIX 
 
UNCERTAINTY 
Daily/Weekly/Monthly 
 
Monthly 
CBOE 
 
Baker et al. 
2015 
The implied volatility of the CBOE index 
An index constructed from three types of underlying components: The first component quantifies 
information on policy-related economic uncertainty from newspaper coverage. The second 
component reflects the number of tax code provisions that are set to expire in the future years. 
The third component employs disagreement among economic forecasters as a proxy for 
measuring uncertainty. For more information, see Baker et al. 2015. 
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Table 5.2 
Total Spillover Index. Factor-augmented VAR 
GRE IRA ITA POR ESP GER FRA AUS BEL FIN NED GRE IRA ITA POR ESP GER FRA AUS BEL FIN NED Bond CDS
From 
Others
GRE 86,11 1,15 0,72 0,06 0,20 1,36 0,14 0,13 0,20 0,12 0,04 0,40 4,94 0,99 1,26 0,72 0,20 0,12 0,06 0,48 0,18 0,12 0,09 0,21 13,89
IRA 2,78 86,42 1,11 0,20 0,70 0,38 0,39 0,19 0,18 0,20 0,20 0,03 4,12 0,41 0,33 0,92 0,52 0,23 0,32 0,03 0,10 0,15 0,02 0,08 13,58
ITA 2,79 6,67 77,77 0,44 0,92 0,49 0,46 0,49 0,92 0,15 0,31 0,40 1,55 1,86 0,57 0,91 0,05 0,80 0,40 0,34 0,43 0,15 0,04 1,10 22,23
POR 2,46 11,88 3,67 58,21 0,50 0,37 0,05 0,17 0,06 0,43 0,12 0,55 4,33 0,16 13,03 0,71 0,12 0,72 0,36 0,63 0,53 0,43 0,00 0,47 41,79
ESP 2,86 6,31 28,01 1,42 45,13 0,87 1,90 0,38 1,04 0,23 0,09 0,05 3,54 0,80 0,37 5,24 0,04 0,47 0,50 0,23 0,08 0,14 0,02 0,29 54,87
GER 0,20 0,24 1,80 0,27 0,24 85,19 6,06 1,19 0,29 0,77 1,33 0,13 0,70 0,25 0,01 0,14 0,18 0,36 0,08 0,17 0,24 0,07 0,05 0,04 14,81
FRA 0,73 1,26 6,13 1,14 1,06 35,47 47,17 0,79 2,54 0,11 0,76 0,10 0,36 0,34 0,38 0,14 0,07 0,18 0,16 0,12 0,63 0,13 0,01 0,22 52,83
AUS 0,30 0,71 4,10 1,46 1,80 21,59 5,77 58,16 3,24 0,15 0,05 0,14 0,29 0,17 0,20 0,17 0,10 0,23 0,89 0,16 0,12 0,04 0,02 0,16 41,84
BEL 2,77 3,90 15,90 1,49 2,67 11,42 12,98 0,65 41,54 0,03 0,22 0,09 0,86 1,47 0,54 0,78 0,21 0,27 0,25 0,94 0,48 0,29 0,01 0,24 58,46
FIN 0,08 0,40 2,13 0,36 0,98 33,63 4,80 1,04 0,70 52,98 1,31 0,05 0,43 0,02 0,04 0,04 0,08 0,16 0,13 0,02 0,35 0,24 0,02 0,04 47,02
NED 0,24 0,69 1,90 0,30 0,36 32,86 12,78 0,24 0,86 0,34 47,09 0,04 0,63 0,11 0,09 0,05 0,31 0,22 0,34 0,05 0,27 0,16 0,02 0,06 52,91
GRE 1,03 0,07 0,47 1,19 0,19 0,17 0,32 0,22 0,17 0,02 0,09 91,99 0,54 0,50 0,19 0,22 0,08 0,36 0,21 0,14 0,09 0,04 0,04 1,66 8,01
IRA 2,26 19,49 2,48 0,19 0,81 11,40 0,27 0,34 0,85 0,90 0,29 0,56 56,33 0,94 0,25 0,49 0,19 0,51 0,02 0,26 0,56 0,19 0,03 0,39 43,67
ITA 2,53 2,99 13,04 0,46 1,58 16,07 0,18 0,79 1,36 1,04 0,21 1,15 14,56 39,03 0,18 2,07 0,07 0,99 0,06 0,91 0,39 0,19 0,09 0,06 60,97
POR 2,82 8,11 3,12 1,23 0,93 8,00 0,22 0,18 0,49 0,94 0,33 1,34 27,09 5,82 36,60 1,53 0,12 0,16 0,24 0,34 0,27 0,09 0,00 0,03 63,40
ESP 3,23 4,09 8,61 0,61 3,44 13,77 0,54 0,30 1,01 0,98 0,27 1,60 19,08 21,40 0,87 17,70 0,05 0,94 0,09 0,74 0,35 0,06 0,05 0,21 82,30
GER 1,61 1,04 3,14 0,48 0,33 11,29 0,94 0,19 2,38 0,54 0,13 0,50 11,60 12,89 0,52 2,48 45,51 0,13 1,35 0,70 1,27 0,71 0,02 0,27 54,49
FRA 3,89 1,79 4,17 2,11 0,60 12,11 1,25 0,53 3,46 0,51 0,20 2,16 13,57 18,03 0,94 2,16 8,37 21,84 0,41 0,99 0,40 0,43 0,02 0,05 78,16
AUS 0,62 1,48 2,33 1,45 0,13 10,45 0,58 0,32 2,79 0,66 0,18 0,55 10,94 11,00 0,90 1,93 11,73 1,52 38,05 0,87 1,10 0,32 0,03 0,07 61,95
BEL 2,41 2,05 6,19 1,84 0,95 13,92 1,20 0,31 8,23 0,45 0,38 0,98 16,50 12,43 1,17 2,66 2,29 1,85 1,21 21,46 1,05 0,40 0,02 0,06 78,54
FIN 1,73 0,96 2,22 0,73 0,19 10,12 0,73 1,02 2,05 0,56 0,20 0,85 9,70 9,70 0,41 0,86 11,55 1,55 3,95 0,88 39,33 0,60 0,02 0,08 60,67
NED 0,53 1,52 2,42 1,24 0,44 10,12 0,38 0,27 3,62 0,43 0,20 0,59 11,42 12,22 0,59 1,03 10,47 1,51 3,72 3,22 2,06 31,90 0,01 0,09 68,10
Bond 3,62 8,12 22,86 1,59 45,91 1,47 2,92 0,18 1,01 0,04 0,01 0,01 4,38 0,59 0,11 5,86 0,00 0,38 0,06 0,07 0,12 0,06 0,49 0,13 99,51
CDS 1,47 0,50 2,20 0,34 0,79 8,39 0,42 0,01 1,97 0,15 0,10 0,41 11,59 14,96 0,23 2,01 9,29 2,76 0,48 0,20 2,37 0,06 37,50 1,78 98,22
To Others 42,97 85,41 138,70 20,58 65,71 265,72 55,25 9,91 39,44 9,74 7,01 12,66 172,73 127,07 23,20 33,12 56,11 16,41 15,30 12,50 13,40 5,08 38,15 6,01 1272,22
To Others 
(+ own)
129,08 171,83 216,47 78,79 110,84 350,91 102,42 68,07 80,98 62,72 54,10 104,66 229,06 166,10 59,80 50,82 101,62 38,25 53,35 33,96 52,73 36,98 38,65 7,79 53%
From Others 13,89 13,58 22,23 41,79 54,87 14,81 52,83 41,84 58,46 47,02 52,91 8,01 43,67 60,97 63,40 82,30 54,49 78,16 61,95 78,54 60,67 68,10 99,51 98,22
Net Spillover 29,08 71,83 116,47 -21,21 10,84 250,91 2,42 -31,93 -19,02 -37,28 -45,90 4,66 129,06 66,10 -40,20 -49,18 1,62 -61,75 -46,65 -66,04 -47,27 -63,02 -61,72 -92,21
F
a
c
t
o
r
BOND CDS Factor
B
O
N
D
C
D
S
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Table 5.3 
Total Spillover Index. VAR 
 
GRE IRA ITA POR ESP GER FRA AUS BEL FIN NED GRE IRA ITA POR ESP GER FRA AUS BEL FIN NED
From 
Others
GRE 98,32 0,06 0,20 0,01 0,09 0,27 0,01 0,04 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,07 0,28 0,04 0,23 0,05 0,05 0,03 0,09 0,07 0,03 0,01 1,68
IRA 0,20 89,43 1,44 0,21 0,27 0,26 0,34 0,21 0,19 0,20 0,20 0,02 4,93 0,34 0,20 0,60 0,28 0,06 0,26 0,10 0,18 0,09 10,57
ITA 0,22 7,31 83,92 1,20 0,25 0,28 0,27 0,40 0,36 0,06 0,25 0,15 1,65 0,50 0,53 0,71 0,01 0,16 0,17 0,33 0,43 0,86 16,08
POR 0,67 11,73 4,12 62,47 0,29 0,20 0,02 0,15 0,23 0,34 0,15 0,56 4,35 0,31 12,45 0,28 0,05 0,29 0,28 0,45 0,41 0,21 37,53
ESP 0,29 6,72 38,90 2,15 43,61 0,39 0,30 0,28 0,17 0,14 0,06 0,00 2,46 0,11 0,29 2,67 0,08 0,16 0,17 0,25 0,11 0,69 56,39
GER 0,26 0,30 0,35 0,32 0,33 87,11 5,58 1,13 0,24 0,69 1,32 0,12 0,89 0,17 0,03 0,04 0,10 0,33 0,07 0,15 0,17 0,32 12,89
FRA 0,08 1,18 5,10 1,11 0,46 36,25 50,05 0,87 2,07 0,10 0,58 0,10 0,25 0,15 0,29 0,21 0,25 0,22 0,15 0,04 0,46 0,03 49,95
AUS 0,15 0,59 3,33 1,24 0,91 24,33 7,40 56,93 2,74 0,10 0,04 0,13 0,16 0,04 0,14 0,11 0,22 0,31 0,85 0,12 0,11 0,02 43,07
BEL 0,25 4,31 14,01 1,41 1,37 13,32 16,61 0,91 42,98 0,02 0,14 0,08 0,66 0,61 0,37 0,41 0,47 0,28 0,20 1,08 0,38 0,15 57,02
FIN 0,11 0,23 0,70 0,34 0,34 37,56 5,13 0,99 0,72 51,13 1,45 0,05 0,52 0,02 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,11 0,03 0,28 0,05 48,87
NED 0,16 0,55 0,89 0,36 0,15 35,51 12,72 0,31 0,78 0,45 46,16 0,04 0,58 0,17 0,08 0,01 0,24 0,24 0,26 0,04 0,23 0,08 53,84
GRE 0,19 0,04 0,55 0,94 0,15 0,09 0,22 0,17 0,08 0,01 0,07 95,52 0,46 0,37 0,19 0,24 0,07 0,23 0,23 0,14 0,05 0,00 4,48
IRA 0,18 18,10 1,65 0,28 0,20 7,79 0,11 0,17 1,27 0,73 0,33 0,63 66,36 0,41 0,09 0,43 0,04 0,31 0,02 0,34 0,53 0,02 33,64
ITA 0,08 2,90 8,16 0,03 0,36 8,14 0,25 0,36 2,26 0,45 0,19 0,85 24,65 48,51 0,20 1,06 0,04 0,49 0,05 0,74 0,15 0,09 51,49
POR 0,74 7,15 3,22 1,46 0,30 5,07 0,19 0,22 0,92 0,82 0,48 1,17 30,95 4,42 40,69 1,01 0,25 0,25 0,06 0,32 0,19 0,13 59,31
ESP 0,14 3,64 6,02 0,16 0,92 6,24 0,56 0,11 1,51 0,44 0,17 1,17 28,80 31,65 0,25 16,91 0,07 0,30 0,04 0,58 0,16 0,16 83,09
GER 0,23 1,24 1,93 0,15 0,13 7,44 1,00 0,26 2,83 0,40 0,17 0,47 16,49 12,98 0,48 1,38 49,40 0,20 1,30 0,47 0,98 0,05 50,60
FRA 0,33 2,08 3,29 0,28 0,64 7,97 1,59 0,55 3,56 0,35 0,29 1,58 19,12 19,46 0,87 1,51 10,14 24,88 0,44 0,70 0,27 0,07 75,12
AUS 0,12 1,40 1,69 0,35 0,09 8,12 0,84 0,39 3,32 0,56 0,20 0,60 14,65 9,80 0,61 1,07 12,98 2,26 39,29 0,71 0,96 0,00 60,71
BEL 0,56 2,25 4,82 0,54 0,44 9,74 1,74 0,35 8,85 0,27 0,46 1,02 22,88 12,43 0,95 1,61 3,80 2,54 1,34 22,53 0,86 0,01 77,47
FIN 0,27 1,32 2,16 0,19 0,19 7,97 0,65 0,95 2,55 0,44 0,18 0,78 13,23 9,17 0,69 0,36 13,33 1,68 4,02 0,75 39,03 0,07 60,97
NED 0,08 0,51 1,23 0,15 0,61 2,48 0,59 0,18 1,76 0,07 0,26 0,27 7,60 7,14 0,79 1,20 5,40 0,86 1,36 1,16 0,78 65,52 34,48
To Others 5,29 73,61 103,76 12,87 8,49 219,40 56,12 8,99 36,40 6,65 7,01 9,85 195,58 110,27 19,77 15,05 47,93 11,29 11,48 8,60 7,72 3,10 979,24
To Others
(+ own)
103,62 163,04 187,68 75,35 52,11 306,51 106,18 65,93 79,38 57,78 53,17 105,37 261,94 158,78 60,45 31,96 97,33 36,18 50,77 31,12 46,75 68,62 44.5%
From Others 1,68 10,57 16,08 37,53 56,39 12,89 49,95 43,07 57,02 48,87 53,84 4,48 33,64 51,49 59,31 83,09 50,60 75,12 60,71 77,47 60,97 34,48
Net Spillover 3,62 63,04 87,68 -24,65 -47,89 206,51 6,18 -34,07 -20,62 -42,22 -46,83 5,37 161,94 58,78 -39,55 -68,04 -2,67 -63,82 -49,23 -68,88 -53,25 -31,38
BOND CDS
B
O
N
D
C
D
S
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Table 5.4 
Granger Causality Tests 
Table 5.4 presents ݔଶ statistics of pair-wise Granger causality tests between macroeconomic and monetary variables and country-specific conditional correlations endogenous. Null hypothesis is that row variable 
does not Granger cause column variable. The ordering of the VAR endogenous variables is PCREAL, PCMONETARY, ERX, RRX, EONIA, each of the country-specific conditional correlations. PCREAL is The 
principal component that proxies for real economic convergence. PCMONETARY is the principal component that proxies for monetary policy convergence. ERX The change in the orthogonalized excess reserves 
of Euro Area credit institutions with the ECB. RRX The change in the orthogonalized required reserves of Euro Area credit institutions with the ECB. EONIA is the change in EONIA. AT, BE, DE, EL, ES, IE, FI, 
FR, IT, NL, PT are the country-specific conditional correlations. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain for the period 
between August 2007 and June 2014. *, **, ***, denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. EMU South. 
 
Variables   ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௧ିଵ ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௧ܻିଵ ܧܴܺ ܴܴܺ ܧܱܰܫܣ EL IE IT PT ES 
ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௧ିଵ  25.325*** 32.785*** 10.445** 7.043* 21.361*** 
ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௧ܻିଵ  17.98*** 41.230*** 47.124*** 17.247*** 50.621*** 
ܧܴܺ  19.215*** 30.335*** 18.40*** 26.657*** 16.150*** 
ܴܴܺ  29.40*** 19.005*** 22.782** 23.058*** 28.377*** 
ܧܱܰܫܣ  41.562*** 17.685*** 11.020** 12.002** 23.052*** 
EL 2.325 3.156 1.874 2.112 1.032      
IE 7.047 3.780 7.054 1.034 1.178      
IT 8.654 1.985 5.243 3.204 2.023      
PT 5.587 4.007 1.003 3.247 1.20      
ES 9.658* 6.520 4.652 2.764 2.372      
Country Abbreviations:  
EL: Greece    IE: Ireland    IT: Italy    PT: Portugal    ES: Spain   
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Panel B. EMU North. 
 
Variables    ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௧ିଵ ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௧ܻିଵ ܧܴܺ ܴܴܺ ܧܱܰܫܣ            AT         BE    FI    FR    DE    NL 
ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௧ିଵ  24.285*** 31.002*** 17.124*** 16.453*** 27.751*** 32.24*** 
ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௧ܻିଵ  9.232** 47.650*** 15.021*** 18.377*** 29.021*** 25.047*** 
ܧܴܺ  20.821*** 12.104** 20.504*** 27.880*** 18.354*** 26.388*** 
ܴܴܺ  39.014*** 50.642*** 44.780*** 36.873*** 34.485*** 48.036*** 
ܧܱܰܫܣ  41.782*** 29.601*** 32.219*** 47.276*** 23.804*** 10.507** 
AT 1.057 3.210 1.980 3.212 1.989       
BE 5.641 3.804 1.214 4.560 2.055       
FI 4.870 2.732 2.017 2.990 3.821       
FR 3.170 5.132 3.548 2.327 1.505       
DE 8.524* 7.040 4.084 2.809 2.463       
NL 6.021 4.006 3.001 4.017 1.952       
Country Abbreviations:  
AT: Austria    BE: Belgium   FI: Finland    FR: France    DE: Germany    NL: The Netherlands    PT: Portugal    ES: Spain   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
253 
 
Table 5.5 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
Table 5.5 presents country-specific results from the seemingly unrelated regressions (equation (5.26)) for sovereign bond returns and sovereign CDS spreads. ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௧ିଵis the previous period's principal 
component that proxies for real economic convergence,ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௧ܻିଵ is the previous period's principal component that proxies for monetary policy convergence, ERX is the measure of orthogonalized excess 
reserves, RRX is the measure of orthogonalized required reserves, ER/TR is the ratio of excess reserves to total reserves, RR/TR is the ratio of required reserves to total reserves, EONIA is the Eonia, EURORATE 
is a set of Euro Area interest rates, ߩ஻஼஽ௌ௧ିଵߩ஻஼஽ௌ௧ିଶ are the lagged conditional correlations at time ݐ െ 1 and ݐ െ 2 respectively, VIX is the implied volatility for the CBOE index, UNCERTAINTY is the 
economic uncertainty index, POST-2008 is a dummy variable equal to one for all observations after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers (i.e., September 15 2008), POST-BAN is a dummy variable equal to one 
for all observations after the onset of the implementation of the short-sales ban (i.e., November 1 2012). *, **, ***, denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Variables            AT BE FI FR DE EL IE IT NL PT ES 
ܲܥܴܧܣܮ௧ିଵ 0.1057* 0.1740** 0.0890** 0.0561** 0.0785** 0.0285** 0.2105* 0.0955* 0.0453 0.0751** 0.2344** 
ܲܥܯܱܰܧܶܣܴ ௧ܻିଵ 0.0098 0.0784* 0.0746*** 0.0120* 0.0243*** 0.0568* 0.0976*** 0.0875 0.0024** 0.0746*** 0.1461* 
ܧܥܤ        
ܧܴܺ 0.0895* 0.0156** 0.0832* 0.1022*** 0.0481** 0.1231* 0.0835** 0.0254*** 0.0715** 0.0242*** 0.0473* 
ܴܴܺ 0.0791* 0.0155** 0.0811* 0.0991** 0.0450** 0.1242* 0.0851** 0.0261*** 0.0707* 0.0250*** 0.0477* 
ܧܴ/ܴܶ 0.0091** 0.0112** 0.0772** 0.1054* 0.0431** 0.0891* 0.1785* 0.1824** 0.2104* 0.0872** 0.0921* 
ܴܴ/ܴܶ 0.0094* 0.0223** 0.0845* 0.1144** 0.0532** 0.0952* 0.1891** 0.1788*** 0.2067** 0.0884*** 0.0933* 
ܧܱܰܫܣ 0.0852** 0.1250** 0.0955** 0.0715* 0.0122* 0.0857*** 0.0786*** 0.0877** 0.0454** 0.1045** 0.9500** 
ܧܷܴܱܴܣܶܧ 0.0844** 0.1224** 0.0921** 0.0723* 0.0135* 0.0851*** 0.0754*** 0.0862** 0.0446*** 0.1001*** 0.9431*** 
ߩ஻஼஽ௌ௧ିଵ -0.8544** 0.5840*** -0.5964*** 1.1012*** 0.7955* -0.2475 0.5774* 3.1400 0.7855** 0.8100** 1.2440*** 
ߩ஻஼஽ௌ௧ିଶ 0.4613*** 0.3431 0.1300* 0.7121* 0.2355 0.7644 0.4210* -0.9764 -0.1520*** 0.4201*** -0.3424*** 
ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ        
ܸܫܺ 0.2535* 0.4722 0.0851*** 0.5411 -0.1220* 0.4768*** 0.0985*** -0.3541 0.0780* 0.2145* 0.0845** 
ܷܰܥܧܴܶܣܫܻܰܶ 0.1020 0.3407 0.1123** 0.7102 0.0254*** 0.5071*** -0.2030** -0.2170 0.1030* 0.3402*** 0.0151*** 
ܱܲܵܶ-2008 0.0942*** -0.0855*** 0.0078*** 0.08641*** 0.0985*** 0.1425*** -0.0124*** 0.2104*** 0.0057*** -0.0942*** 0.0727*** 
ܱܲܵܶ-ܤܣܰ 0.0510 0.1820** -0.4521** 0.8241 -0.7412 0.0230*** 0.8510 0.9742 0.1155* 0.1210* 0.1354 
R-squared 0.5235 0.4754 0.5932 0.6108 0.4921 0.5082 0.4192 0.6215 0.5503 0.5795 0.4533 
RMSE 0.0124 0.0952 0.0716 0.0108 0.0624 0.0481 0.1182 0.0098 0.0847 0.0521 0.1055 
Country Abbreviations:  AT: Austria    BE: Belgium   FI: Finland    FR: France    DE: Germany    EL: Greece    IE: Ireland    IT: Italy    NL: The Netherlands    PT: Portugal    ES: Spain   
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Figure 5.1 
Daily Time-Series of Government Bond Yields and Government CDS Spreads 
 
This Figure presents the daily time-series of government bond yields and government CDS spreads for the EMU Periphery (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain), and for the EMU Core 
(i.e., Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands) between August 6 2007 and June 20 2014. Bond yields and CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. The CDS spreads for 
Greece scaled down by 10 to enhance comparability between the countries. Bond yields are from Thomson Reuters Datastream, and CDS spreads are from Markit. 
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Figure 5.2 
Daily Time-Series of Bond Factors and CDS Factors 
 
This Figure presents the daily time-series of the scores from the factors analysis for the sovereign bond yields and for the CDS spreads for of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain between August 6 2007 and June 20 2014. The scores from the factor analysis for the sovereign bond yields and the CDS spreads are 
computed by employing factors 1, 2, and 3. 
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Figure 5.3 
Bond-CDS Net Spillovers 
 
This Figure presents the daily time-series of the net spillover between country-specific sovereign bonds and SCDSs, for Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, between August 6 2007 and June 20 2014. The net bond-
CDS spillover for each country is defined as the spillover of that country's bond to the same country's CDS minus the spillover of that country's 
CDS to the same country's bond. 
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Figure 5.4 
Net Spillover Between the EMU Periphery and the EMU Core 
 
 
 
Graph I. Intra-asset Net Spillover Between the EMU Periphery and the EMU Core 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph II. Cross-asset Net Spillover Between the EMU Periphery and the EMU Core 
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Figure 5.5 
Bond-CDS Conditional Correlations and CDS-Bond Basis 
 
This Figure presents the daily time-series of country-specific conditional correlations between sovereign bonds and SCDSs, against the country-specific daily-time series of the CDS-bond basis, for Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, between August 6 2007 and June 20 2014. Bond-CDS conditional correlation is multiplied by 100 and therefore, is 
bounded in the range [-100, 100], and the CDS-bond basis is expressed in basis points. The CDS-bond basis for Greece is scaled down by 10 from 14/06/2011 to 07/06/2013 to enhance comparability with the 
Greece bond-CDS conditional correlation. 
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Appendix 5.A 
More information about the calculation of the CDS-bond basis 
For the purpose of this study, the CDS-bond basis (the basis) is defined as the difference between the 
CDS premium and the maturity matched par asset swap spread, i.e., the difference between the bond 
yield and the risk-free rate. Therefore, the CDS-bond basis for country ݅ at time ݐ is calculated as:  
ܤܽݏ݅ݏ௜௧ ൌ ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧ െ ሺܤ݋݊݀௜௧ െ ܧ݋݊݅ܽܵݓܽ݌௧ሻ                                                                    (5.27)	
 where, ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧ and ܤ݋݊݀௜௧ are the CDS spread and bond yield respectively of country ݅ at 
time ݐ, and ܧ݋݊݅ܽܵݓܽ݌௧ is the Eonia swap index at time ݐ, which is the measure of risk-free rate 
(other measures of risk-free rate can include LIBOR, or in the case of the US the overnight indexed 
swap (OIS) spread).  
Essentially, the CDS premium covers the risky component of the bond, i.e., the excess of the 
bond yield over the risk-free rate. The no-arbitrage condition forces the basis to be zero, since any 
value different than zero represents an arbitrage opportunity (assuming no transactions costs). In the 
case of a positive (negative) basis, an investor can buy (short) the bond and sell (buy) CDS protection. 
In practice however, the no-arbitrage condition is violated, resulting in the basis being either positive 
or negative.  
This is partly attributed to the changes in the mechanics of CDS contracts. In particular, since 
2009 CDSs trade with a fixed coupon and an upfront payment. For distressed bonds with a low fixed 
coupon, a significant component of the protection costs' is paid in advance. Therefore, if the bond's 
price is added to the cost of the upfront payment for the CDS contract the no-arbitrage strategy costs 
more than par. In the event of an immediate default this translates into a loss for the investor. Only if 
the default occurs in some fixed horizon, the investor is able to receive the higher bond coupons and 
thus, compensate for the potential default of the entity. This feature may consequently account for a 
non-zero basis since the arbitrage opportunities are difficult to be eliminated. 
Most importantly, European sovereign bonds are denominated in Euros, while the standard 
CDS contracts on these bonds are denominated in US Dollars. Hence, a standard no-arbitrage strategy 
further depends on the Euro/US Dollar exchange rate. In particular, the portion of the bond that is not 
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redeemed and, therefore is paid by the CDS contract, is converted into Euros. However, besides the 
daily changes in the Euro/US Dollar exchange rate, a Eurozone sovereign's default is expected to 
impact on the exchange rate, possibly forcing the Euro to depreciate against the US Dollar. This in 
turn is translated into a profit for the Euro-based hedger or arbitrager, while it also presents an 
opportunity for speculation on a Eurozone sovereign's default. To prevent such speculation the US 
Dollar-denominated CDS spread should incorporate the future exchange rate at the time of the 
sovereign's default. Therefore, during periods of extreme market stress where a default is more likely 
to occur, the spread on the US Dollar-denominated CDS contract is higher than the spread on its 
Euro-denominated counterpart.  
An additional method for calculating the CDS-bond basis is though the “par-equivalent CDS 
spread” methodology of JPMorgan. The par-equivalent CDS spread is the spread of a par bond that 
has the same implied default probability as that implied by the CDS contract on the traded bond. 
Then, the CDS-bond basis is simply the difference between the CDS premium and the par-equivalent 
CDS spread. However, for most investment grade bonds, the values for CDS-bond basis calculated by 
the two methods differ by only a few basis points. Since, the analysis in this chapter focuses on the 
value, but most importantly on the direction of the CDS-bond basis with regards to the level of 
correlation between sovereign bonds and CDSs in each country, either of the two methods is credible.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this Section I provide an outline of the Thesis. In particular, I summarize the general findings of the 
Thesis as well as the main findings of each individual empirical chapter and the implications that 
these findings carry. I additionally discuss the limitations of my empirical analysis which concern the 
examination of sovereign bond and CDS liquidity. Finally, within the context of the financial asset 
interaction, I point attention to an issue that arises from the analysis of volatility and integration and 
that can constitute the subject of future academic research. 
 
6.1. Findings of the Thesis 
In the present Thesis I examined the price, liquidity, and volatility interaction between different 
financial asset-markets. Considering the transition to an era of non-standard monetary policy 
measures as a response of policy makers to the financial and the Eurozone crises, I further evaluated 
the success of central banks in affecting this interaction and financial asset-markets in general. My 
analysis provided new information about the nature and the characteristics of financial markets and 
was mainly developed along two fronts: the one concerns the link between the sovereign bond and 
sovereign CDS markets and the other referred to the differences in terms of financial market 
behaviour between the two EMU blocs, i.e., the EMU North and the EMU South. 
On the first front, I provided evidence of the existence of significant differences between the 
sovereign bond and SCDS markets, regarding their liquidity and volatility interaction. My results 
revealed that the sovereign bonds constitute the main transmitters of information, and therefore of 
liquidity and volatility, to the market of sovereign CDS contracts. In addition, through my empirical 
analysis I showed that the two Eurozone blocs, i.e., the North and the South, do not only differ in 
structural aspects or in terms of macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals, but also with regards to the 
features and behaviour of their sovereign financial markets. In specific, I found that in the EMU South 
a) the sovereign bond markets are the sole transmitters of liquidity to the sovereign CDS markets and 
b) that the CDS-bond basis is persistently negative and inversely related to the level of bond-CDS 
integration. On the contrary, within the Northern EMU bloc, the sovereign CDS market also appears 
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to transmit - although to a lesser extent - liquidity to the sovereign bond market, while the CDS-bond 
basis assumes positive values and is positively associated with the level of bond-CDS integration. 
My empirical analysis suggests that sovereign bond yields provide indications of sovereign 
credit risk that reflect different economic fundamentals and market conditions relative to the CDS 
contracts written on them. This pattern is more evident in countries under significant fiscal stress, 
such as those of the European South, since the transmission of information appears to be directed 
solely from the sovereign bonds to CDSs and not the reverse. In addition, when their performance as 
market indicators is considered, sovereign bonds appear to adjust more rapidly to new information, 
particularly during periods of heightened market activity. Therefore, I argue that sovereign CDS 
spreads cannot constitute an efficient hedge to offset sovereign credit risk, therefore hampering the 
diversification of funds and posing a threat to financial stability. My results about the persistently 
negative (positive) in the EMU South (North) CDS-bond basis further point to the fact that sovereign 
CDS spreads cannot entirely replicate the cash flows on the underlying obligations, thereby giving 
rise to arbitrage opportunities. I further showed that these opportunities are in turn associated with the 
level of integration between the sovereign bond and CDS markets in each country. From the 
perspective of policy implementation, my analysis supports the recent EU's decision on prohibiting 
the purchase of naked CDS contracts: I found that greater sovereign CDS illiquidity positively affects 
sovereign bond liquidity in most EMU countries, thereby indicating that the sovereign CDS market 
might be the means for the launch of speculative attacks against the sovereign bond markets of the 
EMU South. 
My results further carry significant implications for the identification and monitoring of 
systemic risk in financial markets as well as for the current global and EU regulatory frameworks. As 
a general rule the sovereign-related exposures should be treated with reference to the sovereign bond 
market rather than that of CDSs except for the cases where the latter are employed as collateral. In 
specific, a) low or zero capital requirements on certain sovereign exposures should be redefined, since 
even risk-free sovereigns such as Germany are susceptible to negative spillovers from large but high-
debt economies such as Italy and Spain, which consequently emerge as primary determinants of the 
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EMU-wide financial stability, b) low capital requirements for government bond collateralised 
exposures due to lower haircuts for high-rated sovereigns should be readjusted upwards when this 
collateral include CDS contracts written on those bonds, due to the less than perfect hedging capacity 
of CDSs at least in countries under fiscal stress. Along the same lines, the construction of broader and 
more forward-looking systemic risk indicators should assign more weight to sovereign bonds. 
I additionally show that the existence of differences in the timing and quantity of the reflected 
information is not a feature of cross-asset interaction only at the sovereign level. At the corporate 
level, my examination of the information transmission between the stock, bond and CDS market 
indices supports the ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of co-movement according to 
which index co-movement is delinked from the underlying fundamentals.133 I show that the stock 
index in both Europe and the US is the asset where information is reflected first before being 
transmitted to the corporate bond and CDS indices. This lead of the stock market is particularly 
relevant in the context of passively managed mutual funds and exchange-traded funds: on the one 
hand, it highlights the importance of monitoring the stock index for predicting movements in the bond 
and CDS indices, while on the other hand, the lag in the information transmission between the market 
indices reduces the efficiency of price information and consequently the benefits of diversification 
across the stock, bond and CDS markets. 
On the monetary policy front, my analysis suggests that the expansion of the central bank's 
balance sheet through the supply of bank reserves constitutes an effective tool for affecting financial 
markets during exceptional monetary conditions. These conditions refer to periods where the interest 
rate is at the zero or even negative level and thus the central bank is deprived of its principal monetary 
policy tool. It further confirms the transition in central bank practice from an interest rate policy to 
that of quantitative easing (QE). By providing evidence that the financial market movements induced 
by QE are of a greater magnitude and duration in the US rather than in Europe and also post- rather 
than pre-crisis: a) I draw attention to the fact that central bank-conducted asset purchases are more 
effective in lowering asset returns when the markets are not functioning normally, a fact that 
                                                            
133 The ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ theories of co-movement are presented in Section 2.2. 
270 
 
empirically verifies the ‘‘portfolio balance’’ channel of monetary policy transmission and further 
confirms the models of market segmentation and the theories of preferred habitat, b) I lend support to 
the adoption of non-standard measures by the Federal Reserve following the 2007-2008 credit 
crunch.134 The effectiveness of the Fed-adopted measures and their consistency with the escalation of 
the US crisis additionally serves as a guide for the ECB, since during the onset and the main stage of 
the Eurozone crisis its monetary policy was primarily exercised by means of interest rate setting. 
 
6.2. Limitations 
One of the issues that have been at the core of this Thesis' empirical analysis was that of cross-asset 
liquidity, acknowledging the fact that liquidity constitutes one of the main channels for the interaction 
between financial assets. In this respect, Chapter II (Section 4) examined the liquidity interaction 
between the sovereign bond and CDS markets. The primary measure of liquidity employed in the 
examination was the bid-ask spread, i.e., the difference between the ask price and the bid price. This 
measure was used to measure liquidity in the sovereign CDS market and was also employed to 
construct the effective bid-ask spread which was the preferred liquidity measure for the sovereign 
bond market. However, other liquidity measures have been employed in the literature to study aspects 
of intra- or cross-asset liquidity.  
These measures which were initially constructed to measure the liquidity of individual stocks 
include the Amihud measure of illiquidity, a price impact measure that captures the ‘‘daily price 
response associated with one dollar of trading volume’’ (see Amihud, 2002), the Roll estimator, an 
estimator of the effective spread based on the serial covariance of the change in price (see Roll, 1984), 
the LOT measure, an estimator of the effective spread based on the assumption of informed trading on 
non-zero-return days and the absence of informed trading on zero-return days (see Lesmond et al., 
1999), the transaction price impact measured as the price response to signed order flow (see Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam, 1996), the probability of information-based trading, a measure estimated from 
                                                            
134 An analysis of the ‘‘portfolio balance’’ channel of monetary policy transmission along with a discussion of 
the models of market segmentation and the theories of preferred habitat is provided in Section 2.6.2. 
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intra-daily transaction data (see Easley et al., 2002), and the Gibbs measure, a Gibbs sampler 
estimation of the Roll model using prices from all days (see Hasbrouck, 2004). 
To construct the above liquidity measures certain information is needed, such as trading 
volume, intra-day transaction prices, order flow, and buy/sell indicators for last trades. Due to its 
nature, this information was not accessible from the available databases on sovereign bonds and CDSs 
at the time of the writing. For that reason, the examination of sovereign bond and CDS liquidity in 
Chapter II was conducted by employing the bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, despite the popularity of the 
bid-ask spread, the consideration of additional liquidity measures would enhance the empirical 
analysis.135 These measures could be used either to confirm the robustness of the empirical findings or 
to enable a comparison between the predicted abilities of different liquidity measures. 
 
6.3. Future Research 
My examination in the previous empirical chapters focused on the most important forms of the 
interaction and comovement between financial asset-markets. These forms refer to the comovement 
and interaction with regards to their price, liquidity and volatility. The latter two forms, i.e., liquidity 
and volatility, additionally constitute the primary channels through which asset-markets are 
connected. However, the prices of different assets frequently follow the same path due to contagion. 
Financial market contagion is closely related to the issue of volatility analyzed in Chapter III (Section 
5). According to the findings of Chapter III, as well as to theoretical propositions (see Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002; Andersen et al., 2003 Aït-Sahalia et al., 2009; Aït-Sahalia and Xiu, 2016), volatility is 
a strong driver of cross-asset correlation.136 In specific, increased volatility linkages cause an increase 
in conditional correlations. This increase in conditional correlations might in turn result in the 
emergence of contagion phenomena, since contagion is defined as a significant increase in cross-
market linkages after a shock to one country, or group of countries (Forbes and  Rigobon (2002).  
                                                            
135 I am grateful to the one of the examiners for this suggestion. 
136 The theoretical link between asset volatility and correlation is analyzed in Section 2.5. 
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Therefore, the overall examination of cross-asset interaction in this Thesis, as well as that of 
cross-asset volatility linkages in Chapter III, could be extended towards this direction: to assess 
whether the financial and/or fiscal shocks during the recent European sovereign debt crisis have 
resulted in the transmission of contagion between the European sovereign bond and CDS markets. 
The issue of contagion is particular relevant, since contagion is a phenomenon in times of crisis. In 
addition, recent evidence from the EMU suggests that the diffusion of a fiscal shock may be different 
across the Eurozone (see Claeys and Vašíček, 2014; Broto and Pérez-Quirós, 2015). Countries with 
higher debt/deficits such as those of the EMU South are found to be immediately and negatively 
affected, whereas the direct impact on the EMU North is significantly less pronounced. In this respect, 
the analysis of sovereign bond-CDS contagion, could be further complemented with the examination 
of whether contagion is transmitted synchronously across different EMU member states. 
Following the correlation concept of contagion - in the sense of  Forbes and Rigobon (2002) - 
I can extend the empirical analysis in order to focus on whether changes in the conditional correlation 
between sovereign bond and CDSs after a negative shock, are of a significant size in order to justify 
the presence of contagion. In contrast to the traditional correlation analysis a measure of local 
Gaussian correlation could be instead be employed, e.g., the one introduced by Tjøstheim and 
Hufthammer (2013).137 This has a number of advantages relative to the traditional correlation analysis, 
since local Gaussian correlation does not suffer from the heteroscedasticity bias problem (Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002). In addition, since linkages are not equally strong between all asset-markets (see 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000) the effect that large fiscal shocks have on European markets could be 
different from the effect that is due to smaller shocks (asymmetric response). In this spirit, the local 
Gaussian correlation is able to detect more complex, nonlinear changes in the dependence structure, 
therefore providing a measure of both average and upper-lower tail dependence. This allows for a 
better understanding of asset interconnectedness in different segments of the distribution or under 
extreme market conditions (booming or crashing). Consequently, the implementation of a bootstrap 
                                                            
137 Studies following the traditional correlation approach include, inter alia, those of King and Wadhwani 
(1990), Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Calvo and Mendoza (2000). 
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procedure (see Stove et al., 2014) would enable the comparison of local correlations before and after 
different break points/periods, thereby providing information on the presence - or not - of 
contagion.138 
Hence, through the examination of contagion within the context of sovereign financial 
markets I can further extend my analysis of the primary forms of financial market interaction 
conducted in the present Thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
138  Exogenous break points could include the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, or Greece's 
upward budget deficit revision in October 2009.  
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